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INTRODUCTION 
 
This doctoral dissertation is about situational crime prevention in the international supply 
chain. This area of research has been selected based upon the observation that, especially 
since 9/11, operators in the industry have increasingly been confronted with programs to 
secure (international) supply chains against acts of unlawful interference. Some of these 
programs are mandatory, other are industry driven. The majority of them are quite 
prescriptive and detailed, and most of them contain the requirement to implement a range 
of very specific situational measures. When implementing these measures, end-users state 
to face a number of (unexpected) costs and implementation problems, which may impact 
the overall success of the initiative. The latter observation led us to look into this subject 
in more detail, and finally make it a topic for a doctoral research.  
 
This introduction consequently covers the problem setting as described above, the central 
hypothesis and research questions that have been set forth at the start of the process, the 
methodology applied to answers these questions, and the structure of the manuscript. 
Regarding the latter it needs mentioning that this doctoral dissertation is a consolidation of 
three research papers that have individually been submitted for publication to three 
different international peer reviewed journals. These papers form the main body of the 
text, and have been inserted without any changes to their structure or content. Each paper 
is preceded by a brief introduction covering the bibliographical details and main 
arguments. The first two papers have already been published (respectively in 2009 and in 
2011), and the third paper has been accepted for publication in the European Journal on 
Criminal Policy and Research. 
 
1. Problem setting 
 
1.1. Government and industry initiatives to secure international supply chains1  
 
In response to the disastrous events of 11 September 2001
2
, federal and state governments 
globally have introduced and strengthened a range of programs designed to protect the 
                                                 
1
 This section mainly focuses on programs that have been established in Europe, as these have been analysed 
as part of the research.   
public in general, and the supply chain in particular, against acts of unlawful interference. 
With the Aviation and Transportation Security Act
3
, the Customs Trade Partnership 
against Terrorism
4 
and the Container Security Initiative
5
, the US Government set the scene 
for the introduction of a range of trans-border security initiatives. The European Union 
was soon to follow with the enforcement of a series of requirements covering all modes of 
transport. In order to combat terrorism, the European Union Heads of State called for „the 
strengthening of all forms of transport systems, including the enhancement of the legal 
framework and the improvement of preventive mechanisms‟.6  A full implementation of 
measures to combat terrorism was declared to be „a matter of urgency‟. 
 
In December 2002 the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code was 
adopted as an amendment to the SOLAS Convention, describing minimum requirements 
for security of ships and ports. In 2004 this code was incorporated into European 
legislation.
7
 As the ISPS rules only cover the direct interface between the vessels and the 
landside, an additional Directive allowing for tailor-made processes in European ports was 
put into place.
8 
 
 
In the area of civil aviation and air cargo security, Regulation (EC) No 2320/2002
9 
enabled for a European framework with intense levels of security in the form of rules and 
measures with detailed, legally binding specifications and checks. The European Air 
Cargo Security Program has been in effect since 19 January 2003, and has been revised 
several times in order to seek further simplification, harmonisation and clarification of the 
                                                                                                                                                   
2
 On September 11, 2001, two hijacked airliners destroyed the twin towers of New York‟s World Trade 
Center. Another one slammed into the Pentagon in Washington, and a fourth airliner, believed destined for 
the White House, crashed in Pennsylvania (Sweet, 2004: 12). 
3
 Public Law 107-071 passed by the 107th Congress on November 19, 2001. 
4
 The Customs Trade Partnership against Terrorism (C-TPAT) is a voluntary government-business initiative 
to build cooperative relationships that strengthen and improve overall international supply chain and U.S. 
border security. More info: www.cbp.gov. 
5
 The Container Security Initiative (CSI) was launched in 2002 by the U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border 
Protection in order to increase security for container cargo shipped to the United States. 
6
 Council of the European Union, Declaration on combating terrorism, Brussels, 25 March 2004. 
7
 Regulation (EC) No 725/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on 
enhancing ship and port facility security, Official Journal of the European Union, L 129/6, 29 April 2004. 
8
 Directive 2005/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 on enhancing 
port security, Official Journal of the European Union, L 310/28, 25 November 2005. 
9
 Regulation (EC) No 2320/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2002 
establishing common rules in the field of civil aviation security, Official Journal of the European 
Communities, L 355/1, 30 December 2002. 
existing rules, as well as improvement of the various levels of security.
10 
It is based on 
standards contained in ICAO
11
 Annex 17, recommendations of the European Civil 
Aviation Conference (ECAC)
12
, and Commission proposals. The initial and revised 
Regulations state that all mail, cargo, courier and express parcels intended to be carried on 
passenger or all-cargo aircraft, need to be subjected to security controls before being 
placed on board the aircraft. When the mail, cargo, courier and express parcels originate 
from a known or account consignor, and sterility of the shipments is maintained until the 
departure of the aircraft, these security controls need not be applied. The option to secure 
supply chains as provided for in the EU Air Cargo Security Program requires the 
consequent provision of a range of different statuses, such as the status of „known 
consignor‟ (for passenger aircraft), „account consignor‟ (for all-cargo aircraft), „road 
haulier‟ (for transport companies moving known cargo), „regulated agent‟ and „ACC3‟ 
(for air carriers bringing cargo and/or mail into the European Union from third 
countries).
13
 All of them have to adopt very specific and binding requirements and 
implement a range of preventive measures and controls in order to be able to guarantee a 
free flow of goods and services.  
 
In an endeavour to regulate security in other forms of transport systems (i.e. rail and road 
transport, inland waterways and short sea shipping), and in order to complement existing 
Community transport security policies, the Commission issued a Communication and a 
Proposal for a Regulation on Enhancing Supply Chain Security.
14 
This proposal has never 
been formalized into European legislation, in part because a similar initiative had been 
developed and enforced by the Customs Directorate of the European Commission. A set 
                                                 
10
 Regulation (EC) No 300/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2008 on 
common rules in the field of civil aviation security and repealing Regulation (EC) No 2320/2002, Official 
Journal of the European Union, L 97/72, 9 April 2008. 
11
 International Civil Aviation Organization. More info: www.icao.int. 
12
 European Civil Aviation Conference. More info: www.ecac-ceac.org. 
13
 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 859/2011 of 25 August 2011 on amending Regulation 
(EU) No 185/2010 laying down detailed measures for the implementation of the common basic standards on 
aviation security in respect of air cargo and mail, Official Journal of the European Union, L 220/9, 26 
August 2011. 
14
 Commission of the European Communities (2006) Communication and Proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on enhancing supply chain security, COM (2006), 79, 
www.ec.europa.eu/dgs/energy_transport/security/intermodal/doc/com_2006_0079_en.pdf, (accessed 29 
December 2008). 
of security amendments to the Community Customs Code was published in May 2005
15
, 
covering a number of measures to tighten security around goods crossing international 
borders, the requirement for traders to provide customs authorities with information on 
goods prior to import to or export from the European Union, the provision to introduce the 
Authorised Economic Operator (AEO) concept, and the introduction of a mechanism for 
setting uniform Community risk-selection criteria for controls.
16  
 
Over the past decade, most of these programs have been strengthened following further 
incidents and changing threat patterns that provoked government and industry 
intervention. To give just one example, recent (2010) interceptions of improvised 
explosive devices originating from Yemen, have triggered US and EU governments to 
further enhance air cargo security regulations and introduce additional safeguards to 
protect civil aviation. Following these incidents, the Presidency of the European Council 
and the European Commission set up an ad hoc high level working group to look at ways 
to strengthen air cargo security.
17
 This has lead to, amongst other, revised legislation with 
regards to cargo and mail being carried into the European Union from third countries
18
, 
and discussions on whether or not (and if so, how) to make use of the Customs‟ system of 
advance information analysis on all cargo movements entering, transiting and exiting the 
European Union, as provided for in EC Regulation 648/2005. 
The total of supply chain security measures introduced in government programs is further 
complemented by a range of measures that form part of international standards (e.g. the 
ISO 28000-series)
19
, and various industry-driven security initiatives in which TAPA has 
taken the lead.
 
TAPA
20
 – the Transported Asset Protection Association (formerly known 
as the „Technology Asset Protection Association‟) – started off in the United States in 
                                                 
15
 Regulation (EC) No 648/2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 April 2005 amending 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 establishing the Community Customs Code, Official Journal of the 
European Union, L 117, 4 May 2005. 
16
 Taxation and Customs Union (n.d.) Customs related security initiatives of the EU, 
www.ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/customs/policy_issues/customs_security/security_initiatives/index_en.
htm, (accessed 29 December 2008). 
17
 Council of the European Union (2010) High Level Working Group Report on Strengthening Air Cargo 
Security, 16271/10, 30 November 2010. 
18
 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 859/2011 of 25 August 2011 on amending Regulation 
(EU) No 185/2010 laying down detailed measures for the implementation of the common basic standards on 
aviation security in respect of air cargo and mail, Official Journal of the European Union, L 220/9, 26 
August 2011. 
19
 For more info: www.iso.org. 
20
 For more info see www.tapaemea.com. 
1997 and unites global manufacturers, freight carriers, law enforcement agencies and other 
stakeholders with the common aim of reducing losses from international supply chains. 
The aim of the association is to provide a forum for responsible managers and to share 
professional information for mutual benefit. One of TAPA‟s key activities has been the 
development and introduction of its Freight Security Requirements (FSR). These 
requirements have been established by security professionals within the high-tech / high-
value industry and specify the minimum acceptable security standards for assets travelling 
throughout the supply chain and the methods to be used in maintaining those standards. 
Suppliers can obtain TAPA certification if they meet or exceed the defined criteria. 
According to the level of certification, „A‟ being the highest level and „C‟ the lowest, 
certification is based on external / independent („A‟ and „B‟ class) or internal auditing („C‟ 
class). The audit bodies are contracted (commercial) entities that are in no way linked to 
government. Over the years the TAPA FSR have become a widely recognized security 
standard for the care and handling of freight, as have the TAPA TSR („Trucking Security 
Requirements‟). The latter was initially designed to be a compliance program21 carried out 
by a self-assessment, but has very recently developed into a proper certification program 
in its own right, meaning that an independent validator (i.e. a commercial entity) will need 
to review compliance with the specific requirements before certification is granted.
22
    
 
1.2. Supply chain security and situational crime prevention 
 
Between 2006 and 2009 – as part of an FP6 Security Research Project further referred to 
as the „Counteract Project‟23 - a series of targeted studies was conducted on behalf of the 
Directorate-General Transport and Energy of the European Commission (DG TREN), one 
of them focusing on the effectiveness and potential spill-over effects of counter-terrorism 
measures in international supply chain security programs.
24
 As part of this targeted study, 
two of the programs highlighted in the previous section were selected in order to examine 
the effectiveness, efficiency and acceptability of supply chain security measures: the EU 
                                                 
21
 The TSR outlines the processes and specifications for Suppliers to attain TAPA compliance to the TSR on 
their transport operations. It identifies three compliance levels, level 1 being the most encompassing. 
22
 Vigilant, TAPA EMEA monthly newsletter, November/December 2011 : 4. 
23
 COUNTERACT - Cluster of User Networks in Transport and Energy Relating to Anti-terrorist Activities, 
2006–2009. 
24
 Haelterman, H. (2009) „Effectiveness and Potential Spill-over Effects of Counterterrorism Measures 
defined in International Supply Chain Security Programs‟, Counteract Report FT4/A, EC Contract Number 
SSP4/2005/TREN/05/FP6/S07.48891, not published. 
Air Cargo Security Program, designed to protect European civil aviation against acts of 
unlawful (terrorist) interference; and the TAPA (2007) Freight Security Requirements, a 
certification program that was specifically designed for theft prevention. In order to 
identify and classify the preventive measures contained in these programs, both were 
analysed to the level of each constituent part (see Annex 1 for more detail). From this 
exercise it became clear that all measures listed in the selected programs could be 
classified using the 25-category classification of opportunity-reducing techniques 
provided for by Clarke and his colleagues (Clarke and Eck, 2003; Cornish and Clarke, 
2003; cited in Clarke, 2005: 46-47). 
 
Most criminological theories have traditionally been concerned with explaining why 
certain individuals are more likely to engage in criminal behaviour compared to others. 
They refer to particular biological, biochemical or psychological dispositions or 
influences; inherited traits; a range of social factors or conditions such as poor education, 
poverty, inadequate socialization, weak bonds to society, weak morals; etc. (Clarke, 1997; 
Maguire, Morgan and Reiner, 2002; Williams, 2004; Burke, 2005; Newburn, 2007; 
Wortley and Mazerolle, 2008; Hagan, 2008). Likewise, much crime prevention effort has 
gone into trying to lessen these dispositions or influences (Tilley, 2005).  
 
Contrary to these more traditional criminological approaches, situational crime prevention 
is an approach to crime prevention that focuses not upon changing offenders, but on 
modifying the settings (with its situational factors) in which crime occurs (Clarke, 1997: 
2). The concept of situational crime prevention was first introduced in the late 1970‟s by a 
team of scholars working in the UK Home Office (Clarke, 1992: vii)
25
. Studies on 
institutional treatments for delinquents undertaken by the Home Office Research Unit 
provided a stimulus for the founding of its theoretical base, together with two independent 
but related strands of policy research in the United States: Oscar Newman‟s concept of 
„defensible space‟ (1972), and Jeffery‟s concept of „crime prevention through 
environmental design‟ (1971; Crowe, 2000; Cozens, 2008) (Clarke, 1992: 5-7). The 
theoretical development of situational crime prevention was further strengthened by the 
development of routine activity and rational choice theory (Clarke, 1992: 5-7; Newman, 
                                                 
25
 As indicated by Mayhew and Hough (2012: 19), Clarke lays no claim to inventing the term „situational 
crime prevention‟. According to the authors, the term originated in discussions in the late 1970s in a working 
group set up by the Home Office Crime Policy Planning Unit.  
Clarke and Shoham, 1997). According to rational choice theory, offenders make rational 
decisions when carrying out a criminal act: if the costs of exploiting a criminal 
opportunity are perceived as being too high, or if an opportunity is reduced or removed 
altogether, the offender will cease the activity or look for another and better opportunity 
(Hamilton-Smith, 2002: 15). Routine activity theory argues that offenders are but one 
element in a crime, and perhaps not even the most important element. The routine activity 
approach emphasizes how illegal activities feed on routine activities: everyday life 
sometimes delivers temptations without controls (Felson, 1998: 73). According to Cohen 
and Felson, „crime occurs when a motivated offender and suitable target (or victim) 
converge in space and time in the absence of a capable guardian‟ (Clarke, 1992: 10). 
Routine activity, rational choice and crime pattern theory – sometimes referred to as 
„opportunity theories‟ (Newman, Clarke and Shoham, 1997: viii; Clarke, 2005: 14; Lilly, 
Cullen and Ball, 2007: 266) or „crime theories‟ – all give an important role to situational 
factors in crime. Although somewhat different in focus, they provide a solid theoretical 
base for the concept of situational crime prevention: „routine activity theory as a “macro” 
theory that seeks to explain how changes in society expand or contract opportunities for 
crime; crime pattern theory as a “meso” theory that seeks to explain how offenders seek or 
stumble across opportunities for crime in the course of their everyday lives; and the 
rational choice perspective as a “micro-level” theory that deals with the decision-making 
processes that result in an offender choosing to become involved in crime and selecting 
specific crimes to commit‟ (Clarke, 2005: 41).   
 
Ever since its introduction, the concept of situational crime prevention has not been 
without its share of resistance. Clarke (2005) summarizes the most frequent criticisms as 
follows:  
 
- The approach is simplistic and a-theoretical, accused of ignoring the vast body of 
criminological research establishing that the root causes of crime lie in deprivation 
resulting from genetic inheritance, personality and upbringing, or from social, 
cultural, racial and economic disparities (see above). To suggest that there is a 
direct link between opportunity and crime is considered to be an oversimplification 
of the determinants of human behaviour (see also Newburn, 2007: 566). 
- It has not been shown to work, it displaces crime and often makes it worse (see 
also Tilley, 2005: 6; Newburn, 2007: 296). 
- It diverts attention from the root causes of crime by offering quick and superficial 
„fixes‟ to crime symptoms (see also Felson and Clarke, 1997: 198). 
- It is a conservative, managerial approach to crime; „damned‟ as administrative 
criminology because of its origins
26
; castigated for its lack of social awareness in 
its choice of crimes to address; accused of paying too much attention to protecting 
the property and interests of the powerful whilst neglecting crimes against women 
and minorities; and said to lack any vision and social purpose.  
- It promotes a selfish, exclusionary society (see also Sève, 1997: 193; Mayhew and 
Hough, 2012: 19).  
- It blames the victim for not taking (sufficient) precautions against crime. 
- It promotes “Big Brother” and restricts personal freedoms (see also Sève, 1997: 
192; Felson and Clarke, 1997: 198; von Hirsch et al., 2000; Tilley, 2005: 6; 
Newburn, 2007: 296). 
 
Although a high level theoretical discussion on the pro‟s and contra‟s of situational crime 
prevention compared to more traditional criminological approaches does not form part of 
the scope of this dissertation
27
, some of the above criticisms will be referred to in the 
various chapters of this manuscript. This is e.g. the case for displacement and escalation 
effects; and for the potential impact of situational measures on civil liberties and personal 
freedoms.  
 
1.3. Situational crime prevention techniques   
 
The set of situational crime prevention measures or techniques has evolved quite 
significantly over the past years. The original formulation of situational crime prevention 
included an eight-category classification of opportunity-reducing techniques of which 
some had proven to be useful while the remainder required modification (Clarke, 1992: 
                                                 
26
 Mid 1980‟s, Young witnessed a shift away from mainstream criminology in official (mainly UK Home 
Office) circles to what he terms „administrative criminology‟. According to Young, this administrative 
criminology represents a return to classical thinking which sees crime in voluntaristic (non deterministic) 
terms (Young, 1986; cited in Jupp, 1989: 21).  
27
 The subject of this study starts from the observation that most of the supply chain security initiatives 
primarily comprehend situational measures. 
11). In his first edition of „Situational Crime Prevention‟ (1992), Clarke presents a revised 
classification of twelve techniques, adding new categories and re-labelling existing ones. 
These twelve have later (1997) been expanded by Clarke and Homel to sixteen, including 
a new category of „removing excuses for crime‟. Finally, in response to Wortley‟s (1997; 
2001) remarks on controlling situational precipitators, Cornish and Clarke (2003) 
expanded the techniques further to twenty five by including a category „reducing 
provocations‟. As such the classification of preventive techniques has grown in step with 
the expanded theoretical base of situational prevention (Clarke, 2005: 48; Mayhew and 
Hough, 2012: 21). Table 1 provides a full overview of situational techniques, listed under 
five basic strategies: (1) increasing the perceived effort, (2) increasing the perceived risk, 
(3) reducing the anticipated rewards, (4) removing excuses and (5) reducing provocations.  
 
Table 1: Situational Crime Prevention Techniques (source: Clarke, 2005: 46-47) 
 
 
Increase the effort Increase the risk Reduce the rewards Reduce provocations Remove excuses 
 
1. Harden targets  
 
 
(e.g. immobilisers in 
cars, anti-robbery 
screens)  
 
 
6. Extend guardianship 
 
 
(e.g. cocooning, 
neighbourhood watch) 
 
11. Conceal targets 
 
 
(e.g. gender-neutral 
phone directories, off-
street parking) 
 
16. Reduce frustration 
and stress 
 
(e.g. efficient queuing, 
soothing lighting) 
 
21. Set rules 
 
 
(e.g. rental agreements, 
hotel registration) 
 
2. Control access to 
facilities 
 
(e.g. entry phones, 
alley-gating) 
 
 
7. Assist natural 
surveillance 
 
(e.g. improved street 
lighting, neighbourhood 
watch hotlines) 
 
 
12. Remove targets 
 
 
(e.g. removable car 
radios, pre-paid public 
phone cards) 
 
17. Avoid disputes 
 
 
(e.g. fixed cab fares, 
reduce crowding in 
pubs) 
 
22. Post instructions 
 
 
(e.g. „no parking‟, 
„private property‟) 
 
3. Screen exits 
 
 
(e.g. electronic tags for 
libraries, tickets 
needed) 
 
 
8. Reduce anonymity 
 
 
(e.g. taxi driver ID‟s, 
„how‟s my driving?‟ 
signs) 
 
13. Identify property 
 
 
(e.g. property marking, 
vehicle licensing) 
 
18. Reduce emotional 
arousal 
 
(e.g. controls on violent 
porn, prohibit 
paedophiles working 
with children) 
 
 
23. Alert conscience 
 
 
(e.g. roadside speed 
display signs, 
„shoplifting is stealing‟) 
 
4. Deflect offenders 
 
 
(e.g. street closures in 
red light district, 
separate toilets for 
women) 
 
 
9. Utilise place 
managers 
 
 
(e.g. train employees to 
prevent crime, support 
whistle blowers) 
 
14. Disrupt markets 
 
 
(e.g. checks on pawn 
brokers, licensed street 
vendors) 
 
19. Neutralise peer 
pressure 
 
(e.g. „idiots drink and 
drive‟, „it‟s ok to say 
no‟) 
 
24. Assist compliance 
 
 
(e.g. litter bins, public 
lavatories) 
 
 
 
 
5. Control tools / 
weapons 
 
(e.g. toughened beer 
glasses, photos on 
credit cards) 
 
 
10. Strengthen formal 
surveillance 
 
(e.g. speed cameras, 
CCTV in town centres) 
 
15. Deny benefits 
 
 
(e.g. ink merchandise 
tags, graffiti cleaning) 
 
20. Discourage 
imitation 
 
 
(e.g. rapid vandalism 
repair, V-chips in TV‟s) 
 
 
 
25. Control drugs / 
alcohol 
 
(e.g. breathalysers in 
pubs, alcohol-free 
event) 
 
Increasing the (perceived) effort 
 
The first set of techniques is designed to make it more difficult for the offender to commit 
a particular crime, or in other words: to increase the effort combined with committing a 
crime as perceived by the offender. This can be achieved by means of:  
 
- Target hardening, i.e. obstruct a potential offender by physical barriers through the 
use of locks, safes, screens, reinforced materials, etc. Examples of target hardening 
include anti-bandit screens on post office counters, transparent screens to shield 
bus drivers, strengthened coin boxes in public telephones, steering locks on cars, 
improved design of ticket machines in the London Underground, the use of 
immobilisers, on-board safes on buses, the use of damage-resistant materials, etc. 
(Clarke, 1997: 17; Clarke and Eck, 2003: 6-3; Clarke, 2005: 46; Morgan and 
Cornish, 2006: 16).  
- Access control, i.e. introduce measures intended to exclude potential offenders 
from facilities / potential crime scenes. Examples from literature include the use of 
electronic personal identification numbers (PIN‟s), entry phones, electronic access 
to parking garages, manned reception desks, baggage and passenger screening, etc. 
(Clarke, 1997: 17; Clarke and Eck, 2003: 6-3). 
- Exit screening to ensure that those leaving a building, facility or some other place 
have not stolen anything, have paid all fees and taxes, etc. Examples include the 
use of electronic (merchandise) tags in shops and libraries, export documents, 
border controls when leaving a country, parking tickets required to exit station car 
parks, etc. (Clarke and Eck, 2003: 6-3; Morgan and Cornish, 2006: 16).   
- Deflecting offenders (i.e. leading offenders away from crime targets). Examples 
include segregating rival groups of soccer fans in the stadium to reduce fighting, 
scheduling arrival and departure times and routes of rival groups of fans, 
scheduling the last bus to leave immediately after pub closing time, only allow 
authorized personnel in shipping areas, etc. (Clarke, 1997: 18-19). 
- Controlling tools and weapons (and other crime facilitators). Some examples: the 
introduction of „toughened‟ beer glasses or plastic mugs to prevent glasses being 
used as weapons when broken, the introduction of Caller-ID in order to reduce 
obscene telephone calls, put restrictions on the sale of spray-cans to juveniles, 
introduce photos on credit cards, etc. (Clarke and Eck, 2003: 6-4).  
 
Increasing the (perceived) risk 
 
The second series of techniques aims at increasing the (perceived) risk of being 
apprehended and is based on the assumption that offenders worry more about the risks of 
being apprehended than about the consequences if they are caught (POP Center, 2011).   
In order to increase this perceived risk, one can: 
 
- Extend guardianship or, in other words, introduce „capable guardians‟ such as 
alarm systems, neighbourhood watch schemes, etc. (Clarke and Eck, 2003: 6-5; 
POP Center, 2011). 
- Assist natural surveillance, e.g. by trimming bushes around premises in order to 
enhance visibility and natural surveillance by people passing by, through 
enhancing lighting conditions, etc. (Clarke and Eck, 2003: 6-5).  
- Reduce anonymity (i.e. take measures to reduce anonymity and, as such, enhance 
social control). A fine example of this technique is to introduce the requirement for 
staff to wear name tags. 
- Utilise „place managers‟ and try to get maximum profit out of surveillance systems 
(e.g. CCTV) and out of the surveillance role performed by, e.g., shop assistants, 
hotel doormen, car park attendants, bus or train conductors, resident caretakers, 
etc. (Clarke and Eck, 2003: 6-5), as the above employees assume some 
responsibility for monitoring conduct in these workplaces. 
- Strengthen formal surveillance provided by police, security guards, store 
detectives, etc. whose main function is to furnish a deterrent threat to potential 
offenders. The introduction of police bike controls to curb auto theft (Clarke, 1997: 
20) is just one example of this frequently used technique.  
Reducing the anticipated rewards 
 
A third set of techniques is designed to reduce the anticipated rewards for the offender, 
being material rewards or other rewards such as sexual release, intoxication, excitement, 
revenge, respect from peers and so forth (Clarke and Eck, 2003: 6-6). These techniques 
include: 
 
- Concealment of targets, e.g. hide valuables to prevent burglary, avoid parking 
desirable vehicle on the street during night time, use unmarked transportation units 
for transporting high value freight, etc. (Clarke and Eck, 2003: 6-6).    
- Target removal (e.g. replacing cash money transfers by electronic systems such as 
credit cards or phone cards, discourage patients to keep cash money or other 
valuables in their hospital rooms, discourage staff to take valuables to the office, 
etc.). 
- Identification of property to make it less easy for resale on the „black market‟ and, 
as such, less desirable for offenders. Examples of this technique include writing 
ones name in a book after purchase, mark identification numbers on major parts of 
bikes, cars or motorbikes, etc. (Clarke, 1997: 22). 
- Disruption of markets for stolen goods (e.g. tell the public how to report shops or 
individuals that sell or unblock stolen phones). 
- Denial of benefits, e.g. the installation of road humps to deny the benefits of 
speeding, the use of ink tags on brand clothing or the application of security codes 
in car radios (Clarke and Eck, 2003: 6-6). 
 
Reducing provocations 
 
A fourth strategy is aimed at reducing provocations, i.e. situations that precipitate or 
induce crime. In order to do so, one can either: 
 
- Reduce frustration and stress in order not to provoke violent or unwanted 
behaviour (e.g. avoid having people standing in a queue for hours without any 
explanation in order to prevent violent or aggressive behaviour). 
- Avoid disputes that may escalate into criminal or unwanted behaviour, e.g. by 
setting fixed taxi fares to prevent cheating and disputes or by segregating rival fans 
in soccer stadiums (POP Center, 2011). 
- Reduce emotional arousal, e.g. by prohibiting convicted paedophiles from taking 
jobs involving contact with children (POP Center, 2011). 
- Neutralise peer pressure (e.g. by introducing good role models). 
- Discourage imitation, e.g. by installing „V-chips‟ allowing parents to program their 
TV‟s to prevent children viewing violent programs, by persuading media not to 
publish details of crime incidents and techniques used, etc. (Clarke and Eck, 2003: 
6-8; Morgan and Cornish, 2006: 16). 
 
Removing excuses 
 
A fifth and final set of techniques aims at removing excuses for unwanted behaviour. 
Often offenders make moral judgments about their behaviour and use excuses to justify 
their actions. In order to tackle this behaviour one can:  
 
- Set rules and formalize what behaviour is acceptable and what is not by 
introducing new rules or procedures and clarify those already in place. 
- Post instructions in public in order to prevent people claiming ignorance of the 
rules or to show precisely where the instructions apply (Clarke and Eck, 2003: 6-
10). 
- Alert conscience, e.g. by putting up signs stating that „shoplifting is stealing‟ or 
„smoking is illegal, selfish and rude‟, thus focusing on specific forms of crime 
occurring in discrete, highly limited settings with the purpose to alert and stimulate 
feelings of conscience at the point of committing a specific kind of offence (Clarke 
and Eck, 2003: 6-10). 
- Assist compliance by putting things in place that aid in following the rules of 
conduct. Some of the examples provided by Clarke and Eck (2003:6-10) are: 
building public lavatories to avoid urinating in the streets, subsidising taxi rides 
home for those who have been drinking too much, and provide litter bins and 
graffiti boards in public places. 
- Control disinhibitors such as drugs or alcohol as they undermine inhibitions or 
impair perception and cognition so that offenders are less aware of breaking the 
law (White and Humeniuk, 1994, cited in Clarke, 1997: 25). 
 
The first set of techniques (i.e. increasing the perceived effort to commit a crime) is quite 
common in transportation security and forms part of various supply chain security 
programs. Some examples taken from the European Air Cargo Security Regulations and 
the TAPA Freight and Trucking Security Requirements, include: (1) access control to 
premises and designated areas in order to ensure that air cargo is secured from 
unauthorized interference; (2) proper packaging and sealing of consignments of air cargo; 
(3) locking and sealing of vehicles; (4) providing parking areas for private vehicles 
separate form shipping, loading and cargo areas; (5) protecting warehouse windows or 
other openings in warehouse walls and roofs; (6) protecting ground floor warehouse 
windows by anti-ram posts or other physical barriers; (7) providing high value security 
cages for assets remaining on site; (8) utilizing hard sided instead of soft sided trailers; (9) 
using padlocks on trailer doors during transport; etc. (Haelterman, 2009a: 15-35). 
Increasing the perceived risk of being apprehended is also an often applied technique. 
Some typical examples include: (1) conducting identity checks on persons delivering 
cargo or entering a site; (2) requesting staff to report any irregularities immediately to 
management or to the authorities; (3) providing sufficient lighting inside and outside the 
facility; (4) challenging unidentified persons present on site; (5) installing CCTV to cover 
the movement of vehicles and individuals; (6) alarming warehouse doors and windows, 
truck, trailer and cabin doors; (7) conducting random trash inspections in warehousing 
facilities; etc. (Haelterman, 2009a: 15-35). A typical (relevant) example of reducing the 
anticipated rewards for the offender, is the replacement of cash money transfers upon 
delivery of a consignment by electronic systems, avoiding cash money being transported 
and – as such – making pick-up and delivery vans a less desirable target for potential 
offenders. Finally, removing excuses by means of rule setting, posting instructions, 
alerting conscience, etc. also form typical ingredients of most transportation and supply 
chain security policies and programs, as was illustrated in the Counteract targeted study 
(Haelterman, 2009a: 15-35). Although Clarke‟s classification of techniques comprises five 
different strategies, it is worth observing that the first two strategies (i.e. increasing the 
perceived effort and increasing the perceived risk) are dominant in the programs that were 
analysed as part of this study (Haelterman, 2009a: 36).  
 
1.4. Implementation problems 
 
One of the other key deliverables identified in the Counteract study – apart from the 
classification of the requirements imposed on operators - was to comment on the 
effectiveness, efficiency and acceptability of the preventive measures defined in the 
European Air Cargo Security Program, and in the TAPA (2007) Freight Security 
Requirements. Relevant data on the measures‟ (perceived) effectiveness was obtained 
from 37 regulated agents listed in the Netherlands, from 3 major international express 
companies and from 7 users of the TAPA Freight Security Requirements. By means of a 
series of semi-structured questionnaires, respondents were asked to qualify the (perceived) 
effectiveness of the various measures, and report any implementation problems they had 
experienced; whether general in nature, or specific to their own situation (Haelterman, 
2009a+b). In this regard, the study revealed a series of costs and implementation problems 
relating to the availability of certain measures that are required by policy makers (e.g. 
limited abilities to verify information across borders and legal limitations to conduct pre-
employment or criminal history checks); to their practicability and impact on core 
business processes; to the (financial and human) resources required to implement and 
maintain them; and to their negative impact on the (perceived) freedom of movement and 
privacy of staff. They further relate to the level of knowledge and expertise required for 
assessing, evaluating, prioritizing and tackling criminal risks; to the level of (user) belief 
in their effectiveness; and to the level of awareness and commitment of end-users and 
other stakeholders (Haelterman, 2009b). Annex 2 provides an overview of the 
implementation problems reported by end-users of the European Air Cargo Security 
Program (version 2005 – NL)28, and by users of the TAPA 2007 Freight Security 
Requirements. 
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 The measures contained in the EU Air Cargo Security Program are communicated on a „need to know‟ 
basis only. Currently they are contained in separate Commission Decisions to guarantee confidentiality. As 
the Program has undergone so many changes over the past years, we considered it no problem to disclose 
some of the content of the 2005 version in this Annex, especially as it illustrates the various clusters of 
implementation problems reported on by its end-users. 
2. Research questions 
 
Taking into consideration that operators in the international supply chain are increasingly 
being made responsible for the introduction of preventive controls - as illustrated in 
section 1.1. - and taking into consideration that previous research revealed that they state 
to face a range of costs and implementation problems when putting the necessary 
safeguards in place, raises the concern whether or not they are being offered sufficient 
guidance; and whether or not policy makers have sufficiently considered the proposed 
measures prior to making them mandatory for implementation.  
 
This doctoral dissertation aims to provide such guidance, or at least to contribute to a 
better understanding of what is required to make the introduction of preventive measures 
into a success. It aims to provide a better insight in the actual cost of situational crime 
prevention in a business environment, enabling practitioners and policy makers to make 
informed decisions when deciding on what measures best to implement or enforce. It does 
not consider the effectiveness of situational measures but merely aims to contribute to the 
selection process of alternative measures that are deemed effective to tackle a certain 
(crime) problem (see figure 1).
29
 It further does not consider the pro‟s and contra‟s of 
situational crime prevention compared to more traditional criminological approaches, as 
our research starts from the observation that policy makers appear to have put forward the 
introduction of situational measures as their preferred option. 
 
Figure 1: Focus area of the study 
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 The scope of this thesis is limited to one particular stage in the design process, being the consideration of 
alternative measures that have been selected as effective to tackle the problem or risk, but haven‟t been 
implemented yet. As such, this dissertation is by no means a study into the effectiveness of situational 
measures, nor an evaluation study of supply chain security programs or measures that have already been 
implemented. 
The central hypothesis that was put forward at the start of the study, is that a thorough and 
“ex ante” consideration of the various measures that are deemed effective to tackle a 
certain crime problem or risk, may add value to the overall preventative effort. The 
following research questions were identified: 
 
- What implementation problems are reported by end-users in the supply chain? 
- How do these relate to what we already know from academic literature on 
situational crime prevention? 
- How can costs and implementation problems best be classified? 
- What should fall within the scope of an ex ante consideration of preventive 
measures? 
- When should this consideration ideally take place? 
- What can we learn from the above to guide future programming? 
 
3. Research design 
 
In order to provide an answer to these questions, a variety of research methods was 
applied: 
 
(1) As to identify and illustrate the implementation problems reported by operators in 
the supply chain, a preliminary (exploratory) survey was conducted as part of a 
targeted study on behalf of the European Commission.
30
 A self-completion 
questionnaire composed of a number of pre-coded closed questions and one main 
open-ended question was sent to all Regulated Agents listed on the official site of 
the Dutch Government
31
, as well as to the four major European Express Integrators 
(and – under a different scope - to a number of users of the TAPA Freight Security 
Requirements). The companies were first contacted by phone in order to explain 
the objectives of the study, and to ask for the contact details of the person 
responsible for implementing air cargo security measures (which was in most cases 
the Aviation Security Advisor). A copy of the questionnaire was then sent by e-
                                                 
30
 COUNTERACT - Cluster of User Networks in Transport and Energy Relating to Anti-terrorist Activities, 
2006–2009. 
31
 www.kmarcargoregister.nl. 
mail for completion.
32
 A number of actions was taken to maximize the response 
rate (Bulmer, 2001: 49-51; Simmons, 2001: 97-100; Esterberg, 2002: 45; 
Bijleveld, 2007: 238) : 
 
- The scope and objectives of the survey were clearly defined in the 
introductory part of the survey, as well as in a covering letter provided for 
by the Head of Unit „Security of surface transports and protection of 
critical infrastructure‟ of the European Commission. The latter further 
highlighted the importance of a high return in the interest of all business 
players. 
- Clear instructions were provided to assist the respondents in completing the 
questionnaire, avoiding any potential misinterpretation. 
- As to guarantee confidentiality and fully respect the doctrine of informed 
consent, it was clearly stressed that cooperation was purely on a voluntary 
basis, and that the study results would be analyzed and presented without 
any reference to the respondent‟s identity. 
- Finally, as to minimize non-response, the questionnaire was kept as concise 
as possible. 
 
Following a range of questions querying some general background details (e.g. 
company size, number of employees, number of sites in Europe, etc.), respondents 
were given an overview of the various measures contained in the program and 
asked what implementation problems they encountered when implementing them 
(free text input). They were encouraged to list all possible implementation 
problems they could think of, whether general in nature or specific to their own 
situation, and to provide as much detail and examples as possible. They were 
further asked to return the completed questionnaire within two weeks, after which 
those that hadn‟t responded were contacted a second time by phone or e-mail to 
maximize the response rate. 
From the research population (= a total of 261 companies including the four major 
European Express Integrators)
33
, 40 completed and returned the questionnaire, 
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 The reason for choosing an electronic survey has been to enable reaching a large population relatively 
cheaply (Simmons, 2001: 87). 
resulting in a response rate of 15,32%.
34
 As such, relevant data was obtained from 
37 regulated agents listed in the Netherlands, from 3 major international express 
integrators, and from 7 users of the TAPA FSR (Haelterman, 2009a+b).  
 
(2) As to further analyze and classify the costs and implementation problems reported 
on by end-users, a thorough literature review was conducted covering the existing 
body of knowledge on situational crime prevention (Bijleveld, 2007: 79). Based on 
this analysis, implementation costs have been differentiated from a range of 
potential reverse effects (i.e. consequential costs resulting from the 
implementation), and from a series of generic preconditions that relate to the 
introduction of preventive measures in general. These were then incorporated into 
a conceptual model designed to identify the scope of an ex ante consideration as 
part of a generic program design. 
 
(3) Finally, the application of this conceptual model was illustrated by means of an ex 
ante consideration of alternative measures to control unauthorized access to pick-
up and delivery vans, a typical ingredient of a number of anti-theft and anti-
terrorism supply chain security programs. As part of this study, two (focus) group 
meetings and two surveys were conducted in a local branch of an international 
express carrier : 
 
a. As to identify and define the problem on hand, and as to list a number of 
risk mitigating measures that were thought of to be effective, an initial 
focus group meeting was organized with the security representatives of the 
branch, moderated by the researcher (Cronin, 2001: 165). A focus group 
methodology was chosen as it enables to explore participants‟ views and 
experiences in full depth. As to remain free of researcher influence, a low 
to medium level form of moderation was obtained for (Cronin, 2001: 166). 
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 End of July 2008, 300 business locations were recorded in the official database of the Dutch Government. 
Based on the recorded info (i.e. company name), some locations form part of the same legal entity, which 
brings the total research population for the Regulated Agents back to 257. 
34
 As indicated by Simmons (2001: 87), the main arguments against using postal questionnaires have 
generally been that, despite the efforts displayed to maximize cooperation, the response rate in general 
remains low. 
b. As to assess the non-monetary cost of the proposed measures, and as to 
verify whether the necessary preconditions are in place to make their 
introduction a success, a survey was conducted amongst the full population 
of van drivers working for the branch. The first part of the questionnaire 
contained a range of questions on the background variables of the 
respondents (i.e. their gender, age, duration and type of employment, and 
any previous victimization). The second part contained a series of 
statements on which the respondents were asked to give their personal 
opinion. Each item was scored on a one to five point Likert scale (Procter, 
2001: 111-112). The statements used were carefully worded as to make 
sure that they had a maximum content validity (i.e. questioning what they 
were meant to question). Prior to presenting the survey to the drivers, a 
small-scale pretest was conducted by presenting the questionnaire to a 
colleague familiar with the context. After having incorporated some minor 
recommendations that came out of the pretest, the questionnaire was 
presented to the drivers during a group meeting. During this meeting the 
drivers were presented some basic information on the aims and scope of the 
study, as well as some instructions for completing the questionnaire. To 
motivate them for completing the entire survey, their importance to the 
overall study was accentuated. It was further stressed that cooperation was 
on a voluntary basis, and they were given a name of an independent contact 
person to reach out to in case they wanted additional information on the 
scope and objectives of the study.
35
  
The drivers were initially given one week to return the completed 
questionnaire in a blank and closed envelope. After this period of one 
week, a brief reminder was sent out. The survey was closed after two 
weeks, and out of a total of 45 drivers, 23 returned a completed 
questionnaire, resulting in a response rate of 51,11%. The answers provided 
by the respondents were then inserted in an SPSS data-file. The 
background variables were listed and compared to the full population. The 
local Operations Manager, who has a clear view on all his drivers, could 
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 The company‟s official Confidant Advisor (i.e. „vertrouwenspersoon‟) was asked to act as the central 
point of contact for the drivers. 
confirm that the spread of these background variables reflects the total 
spread in the targeted population. This means that the data used for further 
analyses was not substantially biased by a non-coverage problem (Arber, 
2001: 60).
36
 The individual items on the drivers‟ opinions were summed up 
to build a relevant scale. The reliability of these scales was tested by means 
of Cronbach‟s alpha, and items were excluded when this brought down the 
value of alpha (Bijleveld, 2007: 232). The scales were also tested on their 
one-dimensional character. The scores of the respondents on these scales 
were then interpreted to form our conclusions.  
c. As to assess the potential for displacement and other reverse effects, a 
second focus group meeting was organized with the (same) security 
representatives that participated in the initial session. This research method 
was chosen due to the limited number of participants and the high level of 
verbal and cognitive skills of the individuals involved. The participants 
were informed of the goal of the focus group and then left to interact, with 
the researcher acting as the moderator. This setup enabled to gather a lot of 
information in a limited time frame. For each of the proposed measures it 
was assessed to what type of displacement its introduction might 
potentially lead, based on past experience and knowledge gained from 
specialist literature and intelligence sharing within the sector. Following 
this exercise, the various measures were ranked by each individual 
participant according to their perceived potential for other reverse effects. 
This ranking was established by means of a survey.  
4. Structure doctoral dissertation 
 
This dissertation is structured around the research questions listed under section 2 (see 
above). Each chapter is an exact copy of a paper that has been published (or accepted for 
publication) in an international peer reviewed journal, and is preceded by a brief summary 
highlighting the main arguments.  
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 If non-responders differ in significant ways from responders, the researcher ends up with a biased sample 
and inferences to the research population will be wrong. 
The following research papers have been combined in this manuscript: 
 
(1) HAELTERMAN, H. (2009) 'Situational Crime Prevention and Supply Chain 
Security: an 'Ex Ante' Consideration of Preventive Measures', in: Journal of 
Applied Security Research, 4 (4), 483-500.  
  
(2) HAELTERMAN, H. (2011) 'Re-thinking the Cost of Supply Chain Security', in: 
Crime, Law and Social Change, 56 (4), 389-405.    
  
(3) HAELTERMAN, H., CALLENS, M. & VANDER BEKEN, T. (2012) 
„Controlling Access to Pick-up and Delivery Vans: the Cost of Alternative 
Measures‟, accepted for publication in the European Journal on Criminal Policy 
and Research.  
 
In the fourth and final chapter the main arguments put forward in these research papers 
have been consolidated into a general conclusion. 
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CHAPTER 1: SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION AND SUPPLY CHAIN 
SECURITY. AN ‘EX ANTE’ CONSIDERATION OF PREVENTIVE 
MEASURES37 
 
Research paper: HAELTERMAN, H. (2009) 'Situational Crime Prevention and Supply 
Chain Security: an 'Ex Ante' Consideration of Preventive Measures', in: Journal of 
Applied Security Research, 4 (4), 483-500.  
 
Main arguments: 
 
In this paper a range of implementation problems reported by end-users in the supply 
chain has been identified and listed. These implementation problems have been derived 
from a survey conducted as part of a targeted study into the effectiveness, efficiency and 
acceptability of the preventive measures defined in the European Air Cargo Security 
Program and in the TAPA (2007) Freight Security Requirements. By means of a series of 
semi-structured questionnaires, respondents were asked to report any implementation 
problems they had experienced, whether general in nature or specific to their own 
situation. 
 
Based on the outcome of this exercise, an initial set of success indicators and an initial 
hypothesis on their impact on the effectiveness, efficiency and acceptability of situational 
measures was developed. The indicators listed in this section relate to: (1) the availability 
of a measure to end-users; (2) the required level of knowledge, expertise and guidance to 
assess, evaluate, prioritize and tackle crime problems; (3) the practicability of a measure to 
end-users; (4) its financial/economic cost; (5) its ethical/social cost; (6) the effort required 
for offenders to circumvent a measure; (7) its beneficial side effects; (8) any unintended 
reverse effects; (9) stakeholder/user belief in the (effectiveness of) a measure; and (10) 
stakeholder/user awareness of the problem on hand and their commitment to tackle it.   
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 Note: this chapter is an exact copy of the first research paper, published in the Journal of Applied Security 
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It is argued that an „ex ante‟ consideration of potential measures, and a thorough 
consideration of interdependencies, may prove to be extremely beneficial to the success of 
future programming. In this paper it is further argued that – in order to stress the 
importance of an ex ante consideration of preventive measures - it is essential to identify 
this consideration as a separate, individual stage in any program design, succeeding the 
production of an initial inventory of effective measures, and preceding the actual 
implementation phase. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
This article is about situational crime prevention in the (European) supply chain. It is 
based on a thorough analysis of two international supply chain security programs, and on 
the consequent observation that the security measures that form part of these programs 
can all be classified as situational techniques. One of the main conclusions of the research 
has been that an „ex ante‟ consideration of preventive measures, and a careful 
consideration of any interdependencies, may prove to be extremely beneficial to the 
success of future programming. The outcome of these considerations can be applied to 
rank potential interventions, and decide on the most promising and feasible one(s). In 
order to facilitate a thorough consideration of the effectiveness, efficiency and 
acceptability of potential measures, a series of „success indicators‟ was developed. 
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Introduction 
 
This paper grounds on a report produced under the Counteract Project of the European 
Commission
1
. The main objectives of the project were to assess current practices in the 
fight against terrorism and to recommend feasible and cost-effective solutions for the 
improvement of security in key sectors of transport and energy. The Counteract project 
was funded within the European Union 6
th
 RTD Framework Programme, started off in 
June 2006 and was to be terminated after 36 months. On behalf of the Directorate-General 
Transport and Energy of the European Commission a series of targeted studies was 
conducted, one of them focusing on the effectiveness and potential spill-over effects of 
counterterrorism measures in international supply chain security programs. One of the 
deliverables identified in the latter, was to comment on the effectiveness, efficiency and 
acceptability of the preventive measures defined in the European Air Cargo Security 
Program, and in the TAPA (2007) Freight Security Requirements. Relevant data on the 
measures‟ (perceived) effectiveness was obtained from 37 regulated agents listed in the 
Netherlands, from 3 major international express companies and from 7 users of the TAPA 
Freight Security Requirements. By means of a series of semi-structured questionnaires, 
respondents were asked to qualify the (perceived) effectiveness of the various measures, 
and report any implementation problems they had experienced, whether general in nature, 
or specific to their own situation. The findings derived from this exercise, together with 
the outcome of an extensive literature review, were consolidated into a set of „success 
indicators‟ and a guide for future programming. One of the main conclusions of the study 
has been that an „ex ante‟ consideration of preventive measures, together with a careful 
consideration of interdependencies, may prove to be extremely beneficial to the success of 
future programming.  
The first part of this article briefly outlines some initiatives taken by US and EU 
government following the attacks of September 11, 2001, and further concentrates on the 
two programs under study. Part two outlines the methodology that was applied to classify 
the preventive measures identified in both programs, and to develop the indicators to be 
used for considering their effectiveness, efficiency and acceptability. Based on the 
observation that both the European Air Cargo Security Program and the TAPA Freight 
Security Requirements primarily contain situational measures, the various stages that 
(should) form part of the design of a generic situational crime prevention project are 
discussed in the third part. The fourth and final part focuses on one particular stage in the 
design process, being the „ex ante‟ consideration of potential measures and 
interdependencies.  
 
(EU) Supply Chain Security Programs 
 
In response to the disastrous attacks of September 11, 2001, federal and state governments 
globally have introduced programs that are designed to protect the public in general, and 
the supply chain in particular, against acts of unlawful interference. With the Aviation and 
Transportation Security Act
2
, the Customs Trade Partnership against Terrorism
3 
and the 
Container Security Initiative
4
, the US Government set the scene for the introduction of a 
range of trans-border security initiatives. The European Union was soon to follow with the 
enforcement of a series of requirements covering all modes of transport. In December 
2002 the International Ship and Port Facility (ISPS) Code was adopted as an amendment 
to the SOLAS Convention, describing minimum requirements for security of ships and 
ports. In 2004 this code was incorporated into European legislation.
5
 As the ISPS rules 
only cover the direct interface between the vessels and the landside, an additional 
Directive allowing for tailor-made processes in European ports was put into place.
6 
In the 
area of civil aviation and air cargo security, Regulation (EC) No 2320/2002
7
 enabled for a 
European framework with intense levels of security in the form of rules and measures with 
detailed, legally binding specifications and checks. The European Air Cargo Security 
Program has been in effect since January 19, 2003, and has recently been revised in order 
to seek further simplification, harmonisation and clarification of the existing rules, as well 
as improvement of the various levels of security.
8
 It is based on standards contained in 
ICAO
9
 Annex 17, recommendations of the European Civil Aviation Conference 
(ECAC)
10
, and Commission proposals. Chapter 6.1. of EU Regulation 2320/2002 states 
that all cargo, courier and express parcels intended to be carried on passenger or all-cargo 
aircraft, need to be subjected to security controls before being placed on board the aircraft. 
When the cargo, courier and express parcels originate from a known or account consignor, 
and sterility of the shipments is maintained until the departure of the aircraft, these 
security controls need not be applied. The option to secure supply chains as provided for 
in the EU Air Cargo Security Program requires the consequent provision of a range of 
different statuses, such as the status of „known consignor‟ (for passenger aircraft), 
„account consignor‟ (for all-cargo aircraft) and „regulated agent‟. All of them have to 
adopt very specific and binding requirements and implement a range of preventive 
measures and controls in order to be able to guarantee a free flow of goods and services.  
In an endeavour to regulate security in other forms of transport systems (i.e. rail and road 
transport, inland waterways and short sea shipping), and in order to complement existing 
Community transport security policies, the Commission issued a Communication and a 
Proposal for a Regulation on Enhancing Supply Chain Security.
11 
This proposal has never 
been formalized into European legislation, in part because a similar initiative had been 
developed and enforced by the Customs Directorate of the European Commission. A set 
of security amendments to the Community Customs Code was published in May 2005
12
, 
covering a number of measures to tighten security around goods crossing international 
borders, the requirement for traders to provide customs authorities with information on 
goods prior to import to or export from the European Union, the provision to introduce the 
Authorised Economic Operator (AEO) concept, and the introduction of a mechanism for 
setting uniform Community risk-selection criteria for controls.
13 
The total of supply chain 
security measures introduced in government programs is further complemented by a range 
of measures that form part of international standards (e.g. the ISO 28000-series)
14
, and 
various industry-driven security initiatives such as the Transported Asset Protection 
Association‟s Freight Security Requirements.15 The latter have been established by 
security professionals within the high-tech / high-value industry, and specify the minimum 
acceptable security standards for the protection of assets travelling throughout the supply 
chain, and the methods to be used in maintaining those standards. TAPA started off in the 
United States in 1997 and unites global manufacturers, freight carriers, law enforcement 
agencies and other stakeholders with the common aim of reducing losses from 
international supply chains. Suppliers can obtain TAPA certification if they meet or 
exceed the criteria detailed in the freight security requirements document. 
 
 
Methodology 
 
Two programs were selected in order to examine the effectiveness, efficiency and 
acceptability of supply chain security measures: the EU Air Cargo Security Program, 
designed to protect European civil aviation against acts of unlawful (terrorist) interference, 
and the TAPA (2007) Freight Security Requirements, a certification program that was 
specifically designed for theft prevention. In order to identify and classify the preventive 
measures in these programs, both were analysed to the level of each constituent part. From 
this exercise it became clear that all measures could be classified using the 25-category 
classification of opportunity-reducing techniques provided for by Clarke and his 
colleagues (Clarke and Eck, 2003; Cornish and Clarke, 2003; cited in Clarke, 2005: 46-
47). The existing body of knowledge on situational crime prevention was reviewed as part 
of an extensive literature review, and based on the outcome of this review a series of 
„success criteria‟ and an initial hypothesis on their impact on the effectiveness, efficiency 
and acceptability of situational measures, was developed. This hypothesis was put to the 
test using data obtained from 37 regulated agents listed in the Netherlands
16
, from the 
Aviation Security Managers of 3 major European express integrators, and from 7 users of 
the TAPA Freight Security Requirements. The findings derived from the literature review 
and the survey were consolidated and lead to the conclusion that an „ex ante‟ 
consideration of potential measures, and a thorough consideration of interdependencies, 
may prove to be extremely beneficial to the success of future programming. Prior to 
describing the set of  indicators that has been identified, the next part first introduces the 
consideration of potential measures as a separate (additional) stage in the design of any 
generic situational program. 
 
Program Design Stages 
 
According to Tilley (2005: 8) „the commonsense problem-solving approach to crime 
issues suggests that we first scan the environment for existing and future problems, then 
subject them to careful analysis to figure out what might be done about them, and on the 
basis of this develop a strategy to address them, which is then systematically evaluated so 
that practice may be refined and failed approaches abandoned‟. The same problem-solving 
methodology is used in problem-oriented policing
17 
(captured in the four-stage SARA 
model)
18 
and in many other forms of social intervention (Clarke, 1997: 15). The standard 
methodology applied for designing situational projects, as outlined by Clarke, is „a version 
of the action research model in which researchers and practitioners work together to 
analyse and define the problem, to identify and try out possible solutions, to evaluate the 
result and, if necessary, to repeat the cycle until success is achieved‟ (Lewin, 1947; cited 
in Clarke, 1997: 15). As such a generic situational crime prevention project comprises five 
stages
19
: (1) a collection of data about the nature and dimensions of the problem, (2) an 
analysis of the situational conditions that permit or facilitate the commission of the crimes 
in question, (3) a systematic study of possible means of blocking opportunities for these 
particular crimes, (4) the implementation of the most promising, feasible and economic 
measures, and (5) a (constant) monitoring of results and dissemination of experience 
(Gladstone, 1980, cited in Clarke, 1997: 15).  
As Clarke and Eck (2003: 8-1) rightly argue, these design stages shouldn‟t necessarily 
follow one another in a strictly linear fashion. An unfolding analysis can result in 
refocusing of the project, and questions about possible responses can lead to the need for 
fresh analyses. The longer and more complicated the project, the more iterations of this 
kind are likely to occur (Clarke and Eck, 2003: 8-1).   
One requirement that is consistent throughout the cycle, is the need for proper analysis and 
proper data. Analyses can be undertaken at each stage of the process: analyses in the initial 
stages would focus on current and future crime problems and the socio-environmental 
contexts in which they (may) occur, while analyses in later stages would be concerned 
with the measurement of policy impacts, the attribution of observed changes to 
interventions, and the search for any policy side-effects such as displacement, crime 
switch, or the diffusion of benefits (Hirschfield, 2005: 632). Obviously proper analysis 
requires proper data. In practice data on crime problems are often hard to access, partial 
and inaccurate, and identifying patterns and underlying problems requires substantial 
understanding and skills (Tilley, 2005: 8). As Tilley continues, „the initially “obvious” can 
be quite mistaken and ill-thought through but well intentioned responses are capable of 
producing perverse and damaging effects‟ (see further). Various tools are available to 
support this process of data gathering and interpretation: impact analyses, vulnerability 
scans, crime-centred analyses (CCA)
20
, crime-environment analyses (CEA)
21
, crime script 
analyses
22
, etc.  
Although various authors have stressed the need for an assessment of measures prior to 
their implementation (Goldstein, 1979; Clarke, 1997; Hirshfield, 2005), it remains unclear 
what criteria to use in order to select the „most promising, feasible and affordable‟ ones. In 
order to stress the importance of an „ex ante‟ consideration of preventive measures it is 
essential to identify this consideration as a separate, individual stage in any program 
design. Taking these comments on board, the next sections will briefly highlight the main 
activities covered in each stage of the (design) process.   
 
Stage 1: Identification and definition of the problem and relevant stakeholders 
 
A proper identification and clear definition of the (current or potential) problem on hand is 
essential in order to make a statement on the urgency and priority to tackle it, as well as 
the decision on appropriate strategies to intervene. If the problem definition is wrong to 
start with or important information is overlooked, then the whole process (and consequent 
decisions) can be compromised (Laycock, 2005: 682). As Gilling (1996: 19) argues, 
„misdiagnoses of crime problems can result from the failure to research the characteristics 
of crimes in sufficient depth‟. For that reason it is important to collect and interpret as 
much data as possible on the nature of the problem, its extent and impact. Ekblom (1988, 
in: Gilling, 1996: 12) identifies this stage as „obtaining data on crime problems‟. Berry 
and Carter (1992, in: Gilling, 1996: 12) refer to the need for „a clear understanding of the 
problem being addressed‟. Once the (potential) problem has been identified and 
prioritised, it is essential to identify all relevant stakeholders and decide on the way 
forward. Morgan and Cornish (2006b: 33) define stakeholders as „private and public 
organisations or groups of people that will benefit if the problem is addressed, or may 
experience negative consequences or harm if it isn‟t‟. I would like to add those (groups of) 
individuals that may experience negative consequences or adverse effects if inappropriate 
measures are introduced to tackle the problem. Those individuals, groups of individuals, 
or organisations that are expected to play an active role in undertaking the measures 
defined in a program (e.g. transport companies requested to implement supply chain 
security measures), form a subgroup within the total stakeholder community. I will further 
refer to this subgroup as „users‟. 
 
 
Stage 2: Further analysis of problem and context 
 
Once the crime problem has been identified, defined and prioritised, it is essential to 
further analyse the situational conditions that permit or facilitate the commission of the 
crime(s) under study, and the situational context and environment in which preventive 
action is required. Effective responses cannot be developed unless all factors contributing 
to the problem are known (Mayhew et al., 1976: 29; Hirschfield, 2005: 632; Morgan and 
Cornish, 2006b: 34). 
 
Stage 3: (initial) Inventory of effective measures 
 
As part of stage three, an inventory of effective measures
23
, whether the most appropriate 
or not, is to be produced. According to Clarke (1997: 4) „situational measures must be 
tailored to highly specific categories of crime‟. „For maximum effect, every specific kind 
of crime, including each variety of terrorism, requires its own analysis and its own tailor-
made solutions […] and usually a package of measures must be introduced‟ (Clarke, 2006: 
xi-xii).  
 
Stage 4: Thorough consideration of potential measures 
 
All too often, countermeasures that are thought of to be effective are identified and 
implemented without considering any potential side effects or interdependencies. These 
side effects and interdependencies (if any) will eventually come to the surface after the 
measures have been implemented (e.g. as part of the evaluation phase), resulting in the 
need for abandoning initial approaches, the need for adjustments or „damage repair‟ or, 
even worse, forcing the conclusion that measures are totally ineffective and efforts and 
resources have been wasted. As Shapland (2000: 121) states, the weakness of having a full 
palette of measures to choose from is the difficulty of making the choice. Part four will 
cover this stage in more detail.     
 
 
 
 
Stage 5: Implementation of the most promising measures 
 
The actual implementation stage starts when all potential measures have been identified 
and considered, and a detailed implementation plan allowing for constant monitoring and 
an „ex post‟ impact and process evaluation has been agreed upon with users and other 
stakeholders.  According to Clarke (2008: 183) „a situational project is more effective 
when it adopts a package of measures, each of which is directed to a particular point of the 
process to committing the crime‟. It goes without saying that each individual measure 
within this package should be carefully considered prior to its implementation. 
 
Stage 6: Evaluation and (constant) monitoring 
 
The general purpose of evaluation is to provide feedback that will generate corrections to, 
and refinements in, crime prevention theory, policy and practice (Tilley, 2002: 1). 
Scientific evaluations are necessary in order to measure and establish the effects of a 
program. As such they are said to be „a part of the remedy for exaggeration and 
overgeneralization of its efficacy‟ (Eck, 2002: 95). Four basic elements must be 
considered in all evaluations: interventions (i.e. the package of actions whose 
effectiveness the evaluation is supposed to determine), outcomes (i.e. the changes in target 
crimes or disorders), cases (i.e. the people or areas involved with crime) and settings 
(Shadish et al., in: Eck, 2005: 702). In most cases evaluations take place once the program 
has been implemented and settled for a certain period of time. It is important, however, to 
receive the feedback as soon as possible in order to allow for fine-tuning and, if necessary, 
more encompassing adjustments. A built-in monitoring system provides for these 
functions and can further be used for purposes of program evaluation (Gilling, 1996: 11).  
 
Considering Interdependencies and Success Indicators  
 
As indicated in the previous part, the design process explicitly stresses the need for 
considering all potential measures prior to their implementation. The value of an „ex ante‟ 
consideration of situational measures is an obvious one: to estimate the effectiveness, 
efficiency and acceptability of a measure before it is actually implemented avoids that 
time and resources would be wasted and negative side effects would come into effect. 
When all potential measures (i.e. solutions that are thought of to be effective) have been 
identified, each of them should be carefully scrutinized and potential interdependencies 
should be identified. The outcome of these considerations can be applied to help prioritise 
and rank them, and decide on the most promising and feasible option(s). When the cost-
benefit calculus for a certain (set of) measures turns out negative, alternative measures 
should be (re)considered.  
 
Interdependencies 
The level of effectiveness or efficiency of a measure often depends on environmental 
conditions, and on the availability of other measures. It is of little or no use to install an 
electronic access control system with no access control procedures in place. Clarke (1997: 
26) provides the example of security guards that rarely monitor CCTV systems as closely 
as designers would expect. Examples of interdependencies that have been reported in the 
Counteract Study are the need to combine locking devices for vehicles and trailers with 
proper security procedures and proper arrangements with subcontractors and suppliers, 
and the need to combine the installation of GPS or similar technology on vehicles with 
proper follow-up capabilities and procedures. Prior to deciding on what measures to 
implement, it is essential to recognize what interdependencies are obvious, and to verify 
how to overcome them. 
 
Success Indicators 
In order to facilitate the consideration of potential measures a series of „success indicators‟ 
has been identified. The first indicator (availability) is of decisive importance: if a 
measure is not available to those who are expected to undertake/utilise it, it simply cannot 
be implemented (thus no effectiveness whatsoever). The other indicators are to be 
assessed (scaled)
24
, and based on the outcome of the assessment a decision should be 
made regarding their effectiveness, efficiency and acceptability. Obviously the outcome 
for certain indicators will influence the outcome for others.  
 
Indicator 1: Availability 
 
A measure can be unavailable for a variety of reasons, e.g. because a certain technology is 
simply not available or supported in certain areas of the world, or because (local) law 
doesn‟t permit its use or implementation.  Staff vetting or (pre-)employment screening is a 
fine example of the latter. Although the rationale behind screening requirements is quite a 
logical one (i.e. „don‟t let the bad guys anywhere near the target‟), a lot of implementation 
problems related to (pre-)employment screening have been reported (n=7). These 
implementation problems refer to limited abilities to verify information across borders, 
limitations to check previous employment or criminal history due to privacy legislation, 
and the lack of access to the necessary information sources. According to some 
respondents, the implementation of security measures may further be opposed by works‟ 
council decisions (n=1), company policy (n=2) or local settings and arrangements with 
third parties or local authorities (n=3). 
 
Indicator 2: Required level of knowledge, expertise and guidance 
 
Implementing crime prevention measures requires a certain level of knowledge and 
expertise (and a commensurate level of guidance when the availability of the required 
level of knowledge and expertise cannot be taken for granted). The nature and number of 
businesses that are required to play a role in protecting the international supply chain 
highlight the vital importance of sufficient knowledge and expertise (and the potential lack 
of it). Whilst most international companies have people employed with a vast experience 
in tackling transport crime, this is not always the case for small and midsized enterprises, 
and even less for the thousands of shippers who, under total supply chain security 
management, would now become involved in securing their goods and premises. Proper 
guidance will prove to be essential. A poor understanding of available techniques to 
assess, evaluate, prioritise and tackle (crime) risks may render all efforts useless. Supply 
chain security measures that – according to some respondents - require specific guidance, 
are: the need for proper documentation of air cargo (n=3) and the consequent verification 
of this documentation upon receipt of the freight (n=2), the requirement to check the 
identity of persons delivering known freight (n=5), the obligation to screen consignments 
for prohibited articles (n=5), and the duty to perform (pre-) employment checks on staff 
(n=1).  
 
 
 
Indicator 3: Practicability 
 
Practicability refers to the degree to which a certain measure increases or decreases the 
convenience of everyday life and work. As Clarke (1997: 26) indicates, situational 
measures have sometimes failed due to technical or administrative ineptitude. For that 
reason it should be taken into account that those who are requested to implement a 
measure should reasonably be able to do so without impeding their core business 
processes to an extent that their execution becomes impossible. Examples of reported 
problems that refer to the practicability of implementation include difficulties encountered 
with organising security awareness training for all relevant categories of staff (n=5), 
inabilities to seal multiple stop pick-up and delivery vehicles (n=5), difficulties 
encountered with conducting a full identity check on persons delivering known freight 
(n=4), and with trying to limit the use of soft-sided trailers during peak season (n=1).   
 
Indicator 4: Financial / economic cost 
 
Security costs money and those implementing crime prevention measures will weigh the 
potential benefits against the costs involved. As Laycock (2005: 686) states, some ideal 
responses may be far too expensive to be acceptable in financial terms. It‟s important 
therefore that proposals are realistic and not over-ambitious or over-expensive.
25
 Some 
examples of supply chain security measures that have been reported by a number of 
respondents as being very expensive, include: (x-ray) screening of cargo (n=8), the 
provision of security awareness training for staff (n=4), staff vetting (n=3), physical 
protection of building walls, roofs and (dock) doors (n=7), and organising full CCTV-
coverage for warehouse and dock areas (n=4). 
 
Indicator 5:  Ethical / social cost 
 
Solutions to prevent crime may be effective but that does not make them acceptable (von 
Hirsch et al., 2000, cited in Tilley, 2005: 5). By their very nature or when applied without 
reflection, preventive measures can easily turn into the negative and threaten the quality of 
our society. Certain members of our society may become labelled, feelings of intolerance 
and distrust may be stimulated, social conduct may be hindered, and human rights violated 
(Vettenburg et al., 2003: 11-12). As argued by Duff and Marshall (2000: 23) „any cost-
effective measure brings some benefits and imposes some costs (such as the material 
resources required to implement it, the degree of inconvenience it creates, and its possible 
deleterious impact on such interests as freedom, autonomy or privacy)‟.  
The social and ethical acceptability of crime prevention measures depends on their non-
discriminating character in imposing costs and/or burdens to all or just some individuals or 
groups within society (Duff and Marshall, 2000: 27), on the extent to which they tend to 
label certain groups or individuals or exclude them from our society. A thoughtless use of 
access control measures in public or semi-public spaces such as shopping malls, to give 
just one example, may result in the fact that individuals profiled as posing an increased 
risk may lose access to public spaces which formerly were accessible to all, without them 
having ever engaged in any disruptive or aggressive behaviour, or before having had the 
chance to show to be willing to behave properly (von Hirsch and Shearing, 2000: 89). 
Ethical and social costs further relate to feelings of intolerance and distrust that may be 
provoked. If an employer decides to introduce exit searches on employees as they leave 
work, not only the cost-effectiveness of this measure, but also the attitude it displays 
towards the employees should be questioned, as well as the conception it implies of their 
role in the enterprise in which they are engaged (Duff and Marshall, 2000: 22).  
Ethical and social costs also relate to the imminence of a „fortress‟ or „Panopticon‟ society 
in which people, terrified by crime, become distrustful of one-another and barricade 
themselves in their homes and places of work (Davis, in Clarke, 1997: 37; Grabosky, 
1996: 38; von Hirsch, Garland and Wakefield, 2000: vi). They relate to „big brother‟ 
forms of (state) control in which people (have to) give up their right of privacy, or, more 
in general, to the fact that introducing certain measures may have a detrimental effect on 
the environment. As Buruma (2005: 4) argues, crime and security threats provoke 
(government) reactions that, although not intended, can cause other threats to, e.g., the 
freedom and liberties of citizen.  Tilley (2005: 6) refers to proper concerns about the 
potential threats to civil liberties from intrusive surveillance methods or from brutal forms 
of punishment designed to deter offenders.  
Ethical and social costs further relate to inequalities that result from, or are multiplied by, 
the introduction of measures that aren‟t affordable to all: „would-be burglars turn their 
attention from well-protected houses to others which are less protected […] or those who 
lack the more sophisticated kinds of protection are less well protected and more at risk 
than those who have them‟ (Duff and Marshall, 2000: 25). 
While the ethical and social cost of situational crime prevention is obvious in some cases, 
it shouldn‟t be ignored that not every measure is likely to be susceptible to the critical 
concerns raised above, and that „people are willing to surrender some freedoms or endure 
some inconvenience in specific contexts if they gain protection from crime‟ (Clarke, 2005: 
61). A good example of the latter is the general acceptance of the need for a series of 
additional precautions when checking-in on a passenger flight. A precautionary measure 
that was decided on as being too intrusive is the use of full body scanners at European 
airports. Plans to introduce these scanners have been deferred by the European 
Commission as they raised deep concerns about privacy.
 
 
 
Indicator 6: Ease of circumvention 
 
This indicator relates to the efforts required for offenders to circumvent a measure that has 
been introduced, and is inversely proportional to the effectiveness of that measure. Not 
only the ease with which a certain measure can be circumvented is relevant, but also the 
costs associated with the modus operandi applied by offenders in order to circumvent it. 
 
Indicator 7: Beneficial side effects  
 
Another indicator that needs to be assessed (scaled) is the presence, or absence, of any 
beneficial side effects resulting from the implementation (e.g. diffusion of benefits, de-
escalating effects, etc.). A reduction in thefts and losses, improved customer loyalty and 
employee commitment, higher supply chain visibility and improved efficiency, are just 
some examples of beneficial side effects (or „collateral benefits‟) that are frequently 
referred to in literature as resulting from the introduction of (anti-terrorism) supply chain 
security measures (Rice and Spayd, 2005; Peleg-Gillai, Bhat and Sept, 2006). 
 
Indicator 8:  Reverse effects 
 
Even more important in the cost/benefit calculus is the presence or absence of any reverse 
effects that may occur. As Grabosky (1996: 25) argues, the ways in which crime 
prevention programs may become derailed are numerous and diverse. The most common 
side effects that are referred to in literature are effects of („geographical‟, „temporal‟, 
„target‟, „tactical‟ or „crime type‟) displacement.26 A variation on the displacement effect 
is what Grabosky refers to as „escalating effects‟ of crime prevention measures or 
initiatives. In the course of combating crime, one may actually produce crime and, as 
such, do more harm than good. „The frustration that results from blocked criminal 
opportunities may lead to excessive violence or to an instrumental reliance on more 
forceful means of goal attainment‟ (Marx, 1990, in: Grabosky, 1996: 27). To cite Veno 
and Veno: „where intervention is warranted, it should be delivered in a manner that 
minimises the potential for escalation‟ (Veno and Veno, 1993, in: Grabosky, 1996: 27). 
Another variation of reverse effects is what Grabosky refers to as „creative adaptation‟. 
Some initiatives or measures may inspire adaptive behaviour on the part of offenders that 
can entail more inventive, devious or violent activity (Grabosky, 1996: 32). A fourth and 
final example that needs considering as part of the design stage of the program are 
„unintentional enticement effects‟. By dramatising certain aspects by means of, e.g., 
warning messages, one may actually advertise the behaviour in question, either by 
bringing it to the attention of those who would otherwise be oblivious or only vaguely 
aware, or by enticing the potentially rebellious (Grabosky, 1996: 28). Grabosky (1996: 30) 
also refers to this phenomenon as „the forbidden fruit effect‟. 
 
Indicator 9: Stakeholder/user belief 
 
It goes without saying that users will be less motivated to fully implement measures if 
they have no belief in their effectiveness (and vice versa).  The counter-terrorism measures 
that are perceived by users of the EU Air Cargo Security Program as being the most 
effective ones, are: protecting known freight against unauthorized interference at all times 
(87,2% of respondents); providing access control to premises and designated areas where 
known freight is being prepared, handled or stored (79,5%); screening of consignments for 
prohibited articles (79,5%); protecting consignments against unauthorized interference 
during transport (78,9%) and staff vetting (78,9%).  
 
 
 
Indicator 10: Stakeholder/user awareness and commitment 
 
No discussion on crime prevention can be complete unless it takes account of potential 
resistance encountered (Sutton, 1996: 70). As Hirschfield argues: „the effectiveness with 
which crime prevention measures are deployed depends […] on how receptive local 
communities are to having them in their area‟ (Hirschfield, 2005: 631). The effectiveness 
(and success) of a measure will without any doubt depend on the level of awareness and 
commitment of its users. The level of commitment will depend to a great extent on the 
outcome of a proper consideration of some of the indicators discussed above. An average 
user will be less committed to (help) deploy a measure that requires a lot of (lacking) 
expertise to implement, that is extremely expensive or impractical, or that violates his 
right of privacy and freedom of movement, etc.    
According to Laycock (2005: 686), one of the main reasons for implementation failure is 
that the agency expected to carry out the implementation has no direct interest in doing so, 
resulting in the fact that it won‟t be committed to an extent that the program turns into a 
success. In „Designing out crime from products and systems‟, Clarke and Newman (2005: 
3) argue that „manufacturers have been particularly reluctant to act in the public interest 
when they profit from the crime; when they are scrambling to develop new products; 
when changes are costly, inconvenient or of unproven value; when the crimes are 
considered trivial and public concern is not high; and when solutions are controversial‟. In 
general it is of major importance to organise the implementation of a (series of) 
measure(s) in such a way to neutralize or overcome as many acceptance problems as 
possible (NCPI, 2001: 153).   
 
Conclusion 
 
In order to combat terrorism the European Union Heads of State called for „the 
strengthening of all forms of transport systems, including the enhancement of the legal 
framework and the improvement of preventive mechanisms‟.27 According to the Council, 
the cowardly attacks on the rail system in Madrid served as a terrible reminder of the 
threat posed by terrorism to our society, and to the values on which the European Union is 
founded. A full implementation of measures to combat terrorism was declared to be „a 
matter of urgency‟. This article is about situational crime prevention in the (European) 
supply chain. It is based on a thorough analysis of two international supply chain security 
programs, and on the consequent observation that the security measures that form part of 
these programs can all be classified as situational techniques. Unlike more traditional 
criminological theories that are concerned with explaining why certain individuals are 
more likely to engage in criminal behaviour compared to others, situational crime 
prevention focuses on modifying the settings in which crime occurs. As the micro-level 
extreme of the environmental perspective, situational crime prevention puts the reduction 
of opportunities and the manipulation of the costs and benefits of crime to the fore as the 
bases for crime prevention (Wortley and Mazerolle, 2008b: 10).  
Over the past decades, the environmental perspective has been gaining increasing traction 
among government officials and end-users in criminal justice agencies and private bodies. 
As indicated by Wortley and Mazerolle (2008a; 2008b: 2), much has to do with its applied 
focus and its focus on the current dynamics of crime. Academics cannot but recognize its 
growing influence and should be supportive in exploring and improving its potential, 
building on a long and firm tradition of research in social sciences and taking into account 
developments in other academic disciplines.     
In this article it is argued that an „ex ante‟ consideration of preventive measures may prove 
to be extremely beneficial to the success of (situational) crime prevention initiatives. 
Assessing the effectiveness, efficiency and acceptability of a measure before it is actually 
implemented avoids that time and resources would be wasted and negative side effects 
would come into effect. The outcome of this consideration can be applied to help prioritise 
and rank potential interventions, and decide on the most promising and feasible one(s).  
A growing interest in social and ethical costs of situational crime prevention and in its 
potential reverse effects, to name but a few, is not only necessary, but may also prove to 
be the answer to some of the critiques that have been posted to adherents of the situational 
and environmental perspective.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTES 
 
[1] Cluster of User Networks in Transport and Energy Relating to Anti-terrorist Activities, 
2006–2009. 
[2] Public Law 107-071 passed by the 107th Congress on November 19, 2001. 
[3] The Customs Trade Partnership against Terrorism (C-TPAT) is a voluntary 
government-business initiative to build cooperative relationships that strengthen and 
improve overall international supply chain and U.S. border security. More info: 
www.cbp.gov. 
[4] The Container Security Initiative (CSI) was launched in 2002 by the U.S. Bureau of 
Customs and Border Protection in order to increase security for container cargo shipped to 
the United States. 
[5] Regulation (EC) No 725/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 
March 2004 on enhancing ship and port facility security, Official Journal of the European 
Union, L 129/6, 29 April 2004. 
[6] Directive 2005/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 
2005 on enhancing port security, Official Journal of the European Union, L 310/28, 25 
November 2005. 
[7] Regulation (EC) No 2320/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 
December 2002 establishing common rules in the field of civil aviation security, Official 
Journal of the European Communities, L 355/1, 30 December 2002. 
[8] Regulation (EC) No 300/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 
March 2008 on common rules in the field of civil aviation security and repealing 
Regulation (EC) No 2320/2002, Official Journal of the European Union, L 97/72, 9 April 
2008. 
[9] International Civil Aviation Organization. More info: www.icao.int. 
[10] European Civil Aviation Conference. More info: www.ecac-ceac.org. 
[11] Commission of the European Communities (2006) Communication and Proposal for 
a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on enhancing supply chain 
security, COM (2006), 79, 
www.ec.europa.eu/dgs/energy_transport/security/intermodal/doc/com_2006_0079_en.pdf, 
(accessed 29 December 2008). 
[12] Regulation (EC) No 648/2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 
April 2005 amending Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 establishing the Community 
Customs Code, Official Journal of the European Union, L 117, 4 May 2005. 
[13] Taxation and Customs Union (n.d.) Customs related security initiatives of the EU, 
www.ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/customs/policy_issues/customs_security/security_ini
tiatives/index_en.htm, (accessed 29 December 2008). 
[14] For more info: www.iso.org. 
[15] For more info: www.tapaemea.com. 
[16] From the research population (= a total of 257 companies listed as regulated agent in 
the Netherlands in July 2008), 37 completed and returned the questionnaire (= 14,39%). 
Respondents were asked to rate the perceived effectiveness of the various measures on a 
scale from „0‟ to „3‟, and to list and comment on the implementation problems they had 
experienced (free text input). 
[17] „Problem-oriented policing‟, introduced by Goldstein in 1979 and captured in the 
four-stage SARA model (i.e. „Scanning‟, „Analysis‟, „Response‟ and „Assessment‟), 
reflects the same action research paradigm underpinning situational crime prevention 
(Goldstein, 1979, cited in Clarke, 1997: 9; Clarke and Eck, 2003: 5-1). 
[18] The SARA model was originally developed by Eck and Spelman as a simple 
problem-solving tool that can help in addressing any crime or disorder problem (Morgan 
and Cornish, 2006b: 29). More recently Ekblom (cited in Clarke and Eck, 2003: 8-2) 
developed the SARA-acronym further into what he refers to as „the 5 I‟s‟(„Intelligence‟, 
„Intervention‟, „Implementation‟, „Involvement‟ and „Impact and process evaluation‟). 
[19] Similar stages can be identified in Gill‟s Crime Risk Management Process, which is 
broader in scope and encompasses an assessment of the problem , a decision on the most 
appropriate strategy to deal with it and on the points or levels at which actions can be 
taken. The process further encompasses the implementation of those actions, as well as 
their evaluation (Gill, 1998: 14-15).   
[20] Crime-centred analysis (CCA) uses a range of measurements and statistical 
techniques to identify the manifestation of crime and how it is changing over time, and 
includes analyses of its spatial distribution, its temporal patterns and how crime within one 
area compares with that elsewhere (Hirschfield, 2005: 637). 
[21] Crime-environment analysis (CEA) examines the relationship between crime and 
aspects of the physical and social environment. It includes exploring links between crime 
and community-level characteristics (e.g. disadvantage, community cohesion) and 
between crime and other factors such as land use, transport routes, the distribution of 
crime generators, crime attractors and, if available, crime prevention measures 
(Hirschfield, 2005: 637). 
[22] Crime scripts describe the ways in which an offence unfolds and attempt to make 
explicit the series of decision points through which the would-be offender passes in the 
process of crime commission (Morgan and Cornish, 2006: 13). Cornish (1994, sited in 
Cornish and Clarke, 2008: 31) was the first to propose the concept of crime scripts to help 
identify every stage of the crime-commission process, the decisions and actions that must 
be taken at each stage and the resources required for effective action at each step. As 
Laycock argues, crime scripts can be useful in the response development process since 
they offer a mechanism for systematically working through the decision process, thus 
exposing a range of potential intervention points (Laycock, 2005: 682). 
[23] Measures are effective if they have the desired effect or produce the intended result 
(definition derived from the Oxford Advanced Learner‟s Dictionary, fifth edition (1995), 
p. 370). 
[24] Knowledge and experience obtained from previous projects or fellow academics and 
crime prevention practitioners will obviously be of major assistance in this consideration 
process. 
[25] Whilst Clarke‟s classification of situational techniques comprises five different 
strategies (i.e. „to increase the perceived effort‟, „to increase the perceived risk‟, „to reduce 
the anticipated rewards‟, „to remove excuses‟ and „to reduce provocations‟), it is worth 
observing that the first two strategies  have been found to be dominant in both programs 
under study. In order to widen the potential of situational crime prevention in the 
international supply chain it might be worth considering examining and/or introducing 
additional techniques that fall under the other strategic options. Alternative techniques 
may prove to be less expensive and/or less intrusive, which would tackle resistance or 
implementation problems faced by users.  
[26] Displacement theory sees crime as being shifted around in five main ways: either 
moved from one place to another (i.e. „geographical displacement‟), moved from one time 
to another (i.e. „temporal displacement‟), directed away from one target to another (i.e. 
„target displacement‟), replacing on method of committing a crime by another (i.e. 
‟tactical displacement‟) or substituting one type of crime for another (i.e. „crime type 
displacement‟) (Clarke and Eck, 2003: 13-1). 
[27] Council of the European Union, Declaration on combating terrorism, Brussels, 25 
March 2004. 
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CHAPTER 2: RE-THINKING THE COST OF SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY38 
 
Research paper: HAELTERMAN, H. (2011) 'Re-thinking the Cost of Supply Chain 
Security', in: Crime, Law and Social Change, 56 (4), 389-405.    
 
Main arguments: 
 
In this second paper the success indicators that were listed in Chapter 1 have been 
analyzed further and compared to the existing body of knowledge on situational crime 
prevention. Based on the outcome of an extensive literature review and consequent 
analyses, direct and indirect implementation costs have been differentiated from a range of 
(consequential costs provoked by) potential reverse effects, and from a series of generic 
preconditions, enabling practitioners in industry to conduct a proper cost analysis and 
come to an informed decision on what particular measure(s) best to implement.  
 
Preconditions include the practicability and availability of a measure to end-users, as well 
as the knowledge and expertise that is required to evaluate and implement that measure. 
They further include end-users‟ awareness of the problem that is being dealt with, their 
belief in the effectiveness of the proposed solution(s), and their commitment to solve the 
problem and to co-operate with other stakeholders to reach the desired outcome. It is 
argued that the effectiveness and efficiency of a solution may be severely compromised if 
these preconditions are not or insufficiently met. Direct and indirect implementation costs 
refer to the financial, ethical and esthetical cost of a measure that is being considered. 
Financial (or monetary) costs cover the fixed and variable costs of investing in crime 
prevention. Social costs relate to the (perceived) impact of the introduction of a measure 
on civil liberties, convenience and conduct of staff, customers and other stakeholders; and 
esthetical costs relate to the (perceived) impact on the esthetics of the environment in 
which a measure is introduced.  
 
                                                 
38
 Note: this chapter is an exact copy of the second research paper, published in Crime, Law and Social 
Change. No changes have been made to its structure nor to its content. Only footnotes have been converted 
into end notes, as to maintain consistency throughout this manuscript. 
Another factor that requires careful consideration in order to come to an all encompassing 
cost assessment, is the impact of a range of unintended consequences that may come into 
effect following the introduction of a certain (set of) measure(s). This impact may result 
from displacement, escalating, creative adaptation and/or enticement effects. 
 
In this paper it is argued that – as part of a generic program design - the actual 
implementation stage should only start once all potential measures have been identified 
and considered, and a detailed implementation plan allowing for constant monitoring and 
an „ex post‟ impact and process evaluation has been agreed upon with users and other 
stakeholders. It is further argued that criminology and management science can support 
the assessment and decision making process, provided that policy makers allow operators 
a certain freedom of choice between alternative measures and approaches.   
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ABSTRACT 
 
Post 9/11 we have witnessed the introduction and further strengthening of a range of 
trans-border security programs designed to protect international supply chains against 
acts of unlawful interference. In some cases compliance with these programs is 
mandatory. In other cases compliance results in a preferential treatment by appropriate 
authorities. To a great extent, these programs comprehend the introduction of situational  
measures. In most instances, however, operators within the supply chain – being made 
responsible for their actual implementation - are left with limited guidance. In this paper 
it is argued that a lack of guidance may result in measures being introduced without 
taking full account of their potential consequences. Based on an analysis of previous 
research findings and on the outcome of a literature review, direct and indirect 
implementation costs have been differentiated from a range of (consequential costs 
provoked by) potential reverse effects, and from a series of generic preconditions, 
enabling practitioners in industry to conduct a proper cost analysis and come to an 
informed decision on what particular measure(s) best to implement. It is argued that 
criminology and management science can support this decision making process, provided 
that policy makers allow operators a certain freedom of choice between alternative 
measures and approaches. 
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Introduction 
 
„What have you criminologists been doing all these years?‟ This quote was taken from 
Martin Gill‟s introduction to the first volume of „Crime at Work‟ [1]. According to Gill, 
crime in the business environment had been a marginal concern for most criminologists at 
the time. Most tended to see crime and business solely in terms of corporate crime, white 
collar crime and fraud; while in reality virtually any crime can occur at the workplace; and 
the business or its staff, customers or contractors can either be the offender or the victim 
[1]. This paper highlights a similar concern, be it of a somewhat different nature.  
Post 9/11 we have witnessed the introduction of a range of trans-border security programs 
designed to protect international supply chains against acts of unlawful interference [2-4]. 
The scene was set by US Government with the introduction of the Container Security 
Initiative (CSI), the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), and the 
Advanced Manifest Rule (AMR). In the European Union, the International Ship and Port 
Facility Security (ISPS) Code was adopted in December 2002 as an amendment to the 
SOLAS Convention, describing minimum requirements for security of ships and ports
1
. In 
the area of civil aviation and air cargo security, Regulation (EC) No. 2320/2002 enabled 
for a European framework with intense levels of security in the form of rules and 
measures with detailed, legally binding specifications and checks
2
, and in 2003 the 
European Commission communicated two main goals with respect to the future of 
customs authorities, introducing – amongst other – the European Authorized Economic 
Operator concept
3
. Over the past decade, most of these programs have been strengthened 
following further incidents and changing threat patterns provoking government and 
industry intervention.
4
 In some cases compliance to them is mandatory for operators in the 
logistics chain. In other instances compliance results in a preferential treatment by 
appropriate authorities, as is the case for the Authorized Economic Operator program that 
allows for reduced security checks by Customs and – as such - for a faster transfer of 
goods through so-called “green lanes” [2]. In all cases, operators are being made 
responsible for the introduction of preventive controls, putting security and compliance 
high on the agenda and making them an integral part of contemporary supply chain 
management.  
In most if not all instances, supply chain security programs comprehend the introduction 
of situational measures, and in many cases operators in the industry are left with limited 
guidance on how best to implement them [5]. A study conducted in 2009 into the 
effectiveness, efficiency and acceptability of situational crime prevention in international 
supply chain security programs, identified a series of costs and implementation problems 
reported by end-users [4-5]. In the same study it was argued that an „ex ante‟ 
consideration of preventive measures may prove to be extremely beneficial to the success 
of future programming. This consideration is to take place prior to the actual 
implementation phase, and the outcome can be applied to help prioritize and rank potential 
interventions and to decide on the most promising and feasible one(s) [4]. It goes without 
saying that, in order to enable operators in the supply chain to consider alternative options, 
they must first be allowed a certain freedom of choice. This is currently the case in some 
but by far not all programs. As where customs supply chain security programs such as the 
European Authorized Economic Operator program clearly indicate the scope of the 
required interventions, leaving the decision on what particular safeguards to introduce 
open to some extent; business driven initiatives such as the TAPA Freight Security 
Requirements
5
 only list a range of very specific situational measures that need to be 
introduced in order to reach and maintain compliance. 
The present paper further elaborates on the above and aims to identify what costs and 
preconditions need to be considered in order to come to an informed decision on what 
measure(s) best to implement. It aims to differentiate the cost components associated with 
the introduction of a specific measure from a range of reverse effects that may result in 
consequential costs; and from a set of preconditions that need to be in place in order for 
the introduction to be feasible and successful. The decision to focus on the costs of 
situational crime prevention is instigated by a genuine concern that operators risk to be left 
in the cold, and, out of ignorance or due to a lack of guidance, risk to implement measures 
without taking full account of its potential consequences. As an understanding of the 
situational calculus made by offenders in specific kinds of crime is the key to effective 
prevention [6], so is an understanding of the costs (and benefits) of the range of situational 
crime prevention measures to choose from.  As Tilley [7] argues: “it should be clear that 
crime prevention is ineluctably complex. This means that those for whom crime reduction 
or community safety is a specialist responsibility either as policy-maker or practitioner, 
need to have a broad grasp of the theory, evidence, circumstances, options, contexts, 
ethics and possible consequences of varying responses if they are to make informed 
decisions”. It goes without saying that those responsible for implementing crime 
prevention programs within their industry or individual company require a commensurate 
level of knowledge, expertise and/or guidance.  
The scope of the attached paper is limited to an identification and consideration of the cost 
of introducing situational measures. As such it aims to move away from a high level 
theoretical discussion on the pro‟s and contra‟s of situational crime prevention compared 
to more traditional criminological approaches, as well as from a debate on who should 
bear the cost of crime prevention. Although space limitations do not allow a detailed 
coverage of the situational perspective, it seems appropriate to provide a brief introduction 
to its theoretical base and to the set of situational techniques available to end-users. 
 
Situational Crime Prevention 
 
Most criminological theories have traditionally been concerned with explaining why 
certain individuals are more likely to engage in criminal behaviour compared to others. 
They refer to particular biological, biochemical or psychological dispositions or 
influences; inherited traits; a range of social factors or conditions such as poor education, 
poverty, inadequate socialization, weak bonds to society, weak morals; etc. [8-9]. 
Likewise, much crime prevention effort has gone into trying to lessen these dispositions or 
influences [7]. In recent decades, various criminological theories have influenced our 
understanding of the importance of settings and places in crime prevention efforts [10]. As 
Clarke [8] argues, they emphasize that the commission of a crime requires not only the 
existence of a motivated offender, but also the opportunity for crime. Situational crime 
prevention relates to the latter group of theories. As such it is an approach to crime 
prevention that focuses not upon changing offenders, but on modifying the settings (with 
its situational factors) in which crime occurs [8].  
The concept of situational crime prevention was first introduced in the late 1970‟s by a 
team of scholars working in the UK Home Office [11]. Studies on institutional treatments 
for delinquents undertaken by the Home Office Research Unit provided a stimulus for the 
founding of its theoretical base, together with two independent but related strands of 
policy research in the United States: Oscar Newman‟s concept of „defensible space‟ 
(1972), and Jeffery‟s concept of crime prevention through environmental design (1971) 
[11]. The theoretical development of situational crime prevention was further strengthened 
by the development of routine activity and rational choice theory [11]. According to 
rational choice theory, offenders make rational decisions when carrying out a criminal act: 
if the costs of exploiting a criminal opportunity are perceived as being too high, or if an 
opportunity is reduced or removed altogether, the offender will cease the activity or look 
for another and better opportunity [12].  Routine activity theory argues that offenders are 
but one element in a crime, and perhaps not even the most important element. The routine 
activity approach emphasizes how illegal activities feed on routine activities: everyday life 
sometimes delivers temptations without controls [13]. According to Cohen and Felson 
„crime occurs when a motivated offender and suitable target (or victim) converge in space 
and time in the absence of a capable guardian‟ [11]. Routine activity, rational choice and 
crime pattern theory – sometimes referred to as „opportunity theories‟ [14] or „crime 
theories‟ – all give an important role to situational factors in crime. Although somewhat 
different in focus, they provide a solid theoretical base for the concept of situational crime 
prevention: „routine activity as a “macro” theory that seeks to explain how changes in 
society expand or contract opportunities for crime; crime pattern theory as a “meso” 
theory that seeks to explain how offenders seek or stumble across opportunities for crime 
in the course of their everyday lives; and the rational choice perspective as a “micro-level” 
theory that deals with the decision-making processes that result in an offender choosing to 
become involved in crime and selecting specific crimes to commit‟ [14].   
The set of situational crime prevention measures or techniques has evolved quite 
significantly over the past years. The original formulation of situational crime prevention 
included an eight-category classification of opportunity-reducing techniques of which 
some had proven to be useful while the remainder required modification [11]. In his first 
edition of „Situational Crime Prevention‟ (1992), Clarke presents a revised classification 
of twelve techniques, adding new categories and re-labelling existing ones. These twelve 
have later (1997) been expanded by Clarke and Homel to sixteen, including a new 
category of „removing excuses for crime‟. Finally, in response to Wortley‟s remarks on 
controlling situational precipitators [15-16], Cornish and Clarke (2003) expanded the 
techniques further to twenty five by including a category „reducing provocations‟. As such 
the classification of preventive techniques has grown in step with the expanded theoretical 
base of situational prevention [14]. Table 1 provides a full overview of situational 
techniques, listed under five basic strategies: (1) increasing the perceived effort, (2) 
increasing the perceived risk, (3) reducing the anticipated rewards, (4) removing excuses 
and (5) reducing provocations.  
 
Table 1: Situational Crime Prevention Techniques (Clarke, 2005: 46-47) 
 
Increase the effort Increase the risks Reduce the rewards Reduce provocations Remove excuses 
Harden targets Extend guardianship Conceal targets Reduce frustration and 
stress 
Set rules 
Control access to 
facilities 
Assist natural 
surveillance 
Remove targets Avoid disputes Post instructions 
Screen exits Reduce anonymity Identify property Reduce emotional 
arousal 
Alert conscience 
Deflect offenders Utilise place managers Disrupt markets Neutralise peer 
pressure 
Assist compliance 
Control tools / 
weapons 
Strengthen formal 
surveillance 
Deny benefits Discourage imitation Control drugs / alcohol 
 
Research design 
 
In order to develop an overview of potential costs associated with the introduction of 
situational crime prevention in a business environment, previous research findings were 
combined with the outcome of a thorough literature review, covering the existing body of 
knowledge on situational crime prevention. Cost factors and implementation problems that 
had been identified earlier in a study conducted into the effectiveness, efficiency and 
acceptability of situational crime prevention in the international supply chain [5], were 
compared with those identified in literature, and combined into an all encompassing 
inventory. This initial inventory was then analyzed further in order to differentiate 
(financial, ethical and esthetical) implementation costs from a range of potential reverse 
effects (i.e. consequential costs resulting from the implementation), and from a series of 
generic preconditions that relate to the introduction of preventive measures in general. 
These have then be incorporated into a conceptual model designed to identify the scope of 
an ex ante consideration of the various cost components in a generic program design. 
Finally it was explored to what extent criminology and management science can be of any 
benefit in enabling policy makers and practitioners to conduct a proper cost analysis and 
come to an informed decision on what particular measure(s) best to implement.   
 
Implementation problems and (consequential) costs 
 
As part of a study conducted in 2009 into the effectiveness, efficiency and acceptability of 
situational crime prevention in the international supply chain, operators with relevant 
experience in implementing the European Air Cargo Security Regulations and the TAPA 
(Transported Asset Protection Association) Freight Security Requirements were asked to 
qualify the (perceived) effectiveness of the various measures, and to report on any 
implementation problems they had experienced [4-5]. The study revealed a series of costs 
and implementation problems relating to the availability of certain measures that are 
required by policy makers (e.g. limited abilities to verify information across borders and 
legal limitations to conduct pre-employment or criminal history checks); to their 
practicability and impact on core business processes; to the (financial and human) 
resources required to implement and maintain them; and to their negative impact on the 
(perceived) freedom of movement and privacy of staff [4]. They further relate to the level 
of knowledge and expertise required for assessing, evaluating, prioritizing and tackling 
criminal risks; to the level of (user) belief in their effectiveness; and to the level of 
awareness and commitment of end-users and other stakeholders [4]. Similar concerns have 
been raised in criminological literature on situational crime prevention, both by its 
advocates and critics. These concerns relate to a variety of areas such as to the financial, 
ethical and esthetical cost related to the implementation of situational measures; and to 
various reverse effects that may result from the implementation (see infra). As argued by 
Duff and Marshall [17], the introduction of any measure „brings some benefits and 
imposes some costs, such as the material resources required to implement it, the degree of 
inconvenience it creates, and its possible deleterious impact on such interests as freedom, 
autonomy or privacy‟.  
Financial (or monetary) costs relate to the fixed and variable costs associated with the 
implementation of a certain measure
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. A review conducted into the monetary costs and 
benefits of thirteen situational crime prevention projects reported on between 1977 and 
1999, focused on a range of cost items such as management and overhead costs, personnel 
costs (e.g. wages of surveillance staff, …), capital expenditures, cost of (security) 
equipment and services, maintenance costs, etc. [18]. Often the implementation of security 
controls in a business environment has an impact on certain core processes (e.g. the 
introduction of X-ray screening, which delays the normal operating procedure and 
therefore adds additional costs to the import or export process). Obviously the cost 
resulting from that impact needs to be taken into account in the total (monetary) cost 
calculation. As Laycock [19] rightly states, some ideal responses may be far too expensive 
to be acceptable in financial terms. It is important therefore that proposals are realistic and 
not over-ambitious or over-expensive. Furthermore, being expensive in financial terms 
does not qualify as a guarantee for success. As Gill [1] argues, the most effective crime 
prevention measures are often cheap or even free. It has long been established, for 
example, that signs of occupancy are the factor most likely to deter potential burglars of a 
domestic dwelling, making the encouragement not to leave a note of absence on the front 
door, or not to let the newspapers build up in the letter-box, an effective and cost-efficient 
preventive measure [1]. In any case, the monetary cost of introducing a certain measure 
should be carefully measured and balanced against the cost of alternative solutions, as 
measures that may initially be thought of as being less expensive than alternative options, 
may actually prove to be the contrary, as illustrated in a study on the cost of electronic 
article surveillance in retail stores, where it was found that the cost of tagging goods 
eventually proved to be the equivalent of employing a full-time member of staff for 52 
weeks [20]. 
Solutions to prevent crime may be effective and cost-efficient, but that does not 
automatically make them acceptable without further consideration. When applied without 
reflection, or by their very nature, preventive measures can easily backfire and lower the 
quality of life in our society. Certain members of society may become labeled, feelings of 
intolerance and distrust may be stimulated, social conduct may be hindered, and human 
rights violated [21-22]. Translated into a workplace environment, staff members may feel 
labeled and discriminated, or hindered in their freedom of movement, alienating them from 
their colleagues and from their employer. Privacy rights may become violated, feelings of 
intolerance and distrust may be provoked, etc. As Duff and Marshall [17] put it, „if an 
employer decides to introduce exit searches on employees as they leave work, not only the 
cost-effectiveness of this measure, but also the attitude it displays towards the employees 
should be questioned, as well as the conception it implies of their role in the enterprise in 
which they are engaged‟. Other examples from literature that illustrate the potential social 
(or ethical) cost of situational crime prevention in a workplace environment, include a 
thoughtless use of access control measures in public or semi-public spaces such as 
shopping malls, resulting in the fact that individuals profiled as posing an increased risk 
may lose access to public spaces which formerly were accessible to all [23]; the 
application of CCTV in retail security which may be seen by customers and staff as 
operating to the detriment of privacy, free association and other civil liberties [24]; 
monitoring one‟s activity on the Internet [16]; and passenger profiling at airports which 
may involve the violation of personal freedom [25]. With its use of electronic hardware, 
the concept of situational crime prevention raised the spectre of totalitarian, “big brother” 
forms of state control [11]. While the ethical and social cost of situational crime prevention 
is obvious in some cases, it shouldn‟t be ignored that not every measure is likely to be 
susceptible to the critical concerns raised above, and that „people are willing to surrender 
some freedoms or endure some inconvenience in specific contexts if they gain protection 
from crime‟ [14]. A good example of the latter is the general acceptance of the need for 
additional precautions when checking-in on a passenger aircraft [14].  
Apart from their financial and social cost, certain measures may have a negative impact on 
(the esthetics of) the environment and, as such, pose an additional cost compared to those 
that are equally effective but blend in with their surroundings. Examples of esthetical costs 
derived from literature include the installation of floor-to-ceiling turnstile railings in 
subway stations, creating a prison-like, „draconian‟ environment [8]; gating-off pay phones 
in public spaces to prevent shoulder surfing [26]; or the installation of bollards or shutters 
outside listed buildings or in older market towns [27].  
Finally there has been extensive publishing on various reverse effects that may result from 
the implementation of situational crime prevention, effects that – again – may result in a 
range of consequential costs. As Grabosky [28] argues, the ways in which crime 
prevention programs may become derailed are numerous and diverse. The most common 
side effects that are referred to in literature are effects of displacement [22, 7-8, 10]. This is 
the phenomenon where the introduction of preventive measures results in crime being 
displaced elsewhere (i.e. „geographical‟ or „spatial displacement‟), to some other time or 
target (i.e. „temporal‟ or „target displacement‟), being committed in another way (i.e. 
„tactical displacement‟), or being substituted for some other kind of offense (i.e.„crime 
type‟, „functional‟ or „offence displacement‟) [11]. Target, tactical and crime type 
displacement have been examined in studies on the introduction of steering column locks 
to prevent car theft [29-30], and on the value of anti-bandit screens to prevent post office 
robberies [31]. Temporal displacement has been analysed in studies on the effectiveness of 
bike patrols to prevent auto theft in commuter lots [32], and of improved street lighting 
[33]; and geographical displacement has been addressed in studies on the introduction of 
caller-ID to deter obscene phone callers [34] and on the use of CCTV [35-36], to cite but a 
few. Furthermore, one may actually produce crime and do more harm than good in the 
course of combating it. As Marx argues, „the frustration that results from blocked criminal 
opportunities may lead to excessive violence or to an instrumental reliance on more 
forceful means of goal attainment‟ [28]. As an example, escalating effects have been 
examined in studies on check frauds in Sweden [37]; on robbers‟ perceptions of enhanced 
security measures [35]; and on decision-making practices of armed robbers [38]. Some 
initiatives or measures may inspire adaptive behaviour on the part of the offenders that can 
entail more inventive, devious or violent activity [14, 28]; or by dramatising certain 
aspects of unwanted behaviour, one may actually advertise that behaviour, either by 
bringing it to the attention of those who would otherwise be oblivious or only vaguely 
aware, or by enticing the potentially rebellious, as indicated by Morrison and O‟Donnell in 
their study on offender‟s decision-making processes [28, 38].  
 
Further analysis and classification 
 
Further analysis enables us to list the above under three broad categories: a set of generic 
preconditions; a range of financial, ethical and esthetical costs related to the 
implementation of a measure; and a number of potential reverse effects that may result 
from that implementation (see infra). While the first are common to any intervention, the 
latter two are specific to the measure that is under consideration (see also Table 2).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Preconditions, costs and reverse effects 
 
Pre-conditions (general) Costs (specific) Reverse effects (specific) 
Availability 
Practicability 
Required knowledge 
Required expertise 
User awareness 
User belief 
User commitment 
Co-operation   
Financial / monetary cost 
- Fixed  
- Variable 
Ethical / social cost 
- Labelling / discrimination  
- Distrust 
- Civil liberties 
- Inequalities 
Esthetical cost 
Displacement 
- Geographical  
- Temporal   
- Target   
- Tactical   
- Crime type   
Escalating effects 
Creative adaptation 
Enticement effects 
 
 
Certain preconditions need to be in place in order for any intervention to be effective. This 
is the case for the practicability and availability of a measure to end-users, as well as for 
the knowledge and expertise that is required to evaluate and implement it. Sampson et al. 
[39] report on measures that have been proven ineffective because too little attention had 
been paid to their practicability for major stakeholders, e.g. innovations that left senior 
citizens trapped inside a fortress of heavy doors and electronic card-key devices which 
they found difficult to understand and to operate, while neighbors were no longer able to 
keep a friendly eye on them. Other issues related to the practicability of preventive 
measures are highlighted in studies on property marking [40] and on schemes to defeat 
vandalism [8]. 
If a measure is unavailable (e.g. because local law does not permit its use or 
implementation), it simply cannot be introduced. If a measure is available to the end-user 
but its introduction would impact core business processes to an extent that their execution 
becomes extremely difficult or impossible, there is little guarantee for success. As Beck 
and Willis argue, there is a delicate balance to be struck between meeting security 
imperatives and maximizing business opportunities [41]. The same applies when the 
implementation of a certain measure requires a level of knowledge or expertise that is 
unavailable to or hard to obtain for the end-user. A poor understanding of available 
techniques to analyze the crime problem or to implement security measures and evaluate 
their effectiveness and efficiency may render all preventive efforts useless. As Knutsson 
and Clarke put it, „seemingly simple measures can be rather difficult to implement for a 
variety of technical, managerial and social reasons‟ [42]. Whilst major international 
supply chain operators have staff employed with a vast experience in tackling transport 
crime, this is not always the case for small and midsized enterprises, and even less for the 
thousands of shippers who, under total supply chain security management, become 
involved in securing their goods and premises. 
Other preconditions include the need for end-users to be aware of the problem that is 
being dealt with, to belief in the effectiveness of the proposed solution(s), and to be 
committed to solve the problem and to co-operate with other stakeholders to reach the 
desired outcome. Those who need to initiate action need to be aware of their responsibility 
to do so. They need to be committed to act, and to achieve the necessary coordination 
among all parties concerned. Especially the latter can prove to be quite challenging. 
Effective crime prevention is often about partnership, in that „each of the players has a role 
which complements and must be coordinated with the others in a system of mutual co-
operation‟ [43]. As illustrated by Newman and Clarke in a case study of the reduction of 
credit card fraud, there are numerous cases where situational crime prevention has 
succeeded through forging partnerships among the crucial players [16], and the fact that a 
lack of commitment or co-operation causes preventive action not to reach its full potential 
is clearly illustrated in a study on ram raiding where it was discovered that police 
recording practices and a lack of commitment of some retailers made it difficult to collect 
useful data to tackle the problem [27]. As Tilley points out, „competing demands on the 
organizations and individuals belonging to them; differences in philosophy, culture and 
organizational style; a lack of dedicated resources; differences over leadership; a historic 
lack of trust; an apparent indifference or apathy amongst some; and so on; all conspire to 
create obstacles to the operation of effective formal partnerships‟ [7].   
A first set of cost components specifically relates to the introduction of a certain measure 
that is under consideration. This is the case for its financial, ethical and esthetical costs. 
As argued before, monetary costs cover the fixed and variable costs of investing in crime 
prevention. Social costs relate to the (perceived) impact of the introduction of a measure 
on civil liberties, convenience and conduct of staff, customers and other stakeholders; and 
esthetical costs relate to the (perceived) impact on the esthetics of the environment in 
which a measure is introduced. 
Finally, another factor that requires careful consideration in order to come to an all 
encompassing cost assessment, is the impact of a range of unintended consequences that 
may come into effect following the introduction of a certain (set of) measure(s). As 
outlined in Table 2, this impact may result from displacement, escalating, creative 
adaptation and/or enticement effects. 
 
A conceptual model for an ex ante consideration of preventive measures 
 
The standard methodology applied for designing situational projects is „a version of the 
action research model in which researchers and practitioners work together to analyse and 
define the problem, to identify and try out possible solutions, to evaluate the result and, if 
necessary, to repeat the cycle until success is achieved‟ [8]. As such a generic situational 
crime prevention project comprises five stages: a collection of data about the nature and 
dimensions of the problem; an analysis of the situational conditions that permit or 
facilitate the commission of the crimes in question; a systematic study of possible means 
of blocking opportunities for these particular crimes; the implementation of the most 
promising, feasible and economic measures; and a (constant) monitoring of results and 
dissemination of experience [8].  
A proper identification and clear definition of the problem at hand is essential in order to 
make a statement on the urgency and priority to tackle it, as well as the decision on 
appropriate strategies to intervene. If the problem definition is wrong to start with or 
important information is overlooked, then the whole process (and consequent decisions) 
can be compromised [19]. Once the crime problem has been identified, defined and 
prioritised, it is essential to further analyse the situational conditions that permit or 
facilitate the commission of the crime(s) under study, and the situational context and 
environment in which preventive action is required. Consequently, an inventory of 
effective measures, whether the most appropriate or not, is to be produced. Each of these 
measures should be carefully scrutinized, and potential interdependencies identified
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outcome of this ex-ante consideration can be applied to help prioritise and rank alternative 
interventions, and to decide on the most promising and feasible option(s). When the cost-
benefit calculus for a certain (set of) measures turns out negative, alternative measures can 
be (re)considered. As outlined in Figure 1, the actual implementation stage should only 
start when all potential measures have been identified and considered, and a detailed 
implementation plan allowing for constant monitoring and an „ex post‟ impact and process 
evaluation has been agreed upon with users and other stakeholders. The latter may adopt a 
range of methods such as randomised control trials, simulations, examination of detailed 
expected outcome footprints and regression discontinuity designs; and may be conducted 
in the interest of informing policy decisions, to inform practitioners‟ and policymakers‟ 
decisions when faced with a new situation, and/or in the interest of taking a field of 
applied knowledge forward [44].    
 
Figure 1: Conceptual Model 
 
List and Consider
Analyse
Identify
Measure BMeasure A Measure ...
Preconditions ?
Costs ?
Interdependencies ?
Preconditions ?
Costs ?
Interdependencies ?
Preconditions ?
Costs ?
Interdependencies ?
Decide and 
implement
Evaluate
 
 
 
 
Cost modelling 
 
In this final section it is argued that management science and criminology can be of much 
assistance in enabling practitioners in industry to conduct a proper cost analysis and come 
to an informed decision on what particular measure(s) best to implement. Management 
science has traditionally been concerned with building explicit models for analysis and 
managerial decision making [45]. According to Moore and Weatherford [45], a „learning-
from-modelling‟ approach allows managers to address the most important issues of any 
decision-making situation, including the choice what alternative options to investigate and 
to implement. Models can be used to abstract the problematic aspects of a management 
situation, often involving conflicting or competing alternatives, into a quantitative model 
that represents the essence of the situation. As such, modelling can be of much assistance 
to those assessing the (benefits and) costs of alternative preventive measures. When 
having to decide on what measures to implement to prevent unauthorized access to the 
loading compartments of pick-up and delivery vehicles – a requirement that forms part of 
various anti-theft and anti-terrorism security programs – one could decide on fitting door 
alarms and GPS modules on all vehicles or, as a combined or alternative option, go for the 
human factor approach and decide to provide recurrent training to all drivers making them 
aware of the need to lock their vehicles at all times and check the loading compartment 
after having made any scheduled or unscheduled stops. For both options a number of cost 
factors can easily be translated in a deterministic model. This is the case for all aspects 
that are known with a reasonable amount of certainty (e.g. financial costs). These costs 
can be depictured in total or - at least the majority of them – divided over time costs and 
distance costs, a practice that is quite common in contemporary transport and logistics 
management [46].
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 The total monetary cost for the first option (i.e. the „technological‟ 
approach) equals a range of fixed and variable costs including the purchase of the 
electronic devices, the installation and maintenance cost, the cost for internal or external 
monitoring of alarms and consequent interventions, and communication costs. For option 
2 (i.e. the „human factor‟ approach), fixed and variable monetary costs include the cost of 
providing trainers, training facilities and training material, the recurrent cost of replacing 
drivers who are participating in the training, etc. 
The assessment of ethical and esthetical costs presents a challenge and requires a 
somewhat different approach. To a certain extent it remains a normative discussion, but, 
notwithstanding that, criminology and management science can provide tools that allow 
for incorporating the assessment into the decision making process on what measures best 
to implement. In the academic debate on the cost of crime, several methods have been 
proposed to estimate intangible or non-monetary costs such as those invoked by pain and 
suffering [47]. These include methodologies such as contingent valuation, which involves 
probing potential victims on how much they would be willing to pay in order to avoid the 
pain and suffering associated with a crime [48]; and the methodology applied by Von 
Hirsch and Jareborg [49] in an effort to categorize the harms of crime. The latter 
methodology focuses on assessing the impact of a crime on the victim‟s standard of 
living
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, identifying four generic-interest dimensions upon which crime intrudes: physical 
integrity, material support and amenity, freedom from humiliation, and privacy or 
autonomy [49]. Where these methods proof to be effective in assessing the social cost of 
crime, they can obviously be adjusted and applied to assess the social (ethical) or 
esthetical cost of crime prevention. The relative importance that stakeholders (e.g. 
management, unions or staff members) attribute to ethical and esthetical cost components 
can be determined e.g. by means of stated preference research [50]. Although this research 
has been criticized as depicting behaviour which is hypothetical and not observed in 
reality [51], it allows for estimating attributes on which revealed preference data is not 
(yet) available.   
An ex ante consideration of (the impact of) potential reverse effects is even more 
challenging as these effects will only present themselves after the measures have been in 
place for a certain period of time. Offenders confronted with vehicle alarms may turn their 
attention to other, unsecured, vehicles (target displacement), or try to gain access to the 
load in another way (tactical displacement), perhaps by means of excessive violence 
(escalating effects). As Hamilton-Smith argues, „measuring displacement […] is 
particularly difficult because attributing the occurrence or non-occurrence of one crime to 
the prevention of another is ostensibly a somewhat speculative pastime‟ [12]. This is not 
to say that displacement and other reverse effects are completely unpredictable. Analyzing 
all available information on (potential) offenders, victims and offense locations at the very 
outset of a project may provide useful input for modelling patterns of offending and for 
considering how they might be affected by the introduction of a given crime reduction 
measure [12]. One needs to identify what criminal opportunities are left unattended once a 
measure has been introduced, and try to anticipate how the offender might attempt to 
circumvent or counter that measure. Although it may be impossible to predict every 
possible permutation in offender behaviour, one should at least attempt to identify 
potential temporal, spatial, target, tactical and offence changes. In order to do so, reliable 
data is crucial. For that reason it is of extreme importance to constantly obtain, archive and 
analyse as much detail as possible on incidents that occur within the organisation or – in 
this case – within the supply chain. 
Finally, apart from trying to predict (the impact of) unintended consequences of the 
introduction of crime prevention measures during the design phase of the program, it is 
also extremely important to be vigilant for their manifestation once the program is in 
place. Even if crime reduction measures do not lead to any reverse effects in the short 
term, the monitoring of crime patterns and trends may reveal more long term adaptations 
by offenders to blocked opportunities or illuminate the exploitation of new opportunities 
[12]. For that reason a built-in monitoring system is essential to the long term success of 
any program. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Post 9/11 we have witnessed the introduction and further strengthening of a range of trans-
border security programs designed to protect international supply chains against acts of 
unlawful interference. Specific programs have been introduced for nearly all modes of 
transport, including air, road and maritime; and to a great extent they comprehend the 
introduction of situational crime prevention measures. In most instances, however, 
operators within the supply chain – being made responsible for the actual implementation 
- are left with limited guidance. In this paper it is argued that such lack of guidance may 
result in measures being introduced without taking full account of their potential 
consequences. It is argued that the cost of introducing preventive measures entails not 
only the financial or monetary costs associated with the implementation, but also a range 
of other cost factors such as ethical and esthetical costs, or consequential costs invoked by 
potential reverse effects coming into play once a measure is introduced. This paper further 
identifies a range of generic preconditions that need to be in place in order for the 
introduction of a measure to be feasible and successful. The latter relate to the availability 
and practicability of a measure that is under consideration, to the knowledge and expertise 
required to implement it, to the level of (user) belief in its effectiveness; and to the level of 
awareness and commitment of end-users and other stakeholders. 
It is argued that the various cost components that have been identified, need to be assessed 
as part of an ex ante consideration of the various measures that are deemed effective to 
mitigate the problem on hand, as this consideration would enable policy makers and 
practitioners in industry to come to an informed decision of what particular measure(s) 
best to implement. Considering actual and potential costs can assist to help prioritize and 
rank potential interventions, and to decide on the most promising and feasible ones. When 
trying to incorporate this ex ante consideration into the standard methodology applied for 
designing situational projects [8], it would succeed the production of an initial inventory 
of effective measures, and precede the actual implementation phase [4]. 
It is further argued that criminology and management science can be of much benefit in 
enabling practitioners to conduct a proper cost analysis and come to an informed decision 
on what particular measure(s) best to implement. Deterministic cost models can be applied 
for those aspects that are known with a reasonable amount of certainty (e.g. financial 
costs). Ethical and esthetical costs can be determined by means of stated preference 
research, or by applying research methods that have been introduced to assess the (non-
monetary) cost of crime; and consequential costs invoked by effects of displacement or 
other reverse effects can, at least to a certain extent, be predicted through analyzing all 
available information on (potential) offenders, victims and offense locations at the very 
outset of a project.  
The value of considering preventive measures before they are actually implemented is an 
obvious one, as it avoids that time and resources would be wasted and negative side 
effects would come into effect. In order to enable this process, those responsible for 
implementing a program should be allowed a certain freedom of choice between 
alternative measures and approaches. The latter is currently the case for some but by far 
not all programs, and clearly constitutes an area for improvement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTES 
 
[1] This code was incorporated into European legislation with Regulation (EC) No. 
725/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on enhancing 
ship and port facility security, OJ, L 129/6, 29 April 2004. 
[2] Regulation (EC) No. 2320/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 
December 2002 establishing common rules in the field of civil aviation security, OJ, 
L355/1, 30 December 2002. 
[3] Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to 
the Council, the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee 
on a simple and paperless environment for Customs and Trade and on the role of customs 
in the integrated management of external borders, COM (2003) 452, Brussels, 24 July 
2003. 
[4] As an example, recent interceptions of improvised explosive devices originating from 
Yemen have triggered US and EU governments to further enhance air cargo security 
regulations. 
[5] The TAPA Freight Security Requirements (FSR) have been established by security 
professionals within the high-tech industry to address the nature by which high-tech 
products and materials are handled, warehoused and transported as they move throughout 
the supply chain (source: www.tapaemea.com, accessed 18 November 2010). 
[6] Fixed costs are expenses that are not dependent on the level of goods or services 
produced or sold, while variable costs are considered to be expenses that change in 
proportion to the activity of a business (source: http://www.accountingtools.com, accessed 
9 November 2010). 
[7] According to Clarke (2008: 183) „a situational project is more effective when it adopts 
a package of measures, each of which is directed to a particular point of the process to 
committing the crime‟. It goes without saying that each individual measure within this 
package should be carefully considered prior to its implementation, and any potential 
interdependencies should be recognized and overcome prior to the actual implementation. 
[8] Time costs are imputed on the basis of the duration of a transportation movement, 
distance costs according to mileage (source: Blauwens, De Baere and Van de Voorde, 
2002: 73). 
[9] Standard of living is defined as the economic means and non-economic capabilities for 
achieving a certain quality of life (Von Hirsch and Jareborg, 1991: 7-11). 
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Main arguments: 
 
In this paper the application of the conceptual model that was developed in Chapter 2 is 
illustrated by means of an ex ante consideration of alternative measures to control 
unauthorized access to pick-up and delivery vans, a requirement that forms part of various 
anti-theft and anti-terrorism supply chain security programs. This application was 
conducted in a Belgian, relatively small branch of an international express operator. 
As to identify and define the problem on hand, and as to list a number of risk mitigating 
measures, an initial focus group meeting was organized with the security representatives 
of the branch. Following this session, nine measures were perceived effective and selected 
for further consideration. As to assess the non-monetary cost of the proposed measures, 
and as to verify whether the necessary preconditions are in place to make their 
introduction a success, a survey was conducted amongst the full population of van drivers 
working for the branch. Finally, as to assess the perceived potential for displacement and 
other reverse effects, a second focus group meeting was conducted with the security 
representatives that participated in the initial session. 
The outcome of the study reported on in this chapter illustrates that – when deciding on 
what measures best to implement - it may be worthwhile or even necessary not to focus on 
monetary costs only, but to also take a number of other cost items into consideration; and 
to make sure that a number of preconditions are in place in order for the introduction of a 
measure to be feasible and successful.  
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It is further argued that an ex ante consideration of alternative solutions will contribute to 
making the decision on what measures best to implement a more informed and balanced 
one. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
Over the past decade – following the disastrous attacks of 9/11 - we have witnessed the 
introduction of a range of trans-border security programs designed to protect 
international supply chains against acts of terrorism. In most if not all cases, these 
programs comprehend the introduction of situational measures, and in many cases 
operators in the industry are left with limited guidance on how best to implement them. In 
academic literature on situational crime prevention it is argued that – when introduced 
without proper reflection and consideration – preventive measures can easily backfire and 
turn into the negative. It is argued that measures need to be carefully assessed prior to 
their implementation, and that this assessment should focus on various criteria. In the 
study reported on in this paper, these observations are illustrated by means of an ex ante 
consideration of alternative measures to control unauthorized access to pick-up and 
delivery vans. This study was conducted in 2011 in a Belgian branch of an international 
express operator, and is limited to the selection process of preventive measures only. The 
outcome illustrates that – when deciding on what measures best to implement - it may be 
worthwhile or even necessary not to focus on monetary costs only, but to also take a 
number of other cost items into consideration; and to make sure that a number of 
preconditions are in place in order for the introduction of a measure to be feasible and 
successful. It is argued that an ex ante consideration of alternative solutions will 
contribute to making the decision on what measures best to implement a more informed 
and balanced one. 
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costs / non-monetary costs / consequential costs  
 
Introduction 
 
Post 9/11 we have witnessed the introduction of a range of trans-border security programs 
designed to protect international supply chains against acts of unlawful interference. In the 
European Union, the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code was adopted in 
December 2002 as an amendment to the SOLAS Convention, describing minimum 
requirements for security of ships and ports
1
. In the area of civil aviation and air cargo 
security, Regulation (EC) No. 2320/2002 enabled for a European framework with intense 
levels of security in the form of rules and measures with detailed, legally binding 
specifications and checks
2
, and in 2003 the European Commission communicated two 
main goals with respect to the future of customs authorities, introducing – amongst other – 
the European Authorized Economic Operator program
3
. Over the past decade, most of 
these programs have been strengthened following further incidents and changing threat 
patterns that provoked government and industry intervention
4
. In most if not all cases, 
supply chain security programs comprehend the introduction of situational measures, and 
operators within the supply chain are increasingly being made responsible for the 
introduction of preventive controls, with no or limited guidance on how best to select and 
implement them. This raises the concern that, out of ignorance or due to a lack of 
guidance, operators risk implementing measures without taking full account of its 
potential consequences. As Tilley (2005: 10) argues, crime prevention is ineluctably 
complex, meaning that “[...] practitioners need to have a broad grasp of the theory, 
evidence, circumstances, options, contexts, ethics and possible consequences of varying 
responses if they are to make informed decisions”. Concerns raised by both advocates and 
critics of situational crime prevention cover a variety of areas such as the financial and 
ethical cost associated with the implementation of preventive measures. Some ideal 
responses may be far too expensive to be acceptable in financial terms (Laycock 2005: 
686); and when applied without reflection, or by their very nature, preventive measures 
can easily backfire and lower the quality of life in our society. Certain members of society 
may become labeled, feelings of intolerance and distrust may be stimulated, social 
conduct may be hindered, and human rights violated (Vettenburg et al 2003: 11-12; 
Newburn 2007: 296). As argued by Duff and Marshall (2000: 23), the introduction of any 
measure “[...] imposes some costs, such as the material resources required to implement it, 
the degree of inconvenience it creates, and its possible deleterious impact on such interests 
as freedom, autonomy or privacy”. Concerns are also raised with regard to various reverse 
effects that may
5
 result from the implementation of preventive measures. The most 
common side effects that are referred to in literature are effects of displacement (Eck and 
Weisburd 1995: 19; Clarke 1997: 38; Bowers and Johnson 2003: 276; Tilley 2005: 6; 
Newburn 2007: 582; Guerette 2009: 2). This is the phenomenon where the introduction of 
preventive measures results in crime being displaced elsewhere (i.e. „geographical‟ or 
„spatial displacement‟), to some other time or target (i.e. „temporal‟ or „target 
displacement‟), being committed in another way (i.e. „tactical displacement‟), or being 
substituted for some other kind of offense (i.e.„crime type‟, „functional‟ or „offence 
displacement‟) (Clarke 1992: 22; Bowers and Johnson 2003: 276; Guerette and Bowers 
2009: 1333). Furthermore, one may actually produce crime and do more harm than good 
in the course of combating it. As Marx (1990, in Grabosky 1996: 27) argues, „the 
frustration that results from blocked criminal opportunities may lead to excessive violence 
or to an instrumental reliance on more forceful means of goal attainment‟. Some initiatives 
or measures may inspire adaptive behaviour on the part of the offenders that can entail 
more inventive, devious or violent activity (Clarke 2005: 53; Grabosky 1996: 32); or by 
dramatising certain aspects of unwanted behaviour, one may actually advertise that 
behaviour, either by bringing it to the attention of those who would otherwise be oblivious 
or only vaguely aware, or by enticing the potentially rebellious (Grabosky 1996: 28).  
In an attempt to identify the various components that should form part of a cost 
assessment of situational measures, and based on previous research combined with an 
extensive literature review, Haelterman (2011) classified the above concerns under two 
broad categories; and differentiates them from a set of generic preconditions that need to 
be in place in order for any intervention to be effective (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Preconditions, costs and reverse effects (Source: Haelterman 2011: 397) 
 
Pre-conditions (general) Costs (specific) Reverse effects (specific) 
Availability 
Practicability 
Required knowledge 
Required expertise 
User awareness 
User belief 
User commitment 
Co-operation   
Financial / monetary cost 
- Fixed 
- Variable 
Ethical / social cost 
- Labelling / discrimination  
- Distrust 
- Civil liberties 
- Inequalities 
Aesthetical cost 
Displacement 
- Geographical  
- Temporal   
- Target   
- Tactical   
- Crime type   
Escalating effects 
Creative adaptation 
Enticement effects 
 
A first set of cost components comprehends the financial, ethical and aesthetical costs of a 
specific measure that is under consideration. Financial (or monetary) costs cover the fixed 
and variable costs of investing in crime prevention. Ethical costs relate to the (perceived) 
impact of the introduction of a measure on civil liberties, convenience and conduct of 
civilians, staff, customers and other stakeholders; and aesthetical costs relate to the 
(perceived) impact on the aesthetics of the environment in which a measure is introduced. 
A second set covers the impact of a range of unintended consequences that may come into 
effect following the introduction of a certain (set of) measure(s). As outlined in Table 1, 
this impact may result from displacement, escalation, creative adaptation
6
 and/or 
enticement effects. Finally, a number of preconditions need to be in place for any 
intervention to be successful. These include the availability and practicability of a 
measure to end-users, the level of knowledge and expertise that is required to implement 
it; the need for end-users to be aware of the problem that is being dealt with; their belief in 
the effectiveness of the proposed solution(s); and their commitment to (help) solve the 
problem and to co-operate with other stakeholders to reach the desired outcome. 
Haelterman (2011: 399) further argues that both these preconditions and cost components 
need to be assessed as part of an ex ante consideration of the measures that are deemed 
effective to mitigate the problem on hand, as this consideration would enable policy 
makers and practitioners to come to an informed decision of what particular measure(s) 
best to implement.  
In this paper the above is illustrated by means of a study into the selection process of 
potential measures to control unauthorized access to pick-up and delivery vans, a 
requirement that forms part of various supply chain security programs, and at the same 
time addresses an important business need. The study was conducted in 2011 in a Belgian, 
relatively small branch of an international express operator. The branch that was selected 
operates 45 pick-up and delivery vans daily, six of them owned by the company and 39 
owned by a number of subcontractors
7
. Being part of an international organisation serving 
over 200 countries and territories, the express operator has a vast interest in complying 
with international security standards and regulations; and controlling access to 
consignments forms part of its standard operating procedures. 
The main objective of the study is to identify the various cost components of a number of 
alternative measures that have been identified as being effective to mitigate the problem 
on hand, and to illustrate the benefit of taking these into account when deciding on what 
measures best to implement. The scope of the study is limited to the selection process of 
preventive measures only, and does not cover the actual implementation and ex post 
evaluation phase. Its main objective is to illustrate the process of considering situational 
measures prior to their actual implementation. As such, it should not be considered a 
detailed study into the potential effectiveness (or reverse effects) of situational measures 
available to operators to tackle security risks in the pick-up and delivery process, as this 
would require additional research, a broader study sample and a more in-depth analysis 
and comparison of relevant incident data.  
Following a description of the applied methodology, the structure of the paper follows the 
various stages that are defined as constituting the standard methodology applied for 
situational crime prevention projects (Clarke 1997: 15). Part two provides detail on the 
problem that was selected and on the objectives to tackle it. In part three a range of 
mitigating measures is identified and listed. Before coming to a summary of the main 
conclusions, parts four to seven deal with the actual consideration of these measures, 
assessing the relevant preconditions, their monetary and non-monetary cost, as well as any 
(potential) consequential costs.     
 
Methodology 
 
As to identify and define the problem on hand, and as to list a number of risk mitigating 
measures that are thought of to be effective, an initial focus group meeting was organized 
with the security representatives of the branch
8
, moderated by the researchers (Cronin 
2001: 165). A focus group methodology was selected as it enables to explore participants‟ 
views and experiences in full depth. As to remain free of researcher influence, a low to 
medium level form of moderation was obtained for (Cronin 2001: 166). 
As to assess the non-monetary cost of the proposed measures, and as to verify whether the 
necessary preconditions are in place to make their introduction a success, a survey was 
conducted amongst the full population of van drivers. Out of a total of 45 drivers, 23 
returned a completed (structured) questionnaire, resulting in a response rate of 51,11 %. 
The first part of the questionnaire contained a range of questions on the background 
variables of the respondents. A minority of those that responded is female (8,7%); and 
52.2% of the respondents was between 30 and 40 years old at the time of the survey. 
About two thirds (68,2%) was working as a subcontractor, the other third was directly 
employed by the operator
9
. The second part of the questionnaire contained a series of 
statements on which the respondents were asked to give their personal opinion. Each item 
was scored on a one to five point Likert scale (Procter 2001: 111-112). The statements 
used were carefully worded as to make sure that they had a maximum content validity. 
Prior to presenting the survey to the drivers, a small-scale pretest was conducted by 
presenting the questionnaire to a colleague familiar with the context. After having 
incorporated some minor recommendations that came out of the pretest, the questionnaire 
was presented to the drivers during a group meeting. During this meeting the drivers were 
presented some basic information on the aims and scope of the study, as well as some 
instructions for completing the questionnaire. To motivate them for completing the entire 
survey, their importance to the overall study was accentuated. It was further stressed that 
cooperation was on a voluntary basis only, and they were given a name of an independent 
contact person to reach out to in case they wanted additional information on the scope and 
objectives of the study
10
.  
The drivers were initially given one week to return the completed questionnaire in a blank 
and closed envelope. The answers provided by the respondents were then inserted in an 
SPSS data-file. The individual items on the drivers‟ opinions were summed up to build a 
relevant scale. The reliability of these scales was tested by means of Cronbach‟s alpha, 
and items were excluded when this brought down the value of alpha (Bijleveld 2007: 232). 
The scales were also tested on their one-dimensional character. The scores of the 
respondents on these scales were then interpreted to form the conclusions.  
Finally, as to assess the perceived potential for displacement and other reverse effects; a 
second focus group meeting was planned with the same security representatives that 
participated in the initial session. This research method was selected due to the limited 
number of participants and the high level of verbal and cognitive skills of the individuals 
involved. The participants were informed of the goal of the focus group and then left to 
interact, with the researchers acting as the moderator. This setup enabled to gather a lot of 
information in a limited time frame. For each of the proposed measures it was assessed to 
what type of displacement its introduction might potentially lead, based on past experience 
and knowledge gained from specialist literature and intelligence sharing within the sector. 
Following this exercise, the various measures were ranked by each individual participant 
according to their perceived potential for other reverse effects.  
 
Problem analysis and definition 
 
Defining and analysing the (potential) problem on hand is probably one of the most 
important and often most underestimated stages in any crime prevention effort. As 
Laycock (2005: 682) argues, if the problem definition is wrong to start with or if 
important information is overlooked, then the whole crime reduction process may be 
compromised. The crime problem under consideration in this paper relates to the risk of 
individuals gaining unauthorized access to (the loading compartments of) pick-up and 
delivery vans when operated on the public road (i.e. not when parked at the premises of 
the operator, consignor or consignee). Protecting cargo from unauthorised interference is 
not only relevant from an anti-terrorism perspective, as offenders may try to introduce 
prohibited articles inside that cargo, but obviously also from an anti-theft perspective; 
hence why controlling access to loading compartments (such as vans, containers or trucks) 
is put forward as a strict requirement in both government as industry-driven security 
initiatives. 
Looking at the standard process of the organisation in which the study was conducted, 
vans are mainly operated on week days between 9.00 AM and 5.00 PM. During that 
period, drivers make a range of scheduled stops to either pick-up or deliver consignments. 
On average, each driver services 47 collection and/or delivery addresses per day, resulting 
in - on average - a total of 2115 scheduled stops daily for the entire research population
11
. 
Apart from the scheduled stops, drivers evidently have to make a number of additional 
comfort stops, e.g. to take their lunch break, or forced stops in case of illness or technical 
problems encountered with the vehicle. Although the number of unscheduled stops is 
extremely limited, it cannot be overlooked when assessing the overall risk. 
In order to assess the importance of controlling access to pick-up and delivery vans to the 
operator, a focus group meeting was organised with a number of its security 
representatives. The main objective identified by the group, is theft prevention. In this 
context, theft can relate to the theft of the actual vehicle; the consignments on board of 
that vehicle; the cargo documentation; and/or cash retrieved from cash deliveries. Other 
objectives are to prevent the introduction of illegal items such as improvised explosive 
devices or narcotics in the supply chain; to limit insurance premiums; to ensure the safety 
and security of drivers; to reduce reputational risks to the company; and – last but not least 
– to achieve and maintain regulatory compliance (e.g. compliance with air cargo security 
regulations). Although there is no record of any breaches highlighted by the competent 
civil aviation authority to date, the latter objective alone makes the protection of air cargo 
a top priority to the company, as losing its regulated agent status would have a direct 
impact on business continuity.  
Prior to identifying the range of measures that could be introduced to mitigate the risk of 
individuals gaining unauthorized access to the vans and/or their loading compartments; 
available data on previous victimization was gathered and analyzed
12
. Of the total of 
consignments due for delivery between 1 January 2008 and 31 December 2010, 99 were 
reported (partially) missing, but the data did not reveal enough detail on the exact 
circumstances as to clarify whether or not the incident occurred on the public road whilst 
on board a pick-up and delivery van
13
. In one occasion, however, it was clear that a break-
in took place while the driver was away from the vehicle making a delivery. The incident 
was reported to the police and clear signs of forced entry were found on the rear doors. At 
the time of the incident, the vehicle was locked but not alarmed. Out of the 23 drivers that 
completed the questionnaire, two reported that a consignment had been stolen from their 
vehicle while working for the operator
14
.  None of them experienced the vehicle itself 
having been stolen, nor any illegal or prohibited item having been introduced on board. 
 
Potential measures for consideration  
 
As part of the same initial focus group meeting, a list was compiled of potential measures 
that could be introduced to mitigate the risk. For each of these measures it was indicated 
whether or not it was perceived effective to reduce the risk of theft of the vehicle (or to 
increase the chances of recovering it after a theft would occur); to reduce the risk of theft 
of the content of that vehicle; and to reduce the risk of someone introducing illegal or 
prohibited items in the supply chain through gaining access to the pick-up and delivery 
vans. The measures that scored positive on all three objectives were selected as measures 
for further consideration. Although quite often the introduction of a combination of 
measures proves most effective in a situational project (Clarke 2008: 183)
15
, this 
consideration was conducted for each individual measure that was perceived effective by 
the security representatives of the organisation in which the study took place.   
After having considered the evident precondition of availability
16
, the final list contained 
nine different measures: (1) the installation of automated locking devices on all vans, 
enabling that the cabin and cargo compartment doors automatically lock when the driver – 
holding a key card – approaches or moves away from the vehicle; (2) the installation of 
audible intrusion alarms, attracting attention when doors or windows are forced open; (3) 
the installation of silent intrusion alarms with remote (GPS) monitoring, allowing remote 
intervention upon receipt of an alarm; (4) issuing formal instructions to drivers (e.g. to 
always lock their vehicles when left unattended), combined with random compliance 
checks and a sanctioning system; (5) providing security awareness training to drivers (e.g. 
on vehicle security, secure parking, offender‟s modus operandi, etc.); (6) arranging two 
individuals (double drivers) for each vehicle, with one person staying in or nearby the van 
at all times; (7) providing overt security escorts; (8) removing company logos from 
vehicles in order to conceal the target; and (9) posting specific notifications on vehicles 
alerting the fact that no valuables are inside, or the fact that the vehicle is alarmed and 
monitored at all times. No significant interdependencies
17
 have been identified between 
these nine measures. 
 
Further analysis of preconditions 
 
Apart from the availability of a measure to end-users, a number of other preconditions 
need to be in place in order for any intervention to be feasible and effective (Haelterman 
2011: 397-398). This is the case for the practicability of a measure, as well as for the 
knowledge and expertise that is required to evaluate and implement it. Other preconditions 
include the need for end-users to be aware of the problem that is being dealt with, to 
believe in the effectiveness of the proposed solution(s), and to be committed to solve the 
problem and to co-operate with other stakeholders to reach the desired outcome 
(Haelterman 2011: 397-398).  
None of the measures that had been identified was considered to pose significant problems 
related to the level of knowledge or expertise required for implementation. Specific 
attention, however, was given to the level of awareness amongst drivers; to their 
commitment to contribute to mitigate the risk; to the perceived practicability of the 
proposed measures; and to the extent to which they believe them to be effective. In order 
to assess the level of awareness of the problem on hand (i.e. of the risk of unauthorized 
individuals gaining access to cargo and cargo compartments), drivers were asked to agree 
or disagree on a number of predefined statements. Because of the abstract character of the 
awareness concept, it was decided to establish an „awareness scale‟ consisting of various 
items rather than to ask the drivers directly to what extent they are aware or unaware of the 
problem. Each item was scored on a one to five point Likert scale
18
. Figure 1 illustrates 
that the scores are unevenly distributed in the advantage of the higher scores as the 
respondents mostly agreed or fully agreed with the awareness statements. It should 
therefore be concluded that the respondents show a fair level of awareness
19
.  
 
 
Figure 1: Awareness scale (i.e. driver awareness of the problem on hand) 
 
 
 
The same methodology was applied to assess the level of commitment amongst drivers to 
(help) mitigate the risk of individuals gaining unauthorised access to cargo (see Figure 2). 
For this scale the sum of three items was used to define the level of commitment
20
. The 
level could range from a score of „3‟ (minimum level) to a score of „15‟ (maximum level). 
Again, the outcome shows a predominance of the higher scores, indicating a high level of 
commitment amongst the group of respondents to help mitigate the problem.  
 
Figure 2: Commitment scale (i.e. driver commitment to help mitigate the problem) 
 
 
 
Taking a closer look at the individual questions that were used to establish the 
„commitment scale‟, learns that nearly all (90,9%) of the respondents agree or fully agree 
that the driver is best placed (i.e. “the ideal person”) to protect the vehicle against 
unauthorized interference; and the majority of them is willing to assist in mitigating the 
risk. Only four out of the 23 respondents state that they should not be occupied with 
protecting their vehicle from unauthorized interference while performing their daily tasks. 
It goes without saying that users will be less motivated to fully implement a measure if 
they have no belief in its effectiveness, or when this measure would impact core business 
processes to an extent that their execution becomes extremely difficult or impossible (and 
vice versa). As to assess the extent to which the drivers believe in the effectiveness and the 
practicability of the proposed measures, they were asked to comment on a range of 
predefined statements for each individual measure
21. A „belief scale‟ was established for 
each measure, comprising five items, meaning that individual (total) scores can range from 
„five‟ (minimum score) to „25‟ (maximum score)22. In order to compare the different 
measures, the average scores of the total of respondents were calculated. Table 2 provides 
detail on the level of user belief in the effectiveness of the measures that were deemed 
appropriate to tackle the risk.  
 
Table 2: User belief (in the effectiveness of the proposed measure) 
 
Rank Measure Average score (on scale) 
 
1 Key card 20,73 
2 Audible alarm 20,39 
3 Awareness training 16,65 
4 Double drivers 16,26 
5 Silent alarm + GPS 16,22 
6 Overt security escorts 16,13 (modus 16) 
7 Formal instructions 16,13 (modus 14) 
8 Notification on vehicles 15,55 
9 No company logos 13,41 
 
The measures that came out most positive, include the installation of automatic locking 
devices on all vans (for example: 87% of the respondents agree or fully agree with the 
statement that the introduction of this measure would make it more difficult for an 
offender to gain access to the vehicle) and the installation of audible intrusion alarms (for 
example: 82,6% agree or fully agree with the statement that an alarm would deter potential 
offenders). The measures perceived as being the least effective, are the removal of 
company logos (for example: 52,1% of the respondents consider this measure useless) and 
the provision of specific notifications on vehicles stressing the fact that no valuables are 
inside, or the fact that the vehicle is alarmed and monitored at all times. 
The same methodology was applied to compare the measures on their perceived 
practicability. The practicability-scale was established for each individual measure, 
comprising four items, meaning that individual (total) scores can range from „four‟ 
(minimum score) to „20‟ (maximum score)23. Table 3 provides detail on the extent to 
which the respondents perceive the proposed measures to be practicable or not. In order to 
compare the different measures, the average scores for the total of respondents were 
calculated for each measure. 
 
Table 3: Perceived practicability of the proposed measure 
 
Rank Measure Average score (on scale) 
 
1 Key card 17,09 
2 Audible alarm 15,61 
3 Silent alarm + GPS 14,04 
4 Notification on vehicles 13,83 
5 Awareness training 13,04 
6 No company logos 12,52  
7 Formal instructions / compliance checks & sanctioning 11,52 
8 Double drivers 10,65 
9 Overt security escorts 09,96 
 
The installation of automated locking devices comes out as the most practical measure (as 
perceived by the drivers). 87% of the respondents believe that this measure would even 
facilitate their job compared to the current situation. Other measures that are perceived 
favorable are the installation of audible alarms and the installation of silent alarms 
combined with off-site monitoring. The measures perceived as being the least practicable, 
are the provision of double drivers for each vehicle (for example: 45% of the respondents 
state that they would be hindered in their job if this measure would be introduced) and the 
provision of overt security escorts. 69,5% of the respondents disagree or totally disagree 
with the statement that the introduction of this measure would make their job any easier.      
 
 
Monetary cost of selected measures 
 
Financial (or monetary) costs relate to the fixed and variable costs associated with the 
implementation of a measure that is under consideration
24
. These include a range of cost 
items such as management and overhead costs, personnel costs (e.g. wages of surveillance 
staff, …), depreciation costs of (security) equipment, costs of services, maintenance costs, 
the cost resulting from the impact of security measures on certain core business processes, 
etc. (Welsh and Farrington 1999; Haelterman 2011: 394). For the purpose of this section, 
the total investment (in equipment, research, development, etc.) and the running costs per 
year have been assessed (see also table 4). 
 
Table 4: Monetary cost of the proposed measure 
 
Rank Measure Investment    
 
Running cost per year25 
 
1 
2 
Overt security escorts 
Double drivers 
- 
- 
  € 143000 
€ 43200 
3 Awareness training € 3750  € 27375 
4 Silent alarms with GPS monitoring € 31580  € 21258 
5 Key card € 33100  € 15998 
6 Audible alarms € 20547  € 9931 
7 Formal instructions & compliance checks  -  € 8320  
8 Notification on vehicles Negligible  Negligible 
9 No company logos Negligible  Negligible 
 
For some measures the monetary cost is negligible or extremely limited. This is the case 
for the removal of company logos or the provision of notification boards or - stickers. The 
provision of a second person accompanying the driver and the provision of overt security 
escorts solely result in additional (though substantial) personnel costs or costs of 
outsourcing a service to an external contractor (i.e. guarding company). The financial cost 
linked to the introduction of the other measures, results from a combination of equipment, 
installation and maintenance costs
26
; personnel costs; management and overhead costs; the 
cost of external service providers; et cetera. 
Conducting random checks to verify compliance with formal instructions imposed on 
drivers, results in an operational cost of 8320 Euros per year, based on one weekly check 
to be conducted by a qualified representative of the security department
27
. 
Taking into account the number of pick-up and delivery vehicles (n= 45), the investment 
that results from purchasing and installing automated locking devices on all vehicles totals 
around 33000 Euros
28
. The equipment is subject to a three year depreciation period. 
Maintenance costs are estimated by the operator‟s facility department at 15% of the 
equipment cost per year, which brings the yearly running cost for this option to 16000 
Euros.   
Installing audible intruder alarms was assessed to amount up to an investment of 456 
Euros per vehicle, totaling 20547 Euros for the entire fleet
29
. Again, the equipment is 
subject to a three year depreciation period and the yearly maintenance cost is estimated at 
15%. The yearly running cost totals 9931 Euros. 
The cost of installing silent alarms with remote monitoring on the entire fleet results from 
an investment in the purchase and installation of the electronic devices, the maintenance 
cost (15%), the cost for external monitoring of alarms and consequent interventions, and 
communication costs. The cost of having the alarms monitored by an external monitoring 
room, equals an amount of 5994 Euros per year (for the entire fleet)
30
. The total running 
cost for this option, amounts up to 21258 Euros yearly, the cost of interventions not taken 
into consideration. 
The „human factor‟ approach (i.e. providing staff with recurrent awareness training) 
presents a yearly investment for developing and upgrading the training package - estimated 
by the operator‟s training department at 3750 Euros - and a yearly running cost for 
delivering the training to the drivers. The latter includes the cost of providing trainers and 
training facilities; as well as the recurrent cost of replacing drivers who are participating in 
the training (i.e. 250 Euros per driver). The average cost of providing a security awareness 
session is estimated at 125 Euros per driver per year (taking into account an average of six 
participants per session), replacement cost not included. Taking into account an average 
staff turnover of 18 drivers yearly and the fact that recurrent training is required every 
year, the yearly (running) cost of training the full population of van drivers amounts up to 
27375 Euros.  
 
 
 
 
 
Non-monetary costs 
 
Solutions to prevent crime may be effective and cost-efficient, but that does not 
automatically make them acceptable without further consideration. Staff members may 
feel labeled and discriminated, or hindered in their freedom of movement, alienating them 
from their colleagues and from their employer. Privacy rights may become violated, 
feelings of intolerance and distrust may be provoked, etc. (Haelterman 2011: 395). As to 
assess the ethical / social cost of the proposed measures, drivers were asked to comment 
on a range of predefined statements for each individual measure
31
. These statements relate 
to (1) the perceived impact on the driver‟s feeling of privacy, (2) their perceived feeling of 
trust or distrust towards their employer, (3) the perceived impact on their freedom of 
movement and (4) on their feeling of being treated equally. These four items composed the 
ethical cost-scale for each measure, meaning that individual (total) scores can range from 
„four‟ (minimum score) to „20‟ (maximum score)32. Table 5 captures the overall outcome 
(i.e. average score on the ethical cost scale). 
 
Table 5: Ethical cost of the proposed measure as perceived by the drivers 
 
Rank Measure Average score (on scale) 
 
1 Formal instructions / compliance checks & sanctioning 15,64 
2 Overt security escorts 15,45 
3 Double drivers 15,05 
4 Silent alarms with GPS monitoring 13,95 
5 Awareness training 13,50 
6 Notification on vehicles 12,59  
7 No company logos 12,14 
8 Audible alarms 09,76 
9 Key-card 09,64 
 
Issuing formal instructions to drivers combined with random compliance checks and a 
sanctioning system is perceived as the measure with the highest ethical cost. Other 
measures that appear in the top-four, are the provision of security escorts, the provision of 
double drivers and the installation of silent alarms combined with remote (GPS) 
monitoring. The measures perceived as most favourable from an ethical perspective, are 
the installation of automatic locking devices and the installation of audible alarms. Table 6 
provides detail on the various items that were measured.  
Table 6: Ethical cost divided by item 
 
Cost Overall ranking Privacy* (dis)Trust* Freedom of movement* Equal treatment* 
High Formal instructions Formal instructions (52,1%) Formal instructions (47,8%) Overt security escorts (63,7%) Formal instructions (54,5%) 
  Overt security escorts Overt security escorts (47,8%) Awareness training (39,1%) Formal instructions (54,5%) Double drivers (54,5%) 
 Double drivers Double drivers (43,4%) Double drivers (39,1%) Double drivers (50%) Silent alarm + GPS (59,1%) 
 Silent alarm + GPS Silent alarm + GPS (34,7%) Overt security escorts (39,1%) Silent alarm + GPS (45,5%) Overt security escorts (59,1%) 
 Awareness training Awareness training (26%) Silent alarm + GPS (34,8%) Awareness training (31,8%) Notification on vehicles (59,1%) 
 Notification on vehicles No company logos (13%) Notification on vehicles (26,1%) Notification on vehicles (22,7%) No company logos (63,7%) 
 No company logos Notification on vehicles (13%) No company logos (26,1%) No company logos (14,3%) Awareness training (68,2%) 
 Audible alarm Audible alarm (8,6%) Key card (17,4%) Audible alarm (13,6%) Key card (77,3%) 
Low Key card Key card (4,3%) Audible alarm (13,6%) Key card (13,6%) Audible alarm (81,8%) 
       
   * ranking based on % of respondents agreeing with statements that the measure poses a (perceived) ethical cost 
    
 
The measures perceived as having the biggest (negative) impact on the driver‟s feeling of 
privacy, are the roll-out and monitoring of formal instructions, the provision of overt 
security escorts and the provision of two drivers for each vehicle. With regard to the 
perceived impact on the feeling of being (dis)trusted by their employer, the provision of 
formal instructions, the provision of awareness training and the provision of two drivers or 
security escorts score least favourable. The provision of overt security escorts, the roll-out 
of formal instructions, the provision of two drivers per vehicle and the installation of silent 
intruder alarms with remote (GPS) monitoring constitute the top-four of the measures that 
are perceived as having the most negative impact on the driver‟s freedom of movement 
and feeling of equal treatment. For all four items that were measured, the installation of 
automatic locking devices and the installation of audible alarms are perceived as posing 
the lowest ethical cost.  
Apart from their financial and ethical cost, certain measures may have a negative impact 
on (the aesthetics of) the environment and, as such, pose an additional cost compared to 
those that are equally effective but blend in with their surroundings. In this study, no 
significant aesthetical costs were identified, apart maybe from having overt security 
escorts following each single vehicle every day of the week, which has a potential to 
invoke negative feelings to the general public living in the collection and distribution area. 
 
Consequential costs 
 
As Hamilton-Smith (2002: 16) argues, „measuring displacement […] is particularly 
difficult because attributing the occurrence or non-occurrence of one crime to the 
prevention of another is ostensibly a somewhat speculative pastime‟. Nevertheless, the 
measurement and monitoring of displacement and other reverse effects should form part 
of the evaluation of any crime prevention project, as they may provide valuable input for 
future programming or for adapting a program that is still running.
33
 
Apart from the above, it is also essential to identify the possibility and likelihood of 
displacement and other reverse effects as part of the design phase of a project, be it to try 
and manage the occurrence upfront, or to provide input for the monitoring- and evaluation 
plan. According to Guerette (2009: 5), the fact whether or not displacement is likely to 
occur, will largely be determined by offender motivation, offender familiarity and crime 
opportunity. To effectively manage displacement at the outset of a program, one needs to 
 identify what criminal opportunities are left unattended once a measure has been 
introduced, and try to anticipate how the offender might attempt to circumvent or counter 
that measure. As Guerette (2009: 11-12) puts it, understanding the local displacement (and 
diffusion) potential requires a thorough analysis of the characteristics of targeted 
offenders, locations and victims.  
As stated in the introduction, the latter (detailed) analyses do not form part of the scope of 
this study. The next table (Table 7) merely covers the potential for displacement as 
perceived by the security representatives that participated in the focus group meetings.
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Table 7: Possible displacement resulting from the implementation (perceived by the focus group members) 
 
Measure Displacement possibilities  
Automated locking devices + key card Offenders may try to gain access to the load in another way, perhaps by using 
forceful means to obtain key cards from drivers 
Offenders may try to invent possibilities to circumvent the technique (e.g. hack 
key cards / frequencies, manipulate van doors / locks, copy key cards, etc.) 
Offenders may try to get to the load when the driver is in the immediate 
proximity of the van, i.e. before the vehicle is locked, or by means of deceiving 
the driver (e.g. „round-the-corner deliveries‟)  
Audible intrusion alarms      Offenders may „hit‟ on places with little social control  
Offenders may try to get to the load when the driver is in the immediate 
proximity of the van (i.e. before the alarm is activated) 
Offenders may try to circumvent the technique  
Silent intrusion alarms with remote (GPS) 
monitoring   
Displacement effects may come into effect once it is widely known that the vans 
of operator x are alarmed 
Formal instructions / compliance checks and 
sanctioning system 
Limited to none 
Security awareness training    Offenders may be inventive in trying to find modus operandi that were previously 
unknown to reach their goal 
Double drivers Offenders may turn to more forceful means of goal attainment 
Offenders may try to get to the load by means of deceiving the drivers (e.g. 
„round-the-corner deliveries‟) 
Overt security escorts   Offenders may turn to more forceful means of goal attainment 
Offenders may try to get to the load by means of deceiving the escorts  
Offenders may strike when the escort vehicle is e.g. blocked in traffic 
Remove company logos   Limited to none 
Post specific notifications    Offenders may turn to more forceful means to attain their goal when noticing the 
fact that vehicles are alarmed / protected 
 
 
 When asked to assess the potential for escalating effects, enticement effects or effects of 
creative adaptation, this potential was identified by a majority of the focus group members 
for six out of nine measures. A majority of them indicate that the installation of audible 
alarms, the provision of double drivers and the provision of security escorts may result in 
escalation; and all feel that providing double drivers or overt security escorts, or posting 
specific notifications on vehicles, may entice potential offenders (i.e. bring the fact that a 
courier van may be an attractive target to the attention of individuals who were previously 
not aware). Measures perceived as presenting the highest probability for escalating effects, 
enticement effects or effects of creative adaptation, are the provision of double drivers and 
the provision of overt security escorts. Table 8 presents the number of focus group 
members (out of a total of four) that indicated a potential for the given effect to occur.  
 
Table 8: Perceived potential for escalating, creative adaptation and enticement effects. 
 
Rank Measure Escalating effects 
 
Creative adaptation Enticement effects 
 
1 Double drivers 3 3 4 
2 Overt security escorts 3 2 4 
3 Notification on vehicles 2 1 4 
4 Audible alarm 4 2 1 
5 Key card 2 4 0 
6 Awareness training 2 2 1 
7 Formal instructions 2 1 1 
8 Silent alarm + GPS 1 3 0 
9 No company logos 0 0 1 
 
Conclusions 
 
In academic literature on situational crime prevention it is argued that – when introduced 
without proper reflection and consideration – preventive measures can easily backfire and 
turn into the negative. It is argued that measures need to be carefully assessed prior to their 
implementation, and that this assessment should cover a range of cost factors and generic 
preconditions. The study reported on in this paper seeks to illustrate the potential benefit 
of this assessment by means of an ex ante consideration of a number of alternative 
measures to control unauthorized access to pick-up and delivery vans, a requirement that 
forms part of various supply chain security programs, and at the same time addresses an 
important business need. The scope of the study is limited to the selection process of 
 preventive measures only, and does not cover the actual implementation and ex post 
evaluation phase. The main objective is to illustrate the process of assessing situational 
measures prior to their actual implementation. As such, it should not be considered a 
detailed study into the potential effectiveness (or reverse effects) of situational measures 
available to tackle security risks in the pick-up and delivery process, as this would require 
additional research, a broader study sample and a more in-depth analysis and comparison 
of relevant incident data.  
The outcome of the study illustrates that, when deciding on what measures best to 
implement, it may be worthwhile or even necessary not to focus on monetary costs only. 
Even though they present an extremely limited financial cost, certain measures may be 
considered questionable because of the fact that end-users have very limited belief in their 
effectiveness. In this study, this is the case for the removal of company logos. Other 
measures are perceived by end-users as being impracticable, hindering them in their daily 
jobs (e.g. the provision of double drivers), or as posing a high ethical cost. The latter is the 
case for the introduction of random compliance checks to monitor adherence to formal 
instructions and to sanction non-compliance. Drivers perceive this measure as having a 
negative impact on their feeling of privacy, their freedom of movement, their feeling of 
being treated equally, and on the relationship of trust that must exist between employer 
and employee. In this study, the measure perceived as the most practicable and effective 
one, and as posing the lowest ethical cost, is the installation of automated locking devices 
on all vans. Finally, certain measures may have an elevated potential for a range of 
unintended reverse effects. Based on the small study sample and the limitations of the data 
employed, this potential should be interpreted as a perceived potential, as a detailed 
determination of e.g. possible displacement effects requires much more research which 
does not fall within the scope of this particular study. 
Based on the outcome of the study it is clear that an ex ante consideration of 
preconditions, monetary costs, non-monetary costs and consequential costs prior to 
deciding on what measure(s) best to implement, has the potential to avoid that time and 
resources would be wasted and negative side effects would come into effect once a 
measure has been introduced. Taking the recommendations set forth in this paper into 
consideration, will contribute to making the decision on what measures best to implement 
a more informed and balanced one. To be able to profit from this, policy makers should 
allow practitioners a certain freedom of choice between a set of alternative measures when 
 imposing requirements on them, as the various preconditions and cost components will be 
different within each individual setting. Translated to the topic of this paper, end-users in 
the supply chain should – to a certain extent – be allowed to introduce measures that best 
fit the setting in which they operate and, as such, assist regulators in reaching their 
objectives in the most effective and efficient way. Furthermore, as a proper consideration 
of alternative measures requires a certain level of theoretical understanding and skills that 
are not always available to all, it is recommended that end-users are offered additional 
guidance and support, e.g. by means of disseminating relevant incident data and research 
findings, by familiarizing them with some key concepts and techniques, or by funding 
additional research and evaluation studies. 
 NOTES 
 
[1] This code was incorporated into European legislation with Regulation (EC) No. 
725/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on enhancing 
ship and port facility security, OJ, L 129/6, 29 April 2004. 
[2] Regulation (EC) No. 2320/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 
December 2002 establishing common rules in the field of civil aviation security, OJ, 
L355/1, 30 December 2002. 
[3] Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to 
the Council, the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee 
on a simple and paperless environment for Customs and Trade and on the role of customs 
in the integrated management of external borders, COM (2003) 452, Brussels, 24 July 
2003. 
[4] As an example, interceptions of improvised explosive devices originating from Yemen 
in 2010, have triggered US and EU governments to further enhance air cargo security 
regulations and introduce additional safeguards to protect civil aviation. 
[5] As argued by Bowers and Johnson (2003: 276), research indicates that crime 
displacement is not a necessary outcome of crime prevention activity, and it is also 
possible that crime reduction schemes may have a diffusion of benefits. Furthermore, it 
has been argued that even where displacement occurs, there may be some benefit to this 
(e.g. offenders choosing to commit less serious types of crimes than those prevented).  A 
systematic review of 102 evaluations of situational crime prevention initiatives by 
Guerette and Bowers (2009) further supports the view that crime does not necessarily 
relocate in the aftermath of situational interventions. 
[6] According to Clarke (2005: 53), the concept of adaptation refers to the process through 
which „offender populations‟ discover new crime vulnerabilities after preventive measures 
have been in place for a while. It is a longer term process than displacement, which refers 
to the ways that „individual offenders‟ find to circumvent preventive measures. 
[7] Figures and further details were obtained from the Operations Manager of the branch. 
[8] The focus group consisted of four members: the Head of Security, the Aviation 
Security Manager, the Manager Security Compliance and the Security Manager 
responsible for the local branch. 
 [9] The local Operations Manager, who has a clear view on all his drivers, could confirm 
that the spread of these background variables reflects the total spread in the targeted 
population. This means that the data used for further analyses was not substantially biased 
by a non-coverage problem. 
[10] The company‟s official Confidant Advisor (i.e. „vertrouwenspersoon‟) was asked to 
act as the central point of contact for the drivers. 
[11] Info obtained from the operator‟s Engineering Department. 
[12] Access to this data was granted by the Head of Security. 
[13] The fact that a shipment is reported missing, can also relate to the fact that it had been 
delivered to the wrong address, or mistakenly swapped with another shipment due to some 
operational error. 
[14] When the survey was conducted, 27,3% of the respondents had been working for the 
operator for less than one year. 36,4% had been working with the company between one 
and five years, and another 36,4% for more than five years. 
[15] E.g. to optimize effectiveness in the example elaborated in this study, one can think 
of combining a measure that is tailored at making sure that van doors are locked at all 
times (e.g. card key) with one that is designed to detect intrusion (e.g. audible alarm). 
[16] If a measure is unavailable (e.g. because local law does not permit its use or 
implementation), it simply cannot be introduced. 
[17] There are no interdependencies if a measure can work on its own (i.e. without 
introducing additional measures).  Examples of measures that are interdependent, are the 
installation of an electronic access control system and the introduction of access control 
procedures: just having the system installed without having access levels defined, will 
have no (or only a limited) effect. 
[18] The one-dimensional character of the scale was confirmed with principal axis 
factoring (a single own value greater than one). This scale tested good on internal 
consistency with an acceptable Cronbach‟s Alfa value. Four items were withheld to build 
up the scale. See Appendix 1 for more detail. 
[19] To interpret the scores one must keep in mind that the scale is internally consistent 
(meaning that individual respondents answered consistently high or low on the four 
items); that a score of „four‟ suggests the lowest possible level of awareness; and that a 
score of „20‟ suggests the highest level of awareness possible. 
 [20] The one-dimensional character of the scale was confirmed with principal axis 
factoring (a single own value greater than one). The scale tested good on internal 
consistency with an acceptable Cronbach‟s. See Appendix 1 for more detail. 
[21] Idem. 
[22] See Appendix 1 for more details on the properties of the scale. 
[23] Idem. 
[24] Fixed costs are expenses that are not dependent on the level of goods or services 
produced or sold, while variable costs are considered to be expenses that change in 
proportion to the activity of a business (source: http://www.accountingtools.com, accessed 
9 November 2010). 
[25] Annual depreciation included. 
[26] The yearly maintenance cost for (security) equipment is budgeted by the operator‟s 
facility department at 15% of the total equipment cost. 
[27] Belgian private security legislation requires a private investigator‟s license for 
conducting (covert) compliance checks on drivers. Conducting one check takes 
approximately 4 hours (info obtained from the operator‟s Head of Security). 
[28] Info obtained from the operator‟s preferred supplier. 
[29] Idem. 
[30] Info obtained from the operator‟s Surveillance department and from the operator‟s 
preferred supplier. 
[31] Again, responses have been plotted on a (five-point Likert) scale, tested by means of 
an exploratory factor analysis, and verified for internal consistency. 
[32] See Appendix 1 for more details on the properties of the scale. 
[33] Over the past decade there have been valuable contributions in criminological 
literature on how to measure displacement effects of crime reduction activities (see e.g. 
Bowers and Johnson 2003). 
[34] Displacement to process steps other than the pick-up and delivery process (e.g. 
offenders turning their attention to depot locations as a result of enhancing security in the 
transport process) has not been considered in this exercise. 
[35] Statements are translated from the original (Dutch) questionnaire. Meanings can be 
slightly shifted due to this operation. 
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 APPENDIX 1: DRIVER SURVEY RESULTS
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a. Awareness scale 
Used items Factor loading Cronbach’s Alfa 
5 point scale („fully agree‟ to „fully disagree‟)  0,627 
“I think there is a great chance that a person with bad 
intentions will try to access my vehicle”. 
0,679  
“I think a lot can be done to prevent access to my vehicle”. 0,590  
“I think the damage to the company caused by theft is big”. 0,567  
“I think my colleagues don‟t lock their vehicles 
appropriately”. 
0,364  
 
 b. Commitment scale 
Used items Factor loading Cronbach’s Alfa 
5 point scale („fully agree‟ to „fully disagree‟)  0,550 
“I don‟t think I should engage myself in trying to prevent 
unauthorized to my vehicle during working hours”. (R) 
0,630  
“I would like to assist with the prevention of unauthorized 
access to my vehicle”. 
0,534  
“A driver is the ideal person to prevent unauthorized access 
to the vehicle”. 
0,486  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 c. Belief scale 
Belief Factor loading 
5 point scale (‘fully agree’ to ‘fully 
disagree’) 
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“I believe others would be deterred 
to enter my vehicle with this 
measure”. 
0,843 0,796 0,529 0,717 0,757 0,528 0,455 0,843 0,870 
“This measure makes it more 
difficult for others to enter my 
vehicle”. 
0,759 0,929 0,876 0,807 0,983 0,630 0,567 0,802 0,682 
“I think this is a useless measure”. 
(R) 
0,561 0,674 0,838 0,833 0,814 0,792 0,858 0,811 0,834 
“I think this measure would not 
have an effect on the number of 
successful attempts to enter the 
vehicle”. (R) 
0,557 0,350 0,707 0,825 0,722 0,548 0,560 0,349 0,862 
“One cannot fully secure a vehicle 
against intruders without the use of 
this measure”. 
0,498 0,832 0,506 0,585 0,487 0,746 0,587 0,895 0,809 
          
Cronbach’s Alfa 0,738 0,798 0,821 0,866 0,867 0,744 0,711 0,856 0,902 
 
 
 d. Practicability scale 
Practicability Factor loading 
5 point scale (‘fully agree’ to ‘fully disagree’) 
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“I would get used to this measure after a few 
hours”. 
0,911 0,665 0,448 0,763 0,756 0,882 0,898 0,742 0,757 
“My job could go much easier thanks to this 
measure”. 
0,819 0,847 0,810 0,965 0,843 0,657 0,571 0,640 0,593 
“I will need more time to finish my round with this 
measure”. (R) 
0,750 0,958 0,881 0,541 0,445 0,786 0,300 0,835 0,730 
“I would be hindered in my job if this measure 
would be used”. (R) 
0,689 0,772 0,844 0,702 0,729 0,766 0,610 0,682 0,782 
          
Cronbach’s Alfa 0,847 0,883 0,828 0,820 0,773 0,872 0,646 0,815 0,751 
 
 e. Social cost 
Social cost Factor loading 
5 point scale (‘fully agree’ to ‘fully 
disagree’) 
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“I would feel less free in my job if 
this was applied”. 
0,954 0,947 0,981 0,958 0,936 0,801 0,807 0,963 0,934 
“This measure would not even be 
necessary if the company has 
enough confidence in the honesty of 
their drivers”. 
0,808 0,803 0,577 0,818 0,728 0,502 0,630 0,634 0,549 
“I would feel invaded in my privacy 
by this measure”. 
0,777 0,856 0,907 0,934 0,743 0,713 0,746 0,864 0,656 
“With this measure every driver is 
treated equally”. (R) 
0,751 0,736 0,655 0,709 0,742 0,520 0,451 0,801 0,899 
“I would feel aimed at if this 
measure was applied”. 
0,605 0,613 0,733 0,696 0,527 0,813 0,613 0,976 0,895 
          
Cronbach’s Alfa 0,877 0,884 0,880 0,912 0,846 0,780 0,784 0,927 0,886 
 CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSIONS 
 
This fourth and final chapter summarizes the outcome of the previous chapters, providing 
an answer to the research questions that were set forth in the introductory part of this 
manuscript. Based on the overall outcome we feel confident to state that our initial 
hypothesis is a valid one: a thorough and “ex ante” consideration of the measures that are 
deemed (or claimed) effective to tackle a certain crime problem or risk, avoids that time 
and resources would be wasted, and negative side effects would come into effect once a 
measure is introduced. It further contributes to the overall effectiveness of the 
intervention, as key considerations such as an assessment of user belief and user 
commitment - to name but a few - influence the quality of its outcome.  
 
The main contributions of this doctoral study are (1) the identification of (the need for) an 
ex ante consideration of alternative measures as a key activity in any situational program 
design and (2) the definition of the preconditions, costs and reverse effects that need to be 
assessed as part of this consideration. We feel confident that both findings will contribute 
to the existing body of knowledge on situational crime prevention, and to a more effective 
and efficient application of situational techniques in a real life environment.  
 
This closing chapter summarizes the main findings of the study and further clarifies at 
what stage in a generic program design the ex ante consideration of alternative measures 
ideally takes place. For clarity reasons, each section in this chapter is preceded by a quote 
of the relevant research question(s). This chapter further includes some recommendations 
for future programming, recommendations that are based on the outcome of the study but 
not form part of its scope.  
 
1. Setting the scene  
 
This doctoral study started off from the observation that, over the past decade, operators in 
the international supply chain have increasingly been confronted with the introduction of 
programs to secure supply chains against acts of unlawful interference. Some of these 
programs are mandatory, other are industry driven. The majority of them are quite 
 prescriptive and detailed, and most of them contain the requirement to implement a range 
of very specific measures and controls.  
 
In most (if not all) programs, these measures and controls can be classified as situational 
measures. This has been illustrated by means of a thorough analysis of two initiatives: the 
EU Air Cargo Security Program and the TAPA (2007) Freight Security Requirements (see 
also Annex 1). As indicated in the introduction, the research reported on in this manuscript 
does not cover the effectiveness of the measures that are put forward by policy makers, 
nor an evaluation of one (or more) particular program(s). The main objective of the 
research is to contribute to a better understanding of the selection process of alternative 
measures that are deemed effective to tackle a certain (crime) problem, focussing on the 
cost of these measures and on the conditions that need to be in place in order for their 
introduction to be successful. 
 
2. Implementation problems reported by end-users 
 
Research question(s): 
What implementation problems are reported by end-users in the supply chain? 
 
As part of a targeted study conducted on behalf of the Directorate-General Transport and 
Energy of the European Commission
40
, end-users of the European Air Cargo Security 
Program and the TAPA (2007) Freight Security Requirements have been asked to report 
on any implementation problems they encountered when implementing the various 
controls in their operations (see also Annex 2 for full detail). These problems have been 
analysed and categorized based on their common denominators. The findings derived 
from this exercise, together with the outcome of an initial literature review, were 
consolidated into a set of „success indicators‟ (see Table 1).41   
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 COUNTERACT - Cluster of User Networks in Transport and Energy Relating to Anti-terrorist Activities, 
2006–2009. 
41
 Based on this exercise it was further argued that the effectiveness and/or efficiency of a measure often 
depend on the availability of other measures. Whenever interdependencies are identified, these should 
obviously be accounted for.  
 
 Table 1: Success indicators 
Indicator Reported problems (some examples) 
 
1. Availability 
 
 
- Limitations to check previous employment or criminal history 
due to privacy legislation 
- Limited abilities to verify information across borders 
- Lack of access to information sources to conduct staff vetting 
 
2. Required level of knowledge, expertise and guidance 
 
- Expertise required to check the identity of persons delivering 
known freight 
- Expertise required to verify cargo documentation 
- Expertise required to screen consignments for prohibited articles 
 
3. Practicability 
 
- Difficulties encountered with organizing security awareness 
training for all relevant categories of staff 
- Inability to seal multiple stop pick-up and delivery vehicles 
- Difficulties encountered with limiting the use of soft-sided 
trailers during peak season 
 
4. Financial / economic cost 
 
 
- Cost of screening equipment 
- Cost of providing security awareness training 
- Cost of staff vetting 
- Cost of protecting building walls, roofs and doors 
- Cost of providing full CCTV-coverage for warehouse and dock 
areas 
 
5. Ethical / social cost 
 
 
- Privacy issues related to staff vetting 
- Privacy issues related to controlling access to facilities 
- Privacy issues related to conducting identity checks on 
individuals 
 
 
6. Ease of circumvention 
 
 
 
7. Beneficial side effects 
 
 
8. Reverse effects 
 
 
- Escalation of violence when using overt or covert escorts to 
secure transport movements 
 
 
9. Stakeholder / user belief 
 
 
- Limited belief in the effectiveness of documentation 
requirements 
 
 
10. Stakeholder / user awareness and commitment 
 
 
 
 3. Re-thinking the cost of supply chain security 
 
Research question(s): 
How do these (implementation problems) relate to what we already know from academic 
literature on situational crime prevention? 
How can costs and implementation problems best be classified? 
What should fall within the scope of an ex ante consideration of preventive measures? 
 
Following a second, more thorough literature review and consequent analysis, the 
indicators that had initially been identified, have been re-classified. One of the initial 
indicators (i.e. „beneficial side effects‟) was abandoned because it relates to the „benefit‟ 
side of the cost-benefit equation. Another indicator (i.e. „ease of circumvention‟) has been 
captured under a different heading. The final classification distinguishes between a set of 
generic preconditions; the (financial, ethical and esthetical) costs of a specific measure 
that is under consideration; and the impact of a range of unintended consequences that 
may come into effect following its introduction (see also Table 2). 
 
Table 2: Preconditions, costs and reverse effects (Source: Haelterman 2011: 397) 
 
Pre-conditions (general) Costs (specific) Reverse effects (specific) 
 
Availability 
Practicability 
Required knowledge 
Required expertise 
User awareness 
User belief 
User commitment 
Co-operation   
 
Financial / monetary cost 
- Fixed 
- Variable 
Ethical / social cost 
- Labelling / discrimination  
- Distrust 
- Civil liberties 
- Inequalities 
Esthetical cost 
 
 
Displacement 
- Geographical  
- Temporal   
- Target   
- Tactical   
- Crime type   
Escalating effects 
Creative adaptation 
Enticement effects 
 
 
 It is argued that a measure should only be introduced after having identified and 
considered all available alternatives, and that this (ex ante) consideration should include 
the assessment of : 
 
- Certain preconditions that need to be in place in order for any intervention to be 
effective. This is the case for the practicability and availability of a measure to 
end-users, as well as for the knowledge and expertise that is required to evaluate 
and implement it. Furthermore, end-users need to be aware of the problem that is 
being dealt with; they need to belief in the effectiveness of the proposed 
solution(s); and they need to be committed to solve the problem and to co-operate 
with other stakeholders to reach the desired outcome. If these preconditions are not 
or insufficiently met, the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed solution may 
be severely compromised. 
 
- A first set of cost components that specifically relate to the introduction of a certain 
measure that is under consideration. This is the case for its financial, ethical and 
esthetical costs. As argued before, monetary costs cover the fixed and variable 
costs of investing in crime prevention. Ethical costs relate to the (perceived) 
impact of the introduction of a measure on civil liberties, convenience and conduct 
of staff, customers and other stakeholders; and esthetical costs relate to the 
(perceived) impact on the esthetics of the environment in which a measure is 
introduced. 
 
- The impact of a range of unintended consequences that may come into effect 
following the introduction of a certain (set of) measure(s). As outlined in Table 2, 
this impact may result from displacement
42
, escalating, creative adaptation and/or 
enticement effects. 
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 As argued by Bowers and Johnson (2003: 276), research indicates that crime displacement is not a 
necessary outcome of crime prevention activity, and it is also possible that crime reduction schemes may 
have a diffusion of benefits. Furthermore, it has been argued that even where displacement occurs, there may 
be some benefit to this (e.g. offenders choosing to commit less serious types of crimes than those prevented).  
A systematic review of 102 evaluations of situational crime prevention initiatives by Guerette and Bowers 
(2009) further supports the view that crime does not necessarily relocate in the aftermath of situational 
interventions, as does a review article recently published by Weisburd and Telep (2012). 
 4. An ex ante consideration of alternative measures as part of a generic 
(situational) program design 
 
Research question(s): 
When should an ex ante consideration of preventive measures ideally take place? 
 
Having identified the various items that require careful consideration, the question 
remains when this consideration should take place. In this section it is argued that an ex 
ante consideration of preventive measures ideally forms part of the generic program 
design, and should be regarded as a separate stage in the design process. 
 
Clarke (1997: 15) describes the standard methodology that is applied for situational 
projects as „a version of the action research model in which researchers and practitioners 
work together to analyse and define the problem, to identify and try out possible solutions, 
to evaluate the result and, if necessary, to repeat the cycle until success is achieved‟. As 
such a generic situational crime prevention project comprises five stages: (1) the 
collection of data about the nature and dimensions of the specific crime problem; (2) the 
analysis of the situational conditions that permit or facilitate the commission of the crimes 
in question; (3) a systematic study of possible means of blocking opportunities for these 
particular crimes; (4) the implementation of the most promising, feasible and economic 
measures; and (5) the monitoring of results and dissemination of experience.  
 
According to Tilley (2005: 8) „the commonsense problem-solving approach to crime 
issues suggests that we first scan the environment for existing and future problems, then 
subject them to careful analysis to figure out what might be done about them, and on the 
basis of this develop a strategy to address them, which is then systematically evaluated so 
that practice may be refined and failed approaches abandoned‟. The same problem-solving 
methodology is used in problem-oriented policing and in many other forms of social 
intervention (Clarke, 1997: 15). „Problem-oriented policing‟, first introduced in 1979 and 
captured in the four-stage SARA model (i.e. Scanning, Analysis, Response and 
Assessment), reflects the same action research paradigm underpinning situational crime 
prevention. According to Goldstein (1979; Clarke and Eck, 2003: 5-1; Scott et al., 2008: 
225) achieving greater operational effectiveness for the police requires: (1) identifying the 
 everyday problems they handle in more precise terms; (2) researching each problem; (3) 
documenting the nature of the current police response to these problems; (4) assessing its 
adequacy and the adequacy of existing authority and resources; (5) engaging in a broad 
exploration of alternatives to present responses; (6) weighing the merits of these 
alternatives; and (7) choosing from among them.  
 
The SARA model was originally developed by Eck and Spelman as a simple problem-
solving tool that can help in addressing any crime or disorder problem (Morgan and 
Cornish, 2006: 29). More recently Ekblom (cited in Clarke and Eck, 2003: 8-2) developed 
the SARA-acronym further into what he refers to as „the 5 I‟s‟: (1) intelligence (i.e. 
„gathering and analysing information on crime problems and their consequences, and 
diagnosing their causes‟); (2) intervention (i.e. „considering the full range of possible 
interventions that could be applied to block, disrupt or weaken those causes and 
manipulate the risk and protective factors‟); (3) implementation (i.e. „converting potential 
interventions into practical methods, putting them into effect in ways that are appropriate 
for the local context, and monitoring the actions undertaken‟); (4) involvement (i.e. 
„mobilising other agencies, companies and individuals to play their part in implementing 
the intervention‟); and (5) impact and process evaluation (i.e. „assessment, feedback and 
adjustment‟). 
 
If we review the above stages and incorporate the outcome of this doctoral study
43
, we end 
up with a dynamic approach that consists of six (opposite to five) „consecutive‟ stages : 
 
(1) Phase one (i.e. the identification and definition of the problem and relevant 
stakeholders) is by far one of the most important although often underestimated 
stages in the process. If the problem definition is wrong to start with or important 
information is overlooked, then the whole crime reduction process can be 
compromised (Laycock, 2005: 682). First of all it is important to collect as much 
data as possible on the nature of the (crime) risk or problem, its extent and 
(possible) impact. Ekblom (1988, in: Gilling, 1996: 12) identifies this stage as 
„obtaining data on crime problems‟. Berry and Carter (1992, in: Gilling, 1996: 12) 
refer to the need for „a clear understanding of the problem being addressed‟. As 
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 See stage four. 
 Gilling (1996: 19) argues, „misdiagnoses of crime problems can result from the 
failure to research the characteristics of crimes in sufficient depth, although this is 
not always possible given the limitations of data collection in the crime field‟. In 
any case a clear definition of the problem (or future problem) on hand is essential 
in order to make a statement on the urge and priority to tackle it. To do so it is also 
extremely important to identify all relevant stakeholders. 
 
(2) Once the problem has been identified and defined, it is essential to analyse the 
situational conditions that permit or facilitate the commission of the crimes under 
study. In this stage of the process the situational contexts and „communities‟ in 
which different types of crime are committed and preventive action is required, 
need to be analysed thoroughly and separately (Mayhew, Clarke, Sturman and 
Hough, 1976: 29; Hirschfield, 2005: 632). 
 
(3) As part of stage three an inventory of potential measures (whether the most 
appropriate or not) is to be produced
44. According to Clarke (1997: 4) „situational 
measures must be tailored to highly specific categories of crime, which means that 
distinctions must be made, not between broad categories such as burglary and 
robbery, but rather between the different kinds of offences falling under each of 
these categories‟. „For maximum effect, every specific kind of crime, including 
each variety of terrorism, requires its own analysis and its own tailor-made 
solutions […] and usually a package of measures must be introduced‟ (Clarke, 
2006: xi-xii). The outcome of this stage should be a list of potential solutions that 
are considered effective to tackle the problem. 
 
(4) In order to stress the importance of an ex ante consideration of potential measures 
we believe it is essential to identify this consideration as a separate, individual 
stage in any program design. All too often countermeasures that are thought of to 
be effective are identified and implemented without considering any potential side 
effects or interdependencies. These side effects and interdependencies (if any) will 
eventually come to the surface after the measures have been implemented (e.g. as 
part of the monitoring or evaluation phase), resulting in the need for abandoning 
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 initial approaches, the need for adjustments or „damage repair‟ or, even worse, 
resulting in the conclusion that measures are totally ineffective and efforts and 
resources have been completely wasted. The need for an „ex ante‟ assessment of 
preventive measures has been touched on in literature but had never been explored 
in full detail. As such we feel confident that the outcome of this study clearly 
contributes to the body of knowledge on (and application of) situational crime 
prevention.  
 
(5) The actual implementation stage starts once all potential measures have been 
identified and considered and a detailed  implementation plan allowing for 
constant monitoring and an „ex post‟ impact and process evaluation has been 
agreed upon with all stakeholders and program partners.   
 
(6) The general purpose of evaluation is to provide feedback that will generate 
corrections to and refinements in crime prevention theory, policy and practice 
(Tilley, 2002: 1). Scientific evaluations are necessary in order to measure and 
establish the effects of a program. As such they are said to be part of the remedy 
for exaggeration and overgeneralization of its efficacy (Eck, 2002: 95). According 
to the National Crime Prevention institute, „a thorough evaluation can help to (1) 
measure the degree of progress toward the general goal of reducing crime, (2) 
identify weak and strong points of program operations and suggest changes, (3) 
compare efficiency and effectiveness of existing program activities with other 
possible program activities, (4) challenge underlying program assumptions and 
improve the quality of program objectives, (5) suggest new procedures and 
approaches, (6) provide for timely recognition of negative program effects, (7) 
help establish priorities for resource allocation, (8) increase public support for 
successful approaches and reduce emphasis on unsuccessful approaches, (9) 
provide standards against which to measure achievement and (10) develop a 
critical attitude among (program) staff and advisory personnel, and increase 
communication and coordination among them (NCPI, 2001: 184). Four basic 
elements must be considered in all evaluations: interventions (i.e. the package of 
actions whose effectiveness the evaluation is supposed to determine), outcomes 
(i.e. the changes in target crimes or disorders), cases (i.e. the people or areas 
 involved with crime) and settings (Shadish et al., in: Eck, 2005: 702). In most 
cases evaluations take place once the program has been implemented and settled 
for a certain period of time. It is important, however, to receive the feedback as 
soon as possible in order to allow for fine-tuning and, if necessary, more 
encompassing adjustments. A built-in monitoring system provides for these 
functions and can further be used for purposes of  program evaluation (Gilling, 
1996: 11).  
 
As Clarke and Eck argue, the above stages shouldn‟t necessarily follow one another in a 
strictly linear fashion. An unfolding analysis can result in refocusing of the project, and 
questions about possible responses can lead to the need for fresh analyses. The longer and 
more complicated the project, the more iterations of this kind are likely to occur (Clarke 
and Eck, 2003: 8-1).  One requirement that is consistent throughout the process is the need 
for proper analysis. Analyses can be undertaken at each stage of the cycle: analyses in the 
initial stages would focus on crime problems and the socio-environmental contexts in 
which they occur, while analyses in later stages would be concerned with the 
measurement of policy impacts, the attribution of observed changes to interventions and 
the search for any policy side-effects such as displacement, crime switch or the diffusion 
of benefits (Hirschfield, 2005: 632). Obviously any proper analysis requires the 
availability of (accurate) data. In practice data on crime problems are often hard to access, 
partial and inaccurate, and identifying patterns and underlying problems requires 
substantial understanding and skills (Tilley, 2005: 8). As Tilley continues, „the initially 
“obvious” can be quite mistaken, and ill-thought through but well intentioned responses 
are capable of producing perverse and damaging effects‟.  
Various tools are available to support this process of data gathering and analysis: impact 
analyses, vulnerability scans, crime-centred analyses (CCA)
45
, crime-environment 
analyses (CEA)
46
, crime script analyses
47
, etc.   
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 Crime-centred analysis (CCA) uses a range of measurements and statistical techniques to identify the 
manifestation of crime and how it is changing over time, and includes analyses of its spatial distribution, its 
temporal patterns and how crime within one area compares with that elsewhere (Hirschfield, 2005: 637). 
46
 Crime-environment analysis (CEA) examines the relationship between crime and aspects of the physical 
and social environment. It includes exploring links between crime and community-level characteristics (e.g. 
disadvantage, community cohesion) and between crime and other factors such as landuse, transport routes, 
the distribution of crime generators, crime attractors and, if available, crime prevention measures 
(Hirschfield, 2005: 637). 
 5. Recommendations for future programming 
 
Research question(s): 
What can we learn from the outcome of this study to guide future programming? 
 
A preliminary analysis of a range of supply chain security programs and a survey 
conducted amongst end-users of these programs indicate (1) an obvious preference of 
policy makers for the introduction of situational controls and (2) a series of unexpected 
costs and implementation problems reported on by field practitioners. In this dissertation it 
is argued that an ex ante consideration of alternative solutions can assist in mitigating 
these problems and, as such, contribute to the overall effectiveness of a (situational) 
program.  
 
In order to enable operators in the supply chain to select the most promising measures that 
best fit the setting in which they are to be introduced, they must obviously be allowed a 
certain freedom of choice between a number of alternative solutions, or the freedom to 
come up with alternatives that are equivalent to those proposed by policy makers. This is 
currently the case in some but by far not all programs. As where customs supply chain 
security programs such as the European Authorized Economic Operator Program basically 
indicate the scope and objectives of the required intervention – i.e. highlighting the risk 
but leaving the decision on what particular safeguards best to introduce open to end-users 
(or at least to some extent)
48
 - business driven initiatives such as the TAPA Freight 
Security Requirements only list a range of very specific situational measures that need to 
be introduced in order to reach and maintain compliance. The latter program allows only 
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 Crime scripts describe the ways in which an offence unfolds and attempt to make explicit the series of 
decision points through which the would-be offender passes in the process of crime commission. They treat 
crimes as stories involving a cast of characters, props and locations that unfold in a purposeful sequence of 
stages, scenes and actions (Morgan and Cornish, 2006: 13). As Laycock argues, crime scripts can be useful 
in the response development process since they offer a mechanism for systematically working through the 
decision process, thus exposing a range of potential intervention points (Laycock, 2005: 682). 
48
 The AEO Guidelines ensure a harmonized implementation of the AEO rules throughout the EU, 
guaranteeing the equal treatment of economic operators and transparency of the rules. Part one of the AEO 
guidelines explains the AEO concept based on the adopted legislation, while part two contains the 
questionnaire, providing a list of points to assist both customs authorities and AEO applicants in assessing 
whether or not the AEO criteria are met. For a full overview of these guidelines: 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/customs/policy_issues/customs_security/aeo_gui
delines_en.pdf, (accessed 23 December 2011). 
 very limited space for considering whether the proposed measure best suits the 
environment in which it is to be introduced. 
 
As indicated in the introduction, the analysis of a number of supply chain security 
programs revealed that although Clarke‟s classification of techniques comprises five 
different strategies, there appears to be an over-representation of two particular strategies 
(Haelterman, 2009a: 36). Allowing scope for choice between alternative measures may 
widen the potential of situational crime prevention in the international supply chain and 
increase the number of professionals occupied with developing, implementing and 
evaluating new techniques, leading to innovative approaches and a continuous refinement 
of existing ones. Furthermore, allowing sufficient freedom to make a choice between a 
range of alternative measures is not only recommended based on the arguments that have 
been raised in this manuscript, but is also key to situational crime prevention as a concept. 
According to Clarke (1997: 4), “situational crime prevention comprises opportunity-
reducing measures that (1) are directed at highly specific forms of crime, (2) involve the 
management, design or manipulation of the immediate environment in as systematic and 
permanent way as possible, (3) make crime more difficult and risky, or less rewarding and 
excusable as judged by a wide range of offenders”. Every specific environment in which a 
measure is to be introduced, will have its own features that need to be considered when 
deciding on the best option. As such, defining one particular measure as being the best 
option for implementation in a global environment encompassing thousands of business 
settings may appear to be a bit overambitious. 
 
As to guide future programming, it is recommended that those responsible for the 
development, direction, enforcement and evaluation of existing or future programs take 
the above into consideration when imposing new or revised requirements upon end-users. 
It is recommended that the emphasis of policy makers is being put on defining the key 
objectives of the program and on meeting these objectives in the most effective and 
efficient way, clearly stating what risks need to be tackled without being too prescriptive 
or limitative in defining the „how‟.  
 
This proposed shift to a more lenient and partnership approach does not come without a 
challenge. In this dissertation it is indicated that (situational) crime prevention is a very 
 complex endeavor, requiring specific theoretical understanding and skills, and the 
availability of accurate data. End-users will need to have sufficient knowledge and 
expertise to select the most efficient solution from a range of alternatives, and those tasked 
with verifying compliance to the program (i.e. governments officials or commercial 
certification bodies) will need to be capable of assessing whether or not the controls that 
have been obtained for by a particular user, meet the key objectives of the program. As 
these activities require a certain level of expertise that may not be readily available to date, 
it is recommended that government and academia offer additional guidance and support, 
e.g. by familiarizing practitioners with key concepts and techniques, by funding or 
conducting additional research and evaluation studies, by means of collecting and 
disseminating relevant (incident) data and research findings, and by facilitating best 
practice sharing. The recent call for proposals published by the European Commission on 
creating a virtual network of excellence on security research
49
 is a good example of what 
can be done to improve current and support future practice. 
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 Topic SEC-2012.7.4-2 : Networking of researchers for a high level multiorganisational  
and cross-border collaboration, http://ec.europa.eu/research/rea/pdf/sec_info_day_2011/2_fp7-sec-2012-
1_call_en.pdf, accessed 20 January 2012. 
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 ANNEX 1: SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION AND SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY 
 
In this annex it is illustrated that the security measures defined in the EU (NL) Air Cargo 
Security Program
50
 and in the TAPA (2007) Freight Security Requirements
51
 can all be 
classified as situational measures using the 25-category classification of opportunity-
reducing techniques provided for by Clarke and his colleagues (see Table 1). Each 
measure is listed against the situational strategy it best represents: „increasing the 
perceived effort‟, „increasing the perceived risk‟, „reducing the rewards‟, „reducing 
provocations‟, or „removing excuses‟. Various measures can be classified under more 
than one strategy, and are listed accordingly.
52
 
 
Table 1: Situational Crime Prevention Techniques (source: Clarke, 2005: 46-47) 
 
 
Increase the effort Increase the risk Reduce the rewards Reduce provocations Remove excuses 
 
1. Harden targets  
 
 
(e.g. immobilisers in 
cars, anti-robbery 
screens)  
 
 
6. Extend guardianship 
 
 
(e.g. cocooning, 
neighbourhood watch) 
 
11. Conceal targets 
 
 
(e.g. gender-neutral 
phone directories, off-
street parking) 
 
16. Reduce frustration 
and stress 
 
(e.g. efficient queuing, 
soothing lighting) 
 
21. Set rules 
 
 
(e.g. rental agreements, 
hotel registration) 
 
2. Control access to 
facilities 
 
(e.g. entry phones, 
alley-gating) 
 
 
7. Assist natural 
surveillance 
 
(e.g. improved street 
lighting, neighbourhood 
watch hotlines) 
 
 
12. Remove targets 
 
 
(e.g. removable car 
radios, pre-paid public 
phone cards) 
 
17. Avoid disputes 
 
 
(e.g. fixed cab fares, 
reduce crowding in 
pubs) 
 
22. Post instructions 
 
 
(e.g. „no parking‟, 
„private property‟) 
 
3. Screen exits 
 
 
(e.g. electronic tags for 
libraries, tickets 
needed) 
 
 
8. Reduce anonymity 
 
 
(e.g. taxi driver ID‟s, 
„how‟s my driving?‟ 
signs) 
 
13. Identify property 
 
 
(e.g. property marking, 
vehicle licensing) 
 
18. Reduce emotional 
arousal 
 
(e.g. controls on violent 
porn, prohibit 
paedophiles working 
with children) 
 
 
23. Alert conscience 
 
 
(e.g. roadside speed 
display signs, 
„shoplifting is stealing‟) 
 
4. Deflect offenders 
 
 
(e.g. street closures in 
red light district, 
separate toilets for 
women) 
 
 
9. Utilise place 
managers 
 
 
(e.g. train employees to 
prevent crime, support 
whistle blowers) 
 
14. Disrupt markets 
 
 
(e.g. checks on pawn 
brokers, licensed street 
vendors) 
 
19. Neutralise peer 
pressure 
 
(e.g. „idiots drink and 
drive‟, „it‟s ok to say 
no‟) 
 
24. Assist compliance 
 
 
(e.g. litter bins, public 
lavatories) 
                                                 
50
 Dutch National Civil Aviation Security Program (version February 2005 - restricted). 
51
 TAPA (2007) Freight Security Requirements: 
http://tapaemea.com/download/public_fsr/2007_TAPA_A_FSR_Audit_Form.pdf, accessed 28 December 
2007. 
52
 There is a considerable overlap between the various techniques and it is obvious that preventive measures 
can serve more than one purpose cq. represent more than one strategy. 
  
5. Control tools / 
weapons 
 
(e.g. toughened beer 
glasses, photos on 
credit cards) 
 
 
10. Strengthen formal 
surveillance 
 
(e.g. speed cameras, 
CCTV in town centres) 
 
15. Deny benefits 
 
 
(e.g. ink merchandise 
tags, graffiti cleaning) 
 
20. Discourage 
imitation 
 
 
(e.g. rapid vandalism 
repair, V-chips in TV‟s) 
 
25. Control drugs / 
alcohol 
 
(e.g. breathalysers in 
pubs, alcohol-free 
event) 
 
1. EU (NL) Air Cargo Security Regulations 
 
1.1. Requirements for Regulated Agents 
 
 
Situational strategy Security measure  
 
Increase the effort 
 
- Access control to premises and designated areas in 
order to ensure that air cargo is secured from 
unauthorised interference   
- Proper packaging/sealing of consignments of air cargo 
- Protection of known freight against unauthorised 
interference at all times 
- Protection of consignments against unauthorised 
interference during transport 
- Locking of vehicles 
- Sealing of vehicles 
 
 
Increase the risk 
 
 
- Nomination of at least one person (per site) responsible 
for the application and control of the relevant security 
measures 
- Adequate verification of accompanying documentation 
- Adequate verification of packaging and/or sealing 
- Identity check on persons delivering known freight 
- Reporting of irregularities to appropriate nominee and 
authorities 
 
 
Increase the effort / increase the risk 
 
 
- Staff vetting 
- Screening of consignments for prohibited articles 
- Proper documentation of air cargo 
 
 
Increase the risk / remove excuses 
 
 
- (Awareness) training of all relevant categories of staff 
 
 
 
 1.2. Requirements for Known Consignors53 
 
 
Situational strategy Security measure  
 
Increase the effort 
 
- Preparation of consignments of air cargo in secure 
areas 
- Protection of consignments of air cargo against 
unauthorised interference during preparation, storage 
and/or transport 
 
 
 
Increase the effort / increase the risk 
 
 
 
- Preparation of consignments of air cargo by reliable 
staff 
- Proper documentation of consignments of air cargo 
(i.e. content, weight, number of pieces, consignee) 
 
 
Remove excuses 
 
 
- Declare in writing that consignments of air cargo do 
not contain any prohibited articles unless properly 
declared 
 
 
 
1.3. Requirements for Road Hauliers54 
 
 
Situational strategy Security measure  
 
Increase the effort 
 
- Protection of consignments against unauthorised 
interference during transport 
- Cargo compartments locked / sealed 
 
 
Increase the risk 
 
 
- Nomination of at least one person responsible for the 
application and control of the security measures 
- Verification of locks and seals when vehicle was left 
unattended 
- Only pre-planned stops 
- Immediate reporting of irregularities to Principal 
 
 
Increase the effort / increase the risk 
 
 
- Staff vetting (criminal history check, reference check) 
 
 
Increase the risk / remove excuses 
 
- Awareness training of all staff with access to air cargo 
                                                 
53
 Dutch National format Known Consignor Declaration. 
54
 Dutch regulation – Official Journal („Staatscourant‟) 29 December 2006, nr. 253. 
  
Remove excuses 
 
 
- Subcontracting not allowed without agreement in 
writing from Principal 
 
1.4. Requirements for Account Consignors55 
 
 
Situational strategy Security measure  
 
Increase the effort 
 
- Access control to areas where consignments of air 
cargo are prepared, packaged and/or stored to ensure 
no unauthorised persons have access to the 
consignments 
- Protection of consignments of air cargo against 
unauthorised interference 
- Adequate packaging (tamper evident closure where 
possible) of consignments of air cargo 
- Protection of consignments against unauthorised 
interference during transport 
 
 
Increase the risk 
 
 
- Nomination of at least one person responsible for the 
application and control of the National instructions 
- Reporting of (apparent or suspected) irregularities to 
the responsible nominee 
- Responsible nominee to take appropriate action 
 
 
Increase the effort / increase the risk 
 
 
- Visitor escorts at all times in areas where consignments 
of air cargo are prepared, packaged and/or stored 
- Staff vetting 
- Screening of consignments for prohibited articles 
- Proper documenting of consignment of air cargo 
 
 
Increase the risk / remove excuses 
 
 
- Awareness training of all staff with access to air cargo 
 
 
 
                                                 
55
 Dutch National instructions on security of premises, staff and transport for Account Consignors (version 
2007). 
 2. TAPA (2007) Freight Security Requirements (A-class) 
 
 
Situational strategy Security measure  
 
Increase the effort 
 
- Any windows or other openings in warehouse walls 
and roof secured 
- Ground floor warehouse windows protected by anti-
ram posts or other physical barriers 
- Dock doors of sufficient strength or design to prevent 
or delay forced entry by use of portable hand tools or 
ramming by vehicle 
- Reinforced exit doors from warehouse (steel doors and 
frames or suitable alternative) 
- Exterior walls designed to resist penetration by 
removing building fabric, cutting or ramming by 
vehicle 
- Visitor office access points controlled 
- All office access points controlled 
- Access control processes both during and outside 
normal operating hours to ensure access is granted only 
for authorized Supplier employees and visitors 
- Only Suppliers authorized employees and escorted 
visitors permitted access to dock/warehouse 
- Restricted-access, caged/vault area for assets on site 
more than 2 hours: high-grade security mesh, chain-
link, or hard wall, including top/roof; alarmed, CCTV, 
controlled access 
- All external dock and warehouse doors closed and 
locked unless required to be opened for normal transit 
operations 
- Restricted access to alarm system 
- Restricted access to CCTV system functions 
- Restricted access to system functions 
- Procedures in place to restrict Supplier‟s employees, 
visitors and contractors access to Buyer‟s assets 
- Adequate control of paperwork. Restricting knowledge 
of transit of Buyer‟s assets to “need to know” only 
(Information Security) 
- Personal containers (defined as lunch box, backpacks, 
coolers, purses, etc.) are controlled in the warehouse 
- Personal vehicles access to shipping and receiving yard 
controlled 
- Solid top, hard-sided, locked cargo doors or reinforced 
soft sided trailers 
- Security tamper evident seals for trucks carrying Buyer 
only shipments 
- Vehicle immobilizing device in place 
 
  
Increase the risk 
 
 
- CCTV external coverage of shipping and receiving 
yard, including entry / exit points, to cover movement 
of vehicles and individuals 
- CCTV coverage of all external dock area 
- CCTV system able to view all exterior sides of the 
facility 
- Flood lighting of enclosed loading / unloading areas 
- Dock doors illuminated externally at night 
- External and internal lighting levels that support high 
quality CCTV images and recording 
- All facility external doors alarmed and linked to main 
alarm system 
- Internal docks covered by CCTV 
- Buyer designated assets under 100% CCTV 
surveillance while in Supplier Facility (this does not 
require 100% of floor coverage, rather 100% coverage 
of Buyer Assets e.g. CCTV from dock to pallet 
breakdown and build area, to HVP cage) 
- Motion detection alarms inside warehouse and 
activated when entire facility is vacated (N/A if facility 
is true 24x7x366 operation) 
- All security system alarms responded to in real-time 
24x7x366 
- Minimum of 60 day records on system alarms 
- Alarms monitored 
- All CCTV images are recorded in real time (VCR or 
digital-recording system). Real-time recording: 
minimum 1,25 frames per second per camera 
- Preventative maintenance plan in place for CCTV 
systems (can be contracted or in house) 
- Minimum 60 day records on system transactions 
- Local documented procedures for handling Buyer‟s 
assets and escalation procedures for communicating 
security incidents to Buyer 
- Process for timely reporting of lost, missing or theft of 
Buyer‟s assets. Incidents to be reported by the Supplier 
to the Buyer within 12 hours; obvious thefts reported 
immediately 
- Emergency customer and local management contacts 
for security incidents listed and available 
- Employee and contractor company photo-ID badges 
issued and worn 
- Badge Policy for visitors/contractors in place 
- Random trash inspection procedures in place for trash 
removal from dock/warehouse 
- Security incident reporting system and method of 
tracking local security incidents 
- Procedure in place to verify box and pallet integrity 
 upon receipt 
- Two-way voice communication system between 
vehicle cab, Supplier‟s base (and escorts, if applicable) 
and procedures for reporting 
- Written contingency plans in place for reporting 
unscheduled events (i.e. stops, delays, route deviation) 
- Routes, schedules and planned stops assessed for risks 
and reviewed 
- Policy in place requiring driver to be present for 
loading and unloading when allowed 
- Pre-alert capability in place 
- Destination to notify origin within 4 hours of receipt of 
shipment, reconciling pre-alert shipment details 
 
 
Increase the effort / increase the risk 
 
 
- Security controlled access points (e.g. guard, card 
access or CCTV with intercom) 
- Manned security monitoring post 24x7x366; 
monitoring post secure from attack 
- Minimum 30-day retention of all CCTV recordings; 
recordings are held in secure storage area 
- Quarterly review of access reports 
- Preventative maintenance plan in place to routinely test 
and service access control and alarm systems 
- At inbound checkpoint for drivers and crews, identity 
and authorization are validated by officially issued 
photo-ID (e.g. Driver‟s license, passport or national ID 
card) 
- Keys controlled in areas where Buyer‟s assets are 
transited / stored 
- Exit Searches performed on exit from secure areas used 
for Buyer‟s assets 
- Criminal history check in place encompassing 5yr 
criminal history, employment check (vetting within 
constraints of local country laws) 
- Termination procedures in place for employees and 
contractors, ensuring return of ID‟s, access cards, keys 
and other sensitive information 
- Procedure in place to preventing systems access to 
Buyer‟s data by terminated employees 
- Records maintained to consider background of 
previously terminated personnel before re-hiring 
- Truck cabins and ignitions keys secured from 
unauthorized use at all times 
- Proof of shipping and receiving records (time, date, 
driver, shipping and receiving personnel, shipment 
details and quantity) 
- Capability to provide overt and covert escorts with real 
time communications with base and local police; 
 written documentation in place 
- Documented response procedures and training for 
escort personnel 
- GPS or similar technology installed on all vehicles 
transporting Buyer‟s assets 
 
Increase the risk / remove excuses 
 
 
- Security awareness training (including robbery 
response training) for all employees 
- Supplier to provide robbery response training detailing 
safe and secure actions to be taken during the event a 
driver is threatened. Details of training are to be 
available to the Buyer 
- Security Awareness training provided to drivers on 
mitigating risk. Details of training are to be available to 
buyer 
 
 
Reduce rewards 
 
 
- Pre-loading or post-delivery storage of Buyer‟s assets 
in trailers 
 
 
Remove excuses 
 
 
- Supplier Security Policy Statement available and 
communicated to all employees 
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 ANNEX 2: EXAMPLES OF IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEMS  
 
This annex captures some of the implementation problems that have been identified by 
end-users in the supply chain. As part of a targeted study on behalf of the European 
Commission
56
, a self-completion questionnaire was sent to all Regulated Agents listed 
on the official site of the Dutch Government
57
, as well as to the four major European 
Express Integrators. The companies were first contacted by phone in order to explain the 
scope and objectives of the study, and to ask for the contact details of the person 
responsible for implementing air cargo security measures (in most cases the Aviation 
Security Advisor). A copy of the questionnaire was then sent by email for completion. 
Respondents were given an overview of the various measures contained in the program 
and asked what implementation problems they encountered when implementing them. 
They were encouraged to list all possible implementation problems they encountered, 
whether general in nature or specific to their own situation, and to provide as much detail 
and examples as possible. From the research population (= a total of 261 companies 
including the four major European Express Integrators), 40 completed and returned the 
questionnaire, resulting in a response rate of 15,32%.
58
 As such, the following data was 
obtained from 37 regulated agents listed in the Netherlands, and from 3 major 
international express integrators (Haelterman, 2009) : 
 
Security requirement Implementation problems  
 
3.2.1. Access control to premises and designated areas in order to 
ensure that (air) cargo is secured 
 
- Some facilities do not easily lend themselves to 
securing, therefore cost elements in such premises are 
extensive 
- Privacy protection issues may arise 
- The human factor is difficult to manage 
- Very expensive and not always feasible for SME‟s 
- Additional cost as not taken into consideration at initial 
/ design stage of the building 
- Difficult to organise: open industrial estate with a lot of 
companies, people passing by, etc. 
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3.2.2. Screening of consignments for prohibited articles 
 
 
- High cost of equipment 
- Throughput issues 
- Lack of training material (TIP) for non-PAX 
- Sometimes difficult due to the nature of the 
consignment 
- Very expensive 
- Time consuming 
- Slows down the operation 
- Adequate controls would be effective, however there is 
a lack of proper guidance on how to perform the 
screening 
- Slows down the operation and organising screening 
„in-house‟ is extremely expensive (staff, equipment, 
etc.) 
- Ever since the equipment is in place, we face ongoing / 
daily visits from Customs. We are considered 
responsible for much more than before. Customs: “as 
you already have x-ray in place, you could easily look 
for other items than those targeted by AvSec 
regulations” 
 
 
3.2.3. Proper documentation of air cargo 
 
 
- Has no security value and can only be described as an 
assisting measure 
- Dependent on consignor acceptance and cooperation 
- Lack of knowledge from the side of the shipper 
- Poses a lot of problems, in most cases created by local 
government 
- Definition problem on who is the consignor from a 
legal point of view 
- Time consuming and thus leading to additional costs 
- Administrative burden but feasible 
 
 
3.2.4. Adequate verification of accompanying documentation 
 
 
- Has no security value 
- Dependent on consignor acceptance and cooperation 
- Lack of knowledge from the side of the shipper 
- Goods description is often very vague which does not 
facilitate the verification process 
- Operational burden but feasible 
 
 
3.2.5. Proper packaging / sealing of consignments of air cargo 
 
 
- If there is a terrorist on the RA premises, using the 
already existing consignment to carry an IED is 
unlikely 
- Complicated for implementation due to operational 
limitations (e.g. sealing ULD‟s) 
- Additional costs 
  
3.2.6. Adequate verification of packaging / sealing 
 
 
- Complicated for implementation due to operational 
limitations 
- Very complex for consolidated freight (i.e. multi pick-
up and delivery) 
 
 
3.2.7. Protection of known freight against unauthorized 
interference at all times 
 
 
- Some areas are under airport authorities‟ control and no 
authority nor capabilities to implement security there 
- The human factor is difficult to manage 
- Leads to additional costs 
 
 
 
3.2.8. Staff vetting / (pre-) employment screening 
 
 
- Moderate effect due to limited abilities to check 
information cross borders 
- Limitation on criminal and work history in some 
countries due to privacy laws. EU open borders 
causing limited capabilities to obtain information 
- Background check can be difficult to do if not resident 
in country for the whole 5 years 
- No access to the necessary information sources, „VOG‟ 
(= Dutch certificate of good conduct) is not sufficient 
- Cost issues 
- Better guidance and information is required, there is 
too much room for interpretation 
- Leads to additional costs 
- Administrative burden but feasible 
 
 
3.2.9. (Awareness) training of all relevant categories of staff 
 
 
- Large turnover in the transportation industry leads to 
additional costs 
- Availability of training (frequency) insufficient 
- Current frequency of refresher training is too high 
- Planning of training sessions and replacement of 
employees attending the training is difficult 
- Direct and indirect cost issues 
- Training contains too much theory and too little 
relevant practice 
- Completely useless, time consuming and costly 
- Implementation of e-learning difficult due to type of 
operation and variety of functions that require training 
(e.g. drivers, warehouse employees, etc.) 
 
 
3.2.10. Protection of consignments against unauthorized 
interference during transport 
 
 
- Not effective for (multiple) pick-up and delivery 
vehicles 
- Not always possible as we don‟t know what exactly 
happens on the road 
 - Human factor is difficult to manage 
- Difficult during loading / unloading periods as our 
driver is often not allowed to be present 
 
 
3.2.11. Locking of vehicles 
 
 
- Not effective for (multiple) pick-up and delivery 
vehicles 
- Routine leads to ease of conduct 
- Not always possible 
 
 
3.2.12. Sealing of vehicles 
 
 
- Not effective for (multiple) pick-up and delivery 
vehicles 
- Difficult for consolidated freight 
- Not always possible 
 
 
 
3.2.13. Identity check on persons delivering known freight 
 
 
- Requires training and expert knowledge on how to 
identify fraudulent documentation 
- Much bureaucracy 
- Conflicting regulations 
- Cost issues 
- Very difficult when the company on whose behalf the 
freight is being delivered, doesn‟t issue company 
badges: difficult to check whether the person 
delivering freight actually works for that company 
- People often feel reluctant to ask for the identity of 
another person / colleague 
- Requires qualified staff in order to be effective 
- Because of time pressure often limited to a „quick scan‟ 
instead of a proper check 
- Administrative burden but feasible 
 
 
A survey on implementation problems was also conducted amongst users of the TAPA 
(2007)  Freight Security Requirements. A self-completion questionnaire similar to the 
previous one (but specifically targeting the TAPA FSR) was sent to TAPA EMEA 
members via the Chairman of the organisation. Despite various reminders, only 7 
companies returned a completed questionnaire.  
 
 
 
 
 Key issue Examples of relevant requirements 
 
Quite a number of measures is identified as being (very) 
expensive to implement (from a purely financial point of view) 
 
 
- Alarm facility external doors and link to the main 
alarm system 
- Retain a minimum of 60 day records on system alarms 
- Install motion detection alarms inside warehouse and 
activate when the entire facility is vacated 
- Have a preventative maintenance plan in place to 
routinely test and service alarm systems 
- Monitor alarms 
- Restrict access to alarm systems 
- Provide 100% CCTV surveillance of Buyers‟ assets 
while in the facility of the supplier 
- Provide CCTV coverage of all external dock area 
- Provide CCTV external coverage of shipping and 
receiving yard, including entry/exit points, to cover 
movement of vehicles and individuals 
- Provide CCTV coverage of all exterior sides of the 
facility 
- Provide CCTV coverage of internal docks 
- Record CCTV images real-time 
- Retain CCTV recordings for a minimum of 30 days 
- Retain CCTV records in a secure storage area 
- Restrict access to CCTV system functions 
- Have a preventative maintenance plan in place for 
CCTV systems 
- Protect windows or other openings in warehouse walls 
and roof 
- Make sure that dock doors are of sufficient strength or 
design to prevent or delay forced entry by use of 
portable hand tools or ramming by vehicle 
- Make sure that exterior walls are designed to resist 
penetration by removing building fabric, cutting or 
ramming by vehicle 
- Provide a manned security monitoring post 24x7x365, 
secure from attack 
- Provide reinforced exit doors from warehouse (steel 
doors and frames or suitable alternative) 
- Protect ground floor warehouse windows by anti-ram 
 posts or other physical barriers 
- Provide a restricted-access, caged/vault area for assets 
on site more than 2 hours (high-grade security mesh, 
chain-link, or hard wall, including top/roof, alarmed, 
CCTV, controlled access) 
- Use solid-top, hard-sided trailers with locked cargo 
doors or reinforced soft-sided trailers 
- Keep dock doors illuminated at night (externally) 
- Provide internal and external lighting levels that 
support high quality CCTV images and recording 
- Provide flood lighting of enclosed loading / unloading 
areas 
- Install GPS or similar technology on all vehicles 
transporting Buyer‟s assets 
 
 
A number of implementation problems that were reported, relate 
to legal or privacy issues 
 
 
- Verification of identity and authorisation of drivers and 
crew at inbound checkpoint: some drivers issue 
complaints about ID‟s being copied and filed with the 
shipping documentation 
- Criminal history checks / pre-employment checks: 
governments do not reveal enough information and 
business has no legal ground to check certain aspects 
such as criminal history or no access to data sources 
- Performing exit searches on exit from secure areas: 
these are not always permitted by law or by works‟ 
council 
- Scheduled routing or GPS monitoring: drivers 
sometimes feel reluctant and see it as „an invasion on 
their freedom and privacy‟ and a „limitation on their 
freedom of movement‟. 
 
 
A number of problems relates to practicability issues, esthetical 
impact, commitment and availability 
 
 
- Building security: architects / developers of real estate 
do not always allow changes to the building plans. 
Often „the looks‟ are considered most important by 
architects 
- Identification/ID badges are often considered as „not 
popular‟ and it is very difficult to keep on convincing / 
reminding staff that they have to wear them 
- Enhanced lighting conditions often attract opposition 
from an environmental point of view (light and energy 
pollution) 
 - GPS on all vehicles often depends on availability: 
during busy seasons / periods it is not always possible 
to use trucks with GPS or similar technology 
 
 
Finally, one respondent points to the risk for „escalation of 
violence‟  
 
- Overt or covert escorts will not prevent „die hard 
criminals‟ from attacking a truck: “they will act with 
force when they think it is necessary” 
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